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Women all over the world face significant social, cultural, political, and economic
barriers that prevent them from obtaining leadership positions. Africa is no exception.
However, in the past four decades, Africa has shown a remarkable increase in the number
of women gaining political leadership positions, in particular as representatives in
parliaments. Due to this remarkable increase in the number of women in parliament in
africa, there is a dearth of literature exploring this phenomenon more systematically.
Most studies on women’s representation focus on the context of developed countries. The
few studies on the African continent are mostly single case studies that cannot be
generalized to a larger context. Any quantitative studies on the topic lack depth, in terms
of the number of countries and years covered and the ability to provide theoretical
explanations for the observed changes.
This study contributes to the current literature by analyzing changes in women’s
representation in African parliaments and by examining their major determinants, as well
as substantive impacts on public policies. Using time-series cross-sectional, panel data of
53 African countries over a period of 21 years from 1990 to 2010, the focus is on how
three broader sets of variables—political-institutional, contextual, and socioeconomic—

help explain the bases for the changes that most countries in Africa are experiencing in
women’s political representation.
Findings from multivariate analyses suggest that many political-institutional
factors such as gender quotas, multiparty elections, and proportional representation
electoral systems offer the most explanatory power for women’s representation generally,
whereas the key contextual factors, including internal conflicts and their magnitude, have
a significant impact on women’s representation at some regional levels. This study also
finds that an increase in women’s political representation results in an improvement in
the focus and substance of public policies operationalized, in terms of public
expenditures on health and education. This study highlights the contemporary African
experience with regard to how governments and women’s movements can help increase
women’s representation in parliaments, and how the individual countries can sustain the
current trend of such increasing newfound representation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In the past four decades, Africa has seen a dramatic increase in the number of
women as elected representatives in parliaments (IPU, 2013; Tripp, 2004). Between 1990
and 2010 for example, the number of women legislators on average, more than doubled
from 8 percent to 18.5 percent, which is slightly below the world average of 20.2 percent
(IPU, 2013). The largest increase was between 1990 and 2003 when the number of seats
held by women rose from eight percent to 14.3 percent (Tripp, 2004, p. 1). Since 1990,
Africa has maintained a steady increase in the number of women in parliaments.
Advocates for increased women’s representation argue that it is important to include
women in leadership because women representatives tend to advocate for public policies
that advance the welfare of women. The inclusion of women representatives in
parliament is good for Africa because women have openly opposed corrupt and
repressive regimes hence facilitating the movement towards democracy in Africa. In
addition, the inclusion of more women in parliaments in Africa may help shift the
percentage of country budgets, which are largely spent on defense towards more social
and economic policies.
What is remarkable about this change is that it has been achieved in a continent
where historically women were deliberately excluded from formal leadership and public
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policy making positions and where women continue to lag behind in a number of socioeconomic indicators (Bauer and Britton, 2006; Tripp, 2004). Nowhere in the world has
the rate of increase in the political representation of women been as fast as in SubSaharan Africa (Tripp, 2004; Bauer & Britton, 2006). A case in point is Rwanda where in
October 2003 the percentage of female representation rose from 25.7 percent to 48.8
percent replacing Sweden as a country with the highest percentage of female
representation in parliament in the world (; Longman, 2006; Powley, 2005). Rwanda is
not alone in sub-Saharan Africa; several countries such as South Africa, Mozambique,
Angola, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania have surpassed the critical mass of 30 percent
women’s representation (IPU 2013).
While Africa has made tremendous progress in electing women to parliament
there are two main questions that remain unanswered. Firstly, the reasons for the rapid
increase in women’s representation in Africa are not well understood. Research on the
factors affecting women’s representation has mainly focused on advanced industrialized
countries and accounts of women’s representation in these countries have failed to
explain the situation in Africa (Matland 1998; Rule, 1987; Hughes, 2009). Research on
women’s representation in advanced industrialized countries argues that social and
structural factors are the major determinants of women’s representation (Reynolds,
1999). However, studies that included developing countries in their analysis noted that
social and structural factors were not significant predictors of women’s representation in
developing countries (Matland 1998, Paxton and Kunovich 2003). In addition most
studies on women representation in Africa are based on single case studies whose
findings are limited in that they are focused on a few countries mainly in East and
2

Southern Africa and as such they do not represent what is happening in the whole of
Africa (Tamale, 2000; Geisler, 2000; Britton, 2006; Bauer, 2004; Goetz, 2002). In
addition, findings from single case studies are limited in that they cannot be generalized
to a wider population (Tripp & Kang, 2008). Yoon’s (2001 and 2004) are the only crossnational quantitative research on women’s representation in Africa; however his studies
included only countries that held democratic elections between 1990 and 2001 and
explored the same socioeconomic and structural factors used in previous studies. In this
paper, I include all African countries thus expanding the number of cases. What is clear
in all these studies is that there is a need for an explicit examination of women’s
representation in Africa which explor explanations of women’s incorporation that are
specific to Africa.
Secondly it is not clear how effective are the women elected to parliament in
influencing public policy that advance the welfare of women. One of the main arguments
for electing women to parliament is that the interests of women are better represented by
women. The inclusion of women in parliament may symbolize the shift in the priorities
of voters towards issues traditionally associated with women. As such, men will be
encouraged to support women’s issues that they would normally ignore. However, some
researchers argue that the methods being used to elect women to parliament such as
gender quotas hinder the effectiveness of women to make substantive policy changes that
improve the welfare of women (Goetz, 2002; Tinker, 2004). Others argue that it is the
patriarchal nature of parliament that prevents women from making policy changes in
parliament. In order to answer these questions there is a need to understand the factors
that are driving women’s representation in Africa.
3

Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study is to examine how and why the representation of
women in parliament in Africa has increased since 1990 and what it means for the
influence of women parliamentarians in policymaking. In this paper, I examine both the
numerical and the substantive representation of women in Africa. I also explore the
similarities and differences in women’s representation across African countries and over
time. Specifically I focus on the socio-political institutions that shape the evolving
context of women’s leadership and political participation. I start by examining the factors
that affect the numbers of women in parliaments in Africa. Secondly, I examine the
extent to which female members of parliament have been able to influence public policy
to favor the interests of women.
I chose the start year of 1990 because there is available data from that year and
because of the significant events that occurred around that time which affected the rise of
women’s representation in Africa. The year of 1990 is unique in that it marks the
beginning of the second wave of democratization in Africa and most countries were
coming out of long and devastating internal conflicts.
In this study, I make use of comparative quantitative research design. I make use
of secondary data drawn from publicly available sources. The aim of the study is to get a
better understanding of what happened in Africa in the past 20 years that led to the rapid
increase of women in parliament and to conduct a preliminary examination of what the
women have achieved so far in terms of policy outcomes. The potential drivers of
women’s representation in Africa include socioeconomic factors, such as women’s access
to education and health and level of economic development; political institutional factors,
4

such as electoral systems, gender quotas, and regime types; contextual factors, such as
women’s movements, international and transnational organizations and gatherings, and
internal conflict; and cultural factors that include the role of religion and perception of
voters on women in parliament. A better understanding of the phenomenon can also help
push the feminist agenda forward and sustain the impetus of women’s representation
currently going on in Africa.
Limitations of the Study
This study is limited to 53 independent African countries. I do not include South Sudan
because it came into existence after 2010, which is the cutoff point for the period under
study. The study is limited to data collected from 1990 to 2010. There are several data
limitations because of the use of quantitative methodology and the use of secondary data.
There is no available data on some determinants of women’s representation in Africa
such as party ideology and different types of Christianity and as such, these variables
could not be used in the analysis. Furthermore, the study does not fully account for some
specific contextual and historical factors that are unique in each country that drive
women’s representation in Africa. Some of these contextual factors cannot be captured in
a quantitative study; they can only be studied using qualitative methods. To account for
this limitation I include a few contextual variables such as type conflict and international
linkages. Substantive representation of women is measured through both policy outcomes
and policy process. However, because of limited data and the use of quantitative
methodology this study is limited to outcomes only in the form of public expenditure on
health and education and does not examine the impact of women’s representation on the
process of policy change. I also use public expenditure on health and education only as
5

measures of public policies outcomes that are influenced by the presence of female
representatives in parliament.
Delimitations
Women’s representation is not limited to women in parliaments only. Women are
represented in several sectors of government such as local government and government
ministries, and outside government in civic organizations. However, in this paper
women’s representation is limited to women representatives in parliaments only. As such,
I am not able to capture the impact of women’s representation at local levels, which
might be at higher levels than national parliaments. It is most probable that there are more
women representatives at local government levels than at national government level;
however, there is limited data available on women’s representation at local level in
Africa.
Significance of the Study
This study is important to expand our knowledge on the topic of female
representation in parliament. The study contributes to the ongoing discourse on women’s
representation by focusing on factors that affect women’s representation in Africa, thus
filling the gap in the existing literature primarily focused on advanced industrialized
democracies. An understanding of women’s representation in the African context may
help understand factors driving women’s representation in developing countries. There is
a lack of comprehensive cross-national quantitative studies on women’s representation in
Africa or other developing countries. This study takes the form of panel data analysis,
which examines the changes in women’s representation across countries and over time.
One explanation for this lack of cross-national studies in developing countries is that in
6

the past there were problems of limited available data (Hughes, 2009). This problem has
since been rectified because of the existence of publicly available sources of data; hence
making it easy to conduct such studies. In addition, this study makes the first attempt at
examining the impact of women representatives in parliament on policy changes that
affect the welfare of women in Africa. There are no cross-national studies that have
examined this substantive representation of women at a national level in Africa.
This study contributes to literature by expanding the number of cases to include
53 independent African countries. In addition to the socioeconomic, political, and cultural
factors, this study examines factors that have been identified in literature as relevant and
unique to the African context such as prolonged conflict, regime type, and presence of
International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs). By increasing the number of
cases and factors that affect women’s representation, this study enhances the scope of
previous findings. Another contribution of this study is that it goes beyond crosssectional studies, which may not show the variation over time and uses panel data over a
twenty-year period (1990 to 2010). Thus in this study I make use of a more complete set
of improved variable measures, a larger sample, and current data to improve upon
previous research.
The understanding from this study can go a long way to help women in Africa
who aspire to become political leaders. One of the goals of the United Nations, which is
one of the most recognized and respected international organization in the world, is to
promote women leadership in all areas of life including politics. The findings of this
study can help further this goal because governments interested in promoting women’s
representation will have an understanding of what drives women’s representation in
7

Africa. Findings from this study can also benefit policy makers so that they can put in
place public policies that will help women participate in politics. Findings from the study
can also help local women movements, and INGOS who are also interested in promoting
women’s representation. I also provide suggestions for further research, which can help
fellow researchers who are interested in researching on women in parliament.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This Chapter reviews related literature on women’s representation in parliaments.
Women’s representation is taken to mean the relative size of women in national
parliaments. On the other hand, women’s substantive representation means the ability of
women to influence public policy in parliament. It is important to note that women’s
movements fought for the increase in numbers of women in parliament not just for the
sake of numbers, but to ensure that women’s interests are promoted and protected under
law (Bauer, 2004; Tinker, 2004). Thus, women’s representation is judged by both the
number of women in parliaments as well as their substantive impact on public policy.
The review is organized under four sections. In the first section, I examine the
concept of women’s representation and trace its history and how it has affected the
discourse of women’s representation in Africa. In the second section, I explore the
theoretical discourse on women’s representation. In this section, I explore the various
theories put forward to explain the changes in women’s representation. I also examine the
complex nature of the discourse of women’s representation in Africa. In the third section,
I explore in detail the various factors, which explain the rise of women’s representation in
parliament in Africa. These factors fall under four headings: political institutional
mechanisms, socioeconomic factors, cultural factors, and contextual factors. Lastly, I
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explore how well women in parliaments are pushing forward women’s causes. Although
I understand that the rise of women in parliament is recent in most African countries and
not much time has passed to effectively measure their impact, it is still necessary to
examine their preliminary impact so far.
History of Women’s Representation
The idea of women’s representation in parliament is a relatively new phenomenon
in the history of women’s movements. As recently as 1890, women did not have the right
to vote anywhere in the world let alone running for office. New Zealand was the first
country to grant suffrage to women in 1893 and Finland became the first country to elect
a female member of parliament in 1907 (Paxton, Hughes, & Green 2006; Reynolds
1999). Women had to fight for suffrage first before even thinking about representation.
Women’s movements began with a few organizations in western nations during the late
1800s and have since spread all over the world (Paxton, Hughes, & Green 2006). The
discourse of international women’s movements began with women’s suffrage.
International women’s movements for a long time focused on getting women the right to
vote. As more and more countries awarded women the right to vote, the discourse of
international women’s movement changed to promoting the welfare of women.
In the early 20th century, international women’s movements fought for education,
employment, and property ownership rights (Paxton, Hughes, & Green 2006). In the
1970s women began to talk about equal rights between men and women and the inclusion
of women in parliament (Paxton, Hughes, & Green 2006; Hughes, 2009). The 1970s saw
an explosion of women’s nongovernmental organizations (WINGO) which also helped to
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push the agenda of women’s representation (Tripp, 2001a). To push for this agenda,
international women’s movements worked together with the United Nations (UN)
The UN was very instrumental in spreading international norms and it responded
to women’s movements by hosting international women conferences and declaring 1975
to 1985 the decade for women (Paxton, Hughes, & Green, 2006). The theme of the 1980
UN Second World Women’s Conference was about too few women in decision-making
positions. The 1995 Beijing conference decided on generating the 30 percent critical
mass for women in parliament (Paxton, Hughes, & Green 2006). Thus, the discourse of
international women’s movements after 1995 did not only advocate for affirmative action
practices to increase women’s representation, but also stressed the critical mass of 30
percent (Tripp, 2001a; Hughes, 2009).
Before 1990, Africa was trailing behind other regions of the world in terms of
women’s representation. In other parts of the world such as Western Europe and the
Scandinavian countries, there was a gradual growth in women’s representation. The
history of women’s movements in Africa can help explain this trend. Most modern
African countries are relatively new. Ethiopia and Liberia are the only two countries
recognized as independent states prior to 1950 and most countries only gained their
independence since 1960 (Marshal, 2005). The first wave of women’s movements in
Africa began when women mobilized to fight for their countries’ independence from
colonial rule (Tripp, 2001a). At first women were not allowed to fight in the armies but as
the wars dragged on women were recruited in the armies of liberation. Women’s
movements at this time were concerned with the liberation struggle and not the
emancipation of women. The women who fought in wars of liberation thought that
11

women’s emancipation will come with independence but they were wrong (Geisler,
2000). Their only reward was the right to vote which all women in Africa gained at
independence.
After independence, several African governments contained the political power of
women to the women’s league a wing of the ruling party (Geisler, 2006; Bauer, 2004).
For women who had fought side by side with men, their only political space became
these ruling parties’ wing for women and a few women who were appointed as token
representation (Bauer & Britton 2006). Thus for countries that got their independence in
the 1970s and 1980s women were not able to realize any gains for their efforts during the
liberation struggle (Geisler, 1995). Instead, women had to watch men taking over all
major political leadership positions, which women had also fought for (Geisler, 1995).
The party affiliated women’s leagues were formed primarily to serve the interests
of the ruling party (Tripp, 2001b). The women’s leagues were usually led by the
president’s wife or the wives and sisters of prominent government officials. These
women’s branches of ruling parties were sometimes reduced to serving in celebratory
functions. For example in Malawi female members of the League were required to be
present at all official functions, dressed in party uniforms, singing and dancing in praise
of the president (Gilman, 2001; Semu, 2002). The women’s league co-opted older, less
educated, and conservative women, whose interest was to safeguard the traditional
patriarchal culture of the government (Geisler, 1987; 2006; Tripp, 2001a). As a result, the
women’s leagues were unable to fight forcefully for women’s interests if these interests
were against the priorities of the ruling party (Tripp, 2001a).
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The strategy to confine women to the political wing of the ruling party worked to
discourage women from participating in formal politics because women who wanted to
promote women’s interests turned away from politics. The women who had fought in the
war and had experienced freedom from patriarchal culture felt isolated from the new
governments that came into power after gaining independence. The women’s league was
not interested in changing laws that affect women. In most countries women did not have
land or property rights, they had no access to education and could not participate in
economic activities (Geisler, 2006). The enlightened young, educated, professional
women realized the plight of women and were determined to change the laws that
oppressed women. They lost hope in formal politics to solve their problems hence they
pursued their agenda in the thriving Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) sector
(Geisler, 1995).
The dismal track record of political parties in representing women’s interests
produced a tradition of antipathy to political parties by women’s movements in Africa
and around the world (Goetz, 2002). International women’s movements were focusing on
improving the social and economic status of women by setting up NGOs for women in
the newly independent countries of Africa (Hughes 2009). Thus, there was no expectation
for women to participate in formal politics during this time (Geisler, 2006). For some
time women were happy to pursue their interests via NGOs. Countries that tried to
promote women representation at this time were not successful. Cases in point are Ghana
and Egypt. Ghana introduced eight percent quota in 1960 but only lasted until 1965
(Tripp 2004). Egypt introduced reserved seats in 1979 and was abolished in 1986 (AbouZeid, 2004). In Zimbabwe after pressure from women, the government set up a ministry
13

of Community Development and Women’s Affairs in 1981. However, the ministry was
not successful because they could not introduce or amend laws in parliament (Geisler,
1995).
The post 1990 discourse of women’s movements in Africa began to shift towards
inclusion of women in parliament. Several explanations have been put forward to explain
this change. Firstly, it is noted that as the discourse of the international women’s
movements changed so did the discourse of local women’s movements in Africa (Tripp,
2001b). By 1990, the discourse of international women’s movements was very clear
about women’s representation and had put in place mechanisms to help women be
elected to parliament (Paxton, Hughes, & Green, 2006). International women’s
movements and IWNGOs helped local women’s movements in Africa by providing funds
to support women’s political activities. These donor funds supported women’s efforts to
participate in formal politics by funding various programs for female parliamentarians
(Tripp, 2001b).
Because of the support from international women ’s movements in the early
1990s, nonpartisan women’s organizations were formed across Africa to tackle various
issues that affected women (Tripp, 2001b). In Madagascar, women’s NGOs began to
emerge in the early 1990s, including associations like Femmes Entrepreneurs, Femmes
Juristes, and Femmes Artisanes, which promoted economic independence of women
(Tripp, 2001a). In Tanzania, there was a proliferation of networking organizations and
women’s coalitions such as the Tanzania Association of Nongovernmental Organizations
and the Tanzania Greater Networking Program.

These autonomous women’s

associations advanced bold new programs, which also included getting women elected to
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parliament (Tripp, 2001a). In Zambia, a nonpartisan National Women’s Lobby Group
(NWLG) was formed in 1991 for increasing the representation of women in decisionmaking positions in government and political parties (Geisler, 1995; 2006). The NWLG
encouraged women to compete in local elections and provided assistance to interested
female candidates of all party affiliations running for office in 1992 and 1997 (Tripp,
2001a; Yoon, 2008).
There are notable events that occurred in Africa that also influenced women to
start demanding political representation. The deepening economic crisis in most countries
in Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s created opportunities for women to enter into
politics (Geisler, 2006). The economic crisis weakened the informal patronage networks
that largely controlled formal politics in Africa thus paving a way for women to run for
office (Tripp, 2001a). Women showed their dissatisfaction with the economic crisis by
protesting against their governments. For example in Guinea, women organized a sit-in in
front of the presidential palace in Conakry, to protest against the country’s economic
crisis (Tripp, 2001a). In Mali, women demonstrated against President Moussa Traoré
whom they blamed for the economic hardships of the country. These demonstrations
contributed to the downfall of President Moussa Traoré’s (Tripp, 2001a).
Another event in Africa that facilitated increased women’s representation in
parliament was the second wave of democracy in Africa. The second wave, which began
in the early 1990s, was the beginning of a new liberation for women (Bauer, 2004). This
second wave of democracy occurred in two ways. There was a move by most countries in
the 1990s from one-party state to multi-party state and several countries were coming out
of severe political conflict (Tripp, 2001b; Geisler, 2006). Before 1990, only six countries
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out of 53 had maintained multiparty elections (Yoon, 2001). Currently about 49 countries
in Africa have multi-party elections (Africa Election Database, 2013). The move to
multiparty elections created competition between the ruling parties and the new
opposition parties. One of the strategies used by most ruling parties was to include
women on party lists to appeal to women voters (Yoon, 2001). Women were also
appointed to leadership positions within both the ruling and opposition parties. For
example, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy an opposition party in Zambia
promised gender equality and appealed to professional women to become active members
of the party (Geisler, 2006).
Women also capitalized on this transition from one party state to multiparty state
by forming their own political parties. In Zimbabwe Margaret Dongo an ex-combatant
formed the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats in 1999. In Lesotho Limakatso Ntakatsane
formed the Kopanang Basotho party in 1992 (Tripp, 2001a). In Zambia Inonge
Mbikusita-Lewanika founded the National Party in 1991. In Kenya, Central Africa
Republic, and Angola women led political parties. Although these parties failed to get
women elected to president, they paved the way and acted as role models for other
women to get interested in politics (Tripp, 2001a).
Botswana is one of the few countries that had multiparty elections since their
independence in 1966, but women were completely excluded from politics (Geisler,
2006). Women in Botswana came together beginning of 1994 after a threat by the
government to make changes to the constitution that would further restrict women’s
freedom (Geisler, 2006). A women’s civic group called Emang Basidi (Stand up Women)
was formed to help women candidates get elected to parliament (Geisler, 2006). The
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civic group was able to add five women to parliament in 1994 but lost not them in the
1998 elections (Geisler, 2006).
In addition to the move from one party to multiparty elections, beginning in the
1990s several African countries were coming out of political conflict and transitioning to
democracy (Yoon, 2004). A few countries such as South Africa and Namibia also gained
their independence in the early 1990s. Women who participated in these conflicts fared
better than before because after 1990 there was a strong discourse of women’s
representation among international women’s movements and IWNGOs. African women
also benefited from the lessons learnt during the first wave of democracy (Bauer, 2004;
Geisler, 2006). The countries that gained independence after 1990 and those that came
out of conflict around the same time had an advantage of a favorable environment, which
supported women’s representation (Hughes, 2009). Countries such as South Africa,
Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Eritrea were able to negotiate new constitutions friendly to
women during the transition process. They were also able to negotiate new electoral laws
that enhance women’s representation such as list PR and gender quotas (Britton, 2006;
Longman, 2006; Hale, 2001a). Women’s movements also benefited from direct
intervention by the international community through the UN Resolution 1325 of October
2000, which called on member states to ensure women’s participation in post-conflict
regimes (Krook, 2006).
Once women decided to get into formal politics, they employed various strategies
to get women elected to parliament. They formed women’s coalition groups to lobby
governments and political parties to take action to include women in party politics.
Through these women’s organizations, they lobbied for the adoption of gender quotas,
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they offered capacity building to potential female candidates; they educated voters to vote
for women, and raised campaign funds for women candidates (Geisler, 2006; Tripp,
2001a; Bauer, 2004; Goetz, 2002).
Theoretical Discourse on Women’s Representation
Research on women’s representation identifies two discourses: the incremental
track and the fast track to women’s parliamentary representation (Dahlerup &
Freidenvall, 2005). Figure 1 shows Rwanda and Denmark as examples of the differences
in the two tracks. Figure 1.1 shows the gradual increase in women’s representation in
Denmark, which represents the incremental track, and the sharp increase in women’s
representation in Rwanda especially from the year 2003 to 2010 and Rwanda represents
the fast track. Through the incremental track, it took Scandinavian countries 70 years to
reach 30 percent women’s representation in parliament. Women in Africa and other parts
of the world are not willing to wait that long to get representation. The incremental track
represented by Scandinavian countries proposes that equal representation takes a long
time and is achieved as the country develops socially and economically (Dahlerup &
Freidenvall, 2005). The incremental track argues that the lack of resources for women
and ingrained prejudices against women prevents women from gaining access to
parliament. Thus, the main barriers to women representation can be removed by
increasing women’s resources through education, participation in the labor force, and
providing social welfare to women (Dahlerup, 2005).
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Figure 1.1: Women in Parliament in Denmark and Rwanda from 1990 to 2010

Another way to increase women’s representation under the incremental track is
through lobbying and educating political parties so that they include women on party lists
(Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005).
On the other hand, the fast track model, which is represented by Africa and Latin
America, argues that the main barriers to women’s representation are the formal and
informal discrimination against women (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005). Thus, the only
way to get women elected to parliament is by taking active actions that will force
political parties and governments to include women in parliament (Bauer, 2004; Tripp,
2004). Such active measures include the adoption of gender quotas particularly legal
candidate quotas and reserved seats (Tripp and Kang, 2008). Latin America pioneered the
adoption of legal gender quotas. Argentina was the first country to adopt legislative
gender quotas in 1991 (Zetterberg, 2009). African countries are using quotas as a fast
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track method to increase women’s representation. Women outside the parliament are
lobbying for the adoption of quotas to rapidly increase the number of female members of
parliament. Countries with very few women in parliament are witnessing historical leaps
in women’s representation. A case in point is South Africa where they managed to elect
26 percent women to parliament in their first democratic election in 1994 (Britton, 2006;
Geisler, 2000). South Africa achieved these results because of a strong women’s
movement, which lobbied for the adoption of voluntary gender quotas and a proportional
representation system of government (Britton, 2006; Geisler, 2000).
The main advantage of the fast track model is that it is fast and can overcome the
barriers that traditionally prevented women from getting to parliament. However, some
researchers argue that women who have been elected or appointed to parliament through
the fast track model have not been able to achieve substantive results because they lack a
constituency base (Tinker, 2004). Researchers also question the sustainability of
women’s representation after gender quotas (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). A case in
point is Uganda where women have thrived under President Museveni without a
democratic system to support them (Goetz, 2010). Women in parliament in Uganda are
elected by an electoral council and as such, they do not have a voting constituency. One
wonders if the women will fare the same after President Museven’s rule ends (Goetz,
2010).The gradual election of women through the incremental track was important in that
it ensured credibility of women elected to parliament and it also removed some of the
obstacles preventing women’s substantive representation (Dahlerup, 2005). There is need
for empirical research to test these hypotheses about the incremental track and this study
hopes to do that.
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The rise of women’s representation in Africa is difficult to explain because
research in this field is dominated by models designed to explain the incremental track.
The main factors in these models include education for women, women’s participation in
the labor force, and provision of social welfare necessities to women (Dahlerup, 2005;
Hughes, 2009). However the fast track discourse advocate for active measures such as
adoption of quotas and electoral laws to increase women representation (Bauer, 2004;
Tripp, 2004). In the fast track model, institutional changes are seen as the way to promote
women’s representation while the incremental model views capacity building and party’s
responsibilities to recruit more women as the major factors that help increase women’s
representation (Dahlerup, 1998, 2005; Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005). While these
factors have some impact in the African experience, they fail to adequately explain the
experiences in Africa (Chen, 2010). In Africa the percentage of women in parliament
rose rapidly even in countries that were so behind economically and socially. Countries
that have very low GDP, very low women literacy rates, very poor health facilities, and
have nondemocratic governments are leading in the numbers of women in parliament
(Tripp & Kang, 2008; Hughes, 2009). Thus, previous models on women representation
are not sufficient to explain the phenomenon in Africa.
In addition to socioeconomic factors, existing research identifies a number of key
factors that might help explain the rapid increase of women in parliaments in Africa.
These factors include the transition from prolonged political instability, the manipulation
of the electoral system, explicit affirmative action interventions such as gender-based
electoral quotas, the ideological orientation of the major political parties and the pressure
exerted on them by women’s movements, and the pressure exerted by the international
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community particularly on the post-conflict countries (Tripp, 2004; Hughes, 2009;
Tamale, 2004, Paxton, Hughes, & Green, 2006). These factors are discussed in detail in
the section below. However, what is important to note is how these factors are
interconnected and how they work in a complex way to augment women’s representation
in Africa.
According to the world polity theory, which is a system of thinking that
emphasizes the world as a unit of analysis; social change is a result of external social and
ideological forces that influence local decisions (Krook, 2006). Thus, the demand for
women’s representation around the world can be explained by the increasing
interconnectedness through international organizations and international gatherings.
There is evidence that international organizations and international gatherings helped
women’s movements in Africa. According to Krook (2006), international and regional
organizations and transnational actors spread global norms through imposition,
emulation, and tipping (Krook, 2006). Beginning with the 1985 UN Nairobi conference
women movements in Africa began to demand representation. Southern Africa
Development Council (SADC) established a regional Bureau for women of the SADC
member states in 1985 (Geisler, 1995). In Uganda, women went to President Museveni
and demanded that women be included in decision-making process of the government in
1986 (Tamale, 2004). In Tanzania 15 seats were reserved for women in 1985 (Yoon,
2008). After the Beijing conference of 1995, women’s movements in Africa began to
demand and lobby for gender-based quotas as a way to increase women’s representation.
The support of international organizations such as the UN added legitimacy and
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credibility to the message of women’s representation in Africa (Paxton, Hughes, & Green
2006; Krook, 2006).
Some researchers posit that the idea of women’s representation is based on the
premise of demand and supply (Hughes, 2009). Socioeconomic factors such as access to
education, access to better health, and participation in the labor force help to prepare
qualified women who are willing to run for office, thus affecting the supply side (Hughes,
2009). On the other hand, institutional factors such as electoral laws, political parties, and
level of democracy create the demand for women in parliament (Hughes, 2009).
Institutional factors create a need for women candidates there by forcing political parties
to look for qualified women candidates who are usually available (Matland, 2005).
Cultural factors on the other hand work both ways. They can affect both supply and
demand. The negative perception of society on women leaders can hinder women from
running for office thus reducing supply. At the same time, negative perceptions on
women can prevent voters from voting for women thus affecting the demand side
(Hughes, 2009). Thus, both the supply and demand factors work together to enhance
women’s representation.
The influence of these institutional factors also varies from country to country
because their effectiveness depends on various circumstances. For example, gender
quotas do not always work to increase women’s representation (Htun, 2005). The effects
of gender quotas depend in part on the type of quota, the specifications of the law,
enforcement of sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of the law, and commitment of party
elites (Ballington 2004; Dahlerup, 2005; Htun, 2005; Krook, 2008). The effectiveness of
gender quotas also depends on the electoral system in place. List PR system is argued to
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be the most favorable with voluntary gender quotas. However, recent developments in
developing countries show that for countries with plurality/majority electoral systems
reserved seats maybe the best way to increase women’s representation (Tripp and Kang,
2008). Furthermore, there are certain conditions that make countries adopt quotas. Most
of the countries that have adopted quotas in Africa recently came out of conflict and were
able to negotiate new constitutions and electoral laws that benefit women (Tripp, 2004;
Hughes, 2009). This transition to democracy helped women because they took advantage
of the competition between political parties to push for more women’s representation.
Political elites adopted voluntary quotas in order to compete with rival parties (Tripp,
2004). Thus, no single factor explains the new trends in women’s representation in
Africa; rather, it takes a combination of factors to get women elected to parliament.
Factors Affecting Women’s Representation in Africa
This section explores in detail the various factors that explain women’s
representation in Africa. These factors fall into four main categories; political
institutional mechanisms, socioeconomic factors, cultural factors, and contextual factors.
Political Institutional Mechanisms
Political institutional mechanisms can be defined as techniques of doing
something that are incorporated into a well-established system (Matland, 2005).
Institutional mechanisms go beyond organizations and include socio-political institutions
that are engrained in society such as rules, laws, and society’s expectations. In this case,
institutional mechanisms are the various methods integrated in government systems that
promote women’s representation. These political institutional mechanisms include
electoral systems, political parties, level of democracy and regime types (Matland, 2005;
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Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008). Research shows that institutional factors are important
in that they shape the rules of the political game, which have been dominated by men (
Shvedova, 2006). Thus, one way to pull women into politics is to manipulate institutional
mechanisms so that they can favor women. Research has shown that manipulation of
institutional factors is one of the major reasons behind the increased representation of
women in Africa (Tripp, 2004, Yoon, 2004, Matland & Taylor, 1997). One explanation
why countries with poor socioeconomic conditions have managed to increase
representation of women in parliament is by employing institutional mechanisms. This
section examines the various institutional mechanisms that influenced the augmentation
of women’s representation in parliament.
Electoral Systems
Electoral systems are defined as the rules and structures that govern the electoral
process (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008). Electoral systems translate the votes cast in an
election to the number of legislators in parliament. Electoral systems determine who is
elected, how a campaign is run, and the role of political parties in the electoral process.
There are three key variables of the electoral systems, which include the electoral
formula, the ballot structure, and the district magnitude. The electoral formula can be
either plurality/majority, proportional, or a mixture of the two. The ballot structure
determines whether the people votes for a candidate or a party (open or closed lists). The
district magnitude is the number of legislatures that can be elected in a district (Matland,
2005; Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008).
In many parts of the world, the electoral system has influenced the ability of
women to rise to political leadership positions because electoral systems can be
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engineered to take into account historical and social conditions of a country. For example
in Africa post conflict countries have opted for the proportional representation system
(PR) so as to address ethnic differences during the conflict period and also to advance
women to political leadership positions. The electoral system is crucial to electing
women to power because unlike changing the culture and perspectives of voters on
women it is much easier to change the electoral system and laws thereby making it easier
to promote women’s representation (Matland, 2005; Htun, 2005; Rule, 1994). Depending
on the type of electoral system votes cast can be translated into dramatically different
results.
There are three main types of electoral systems in Africa, which include
plurality/majority, proportional representation (PR), and mixed systems. There are also
three countries, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Somalia, and Eritrea, which have no provisions
for direct elections (IDEA, 2013). In Somalia, people are appointed to the House of the
People by traditional leaders. In Eritrea, there is no central government since their
independence in 1997 (African Election Database, 2013).
The party-list proportional representation (List-PR) system is a system in which
each party gets a proportion of seats in parliament in relation to the proportion of the vote
it gets during the election. The rationale for the PR system is to ensure that the party’s
share of the votes is proportional to the party’s share of the seats in parliament. PR
system requires multi-member districts where the numbers of candidates elected in a
single district are more than one (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008). The PR system has
several advantages, which also favor the election of women to the legislature. In this
system, no votes are wasted, it produces a representative legislature, which may include
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women and minority parties, and it leads to a greater continuity and stability of policy
(Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008).
Some major drawbacks of List-PR are that there are no constituencies because
voters vote for a party, not for candidates (Gouws, 2008; Tinker, 2004). The PR system
also favors the creation of coalition governments, which may lead to legislative gridlock.
The PR system may also facilitate the election of extremist parties. However, despite
these drawbacks the PR system has been identified as the best electoral system that can
lead to the election of women into parliament (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008; Dahlerup,
2002).
The PR system favors the election of women candidates because political parties
have the incentive to put women on party lists to appeal to women voters. Researchers
have observed that PR electoral systems with closed lists and high district magnitudes
work well with gender quotas (Caul 1999; Htun, 2000; Krook, 2007) In countries with
the PR electoral system there is a greater chance that women will be elected three to four
times more than in other electoral systems (Shvedova, 2006). The high presence of
women in parliaments in the Nordic countries is largely attributed to the proportional
representation system of elections (Dahlerup, 2002; Caul, 1999).
Another advantage of PR system with closed lists is that each party controls the
placement of candidates on the party lists, and voters vote for a party, not for a candidate.
The quantity of votes received by each party determines the number of candidates elected
from the list (Tinker, 2004). As a result, candidates from the same party campaign
together at election time to maximize votes for their party. In an open-list system, by
contrast, voters exercise preference vote where they select individual candidates, not
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entire party. The number of votes received by each candidate individually determines
who wins a seat (Tinker, 2004; Tripp, 2004; Piscopo, 2005). As a result, elections involve
competition within each party for preference votes in addition to competition across
parties. In general, preference-voting systems work to the disadvantage of women
candidates who are less well known and have fewer resources to finance their campaigns
(Htun, 2000).
Proportional representation is more favorable to women than pluralitymajoritarian systems or semi proportional system because political parties can manipulate
the slate of candidates in proportional representation. Ballington (2004) documents that in
2004 all but two of the fifteen countries with the highest rates of women’s representation
in the world used proportional representation and 15 percent with lowest rates were using
popularity-majority systems. Lindberg (2004) corroborates that the more proportional the
system is, the higher the number of women in parliament. Diffusion of ideas from party
to party is more likely to happen under proportional representation. In PR system unlike
majority systems the number of votes corresponds to the percentage of seats, thus, there
is always more than one winner in each district. This difference between single member
and multimember districts makes the PR system more favorable to women candidates
than any other electoral system (Matland, 2005; Bauer, 2004).
In South Africa, the party list proportional representation system was instrumental
in electing more women to parliament in their first democratic election in 1994 (Goetz
&Hassim, 2003; Gouws, 2008; Britton, 2006). Gouws (2008) describes the use of a
proportional list system as a women-friendly electoral system, however, she is quick to
point out that the PR system in general, and South Africa in particular suffers from lack
28

of accountability to voters. The PR system alienates elected officials from their
constituencies because the candidates become loyal to party officials who have the power
to draw up the list at the expense of voters’ interests (Tripp, 2006, 2004; Britton, 2006).
As a result, women in parliament are not able to make policy changes that favor women
unless those changes are supported by the party elites (Goetz, 1998).
One question that needs an answer is why some countries adopt the proportional
representation system and others do not? In Africa, most countries adopted the
proportional representation system as a mechanism to allow fair representation to
competing parties divided by ethnic, regional, and racial lines (Bauer & Britton, 2006).
PR system does not benefit women only but also minority ethnic groups who were
underprivileged during the period of conflict. Hence its popularity among post conflict
countries that fought long internal wars such as Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leon,
Rwanda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Angola, and South Africa (Yoon, 2004; Reynolds,
Reilly, & Ellis, 2008).
The main plurality/majority system is the first past the post (FPTP) which is a
simple electoral system because the candidate with the most votes is the winner of the
election. Voters have to choose one candidate from the list of nominees and whoever gets
the highest number of votes wins the election. The FPTP system uses a single member
district and the voting is candidate-centered and not party centered. In Africa 15 countries
mostly former British colonies use this system (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008; IPU,
2013). Advantages of the FPTP system are that it is simple, it holds candidates
accountable to the voters and not the party, and it excludes extremist parties (Reynolds,
Reilly, & Ellis, 2008). On the other hand, the FPTP system is often criticized for
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excluding smaller parties in parliament; it does not allow for a representative
government, it also excludes minorities and women (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008).
FPTP discourages the election of women to parliament because only one member is
elected from each district and party elites who are mostly men are not willing to risk their
seats by nominating women (Rule, 1994; Matland, 2005).
Other factors of the electoral system that can hinder or support women’s
representation include district magnitudes, party magnitudes, and party threshold. District
magnitude is the number of seats that can be elected per district and party magnitude is
the number of seats a party wins in a district (Matland, 2005, Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis,
2008). Party and district magnitudes are important because they affect party recruiting
strategy. In single-member districts, women have to compete against male candidates and
party elites who are mostly male are unlikely to nominate a woman candidate. When
district margins increase, party gatekeepers are more likely to nominate women. In
addition, chances of electing women are higher in high district margins because parties
can compete for and win more seats allowing them to go further down the party lists,
where women are usually placed (Matland, 2005). The cost of electing women is less felt
in PR system with high district margins because there are several slots to work with
unlike in majority/plurality system where there is only one slot to work with (Matland,
2005, Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008).
Party threshold is the minimum level of support that a party needs to gain
representation (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008). Thresholds limit the number of parties
that are eligible for seats in parliament. Thresholds can be determined by law or
constitution (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008). Higher electoral threshold promote women
30

representation because they discourage the creation of small-parties, which often elect
only one or two representatives, usually male. Few parties with a higher percentage of
seats are more likely to see women being elected to the parliament than several parties
with few seats (Mataland, 2005).
While electoral systems go a long way in promoting women’s representation it is
also important that women become active in and outside their political parties to take full
advantage of the system. Burkina Faso is a good example where electoral reform alone
was not enough. In the 1992 election, using PR closed list system and gender quotas
Burkina Faso failed to elect any women to parliament (Compaore, 2005). One of the
reasons for the failure to elect women was that there was no solid network of women’s
groups.
Post 1990 Transitions to Democracy
A lot of credit is given to a wave of democratization that swept through Africa in
the beginning of the 1990s, which opened up opportunities for women to enter the
political arena (Foster, 1993; Tripp, 2001b; Goetz, 1998). Since 1990, over twenty of
sub-Saharan Africa’s 53 states have initiated steps toward political pluralism and this has
opened up the prospects for women participation in political leadership positions (Foster,
1993). Yoon (2001) defines democratization as the transition from authoritarian rule to
democracy. Democratization is a transitional phase, which includes several stages. Most
African countries are still in the early stages of democratization and the only visible
symbol of democracy is multiparty elections (Yoon, 2001). Because of democratization
of African states, women who represent a slight majority of the voters are being
recognized by some political parties as vital components of their constituents (Foster,
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1993). In some countries such as Lesotho, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, women formed their
own political parties during the democratization process (Tripp, 2001a). During the one
party state period, ruling political parties controlled and confined women’s political
participation (Geisler, 2006).
Transition to democracy in the region allowed women who had formed social
movements during various political struggles to emerge as leaders alongside men during
the peace transition process (Geisler, 2006). The democratization process in Africa has
allowed more African countries to move towards democratic practices, such as multiparty
elections. Beginning 1990 with Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon, constitutional provisions for
multiparty elections were drawn in most African countries (Yoon, 2001). Currently more
than three quarters of African countries hold multiparty elections. Before 1990 only six
countries (Botswana, Djibouti, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe) maintained
regular multiparty elections (Yoon, 2001, ). While democratization in Africa has allowed
women freedom to organize themselves and opportunities to enter into parliament,
democratization has failed to change the underlying social, cultural, and economic
inequalities that prevent women from politics (Yoon, 2001).
Role of Political Parties
Political parties play a major role in the election of women to parliament.
Institutional changes are seldom adopted without the support of political elites (Krook,
2006). According to Matland and Montgomery’s, (2003) election model, there are three
stages in the election process. The first stage is when women select themselves by
deciding to run for office. The second stage is when women are selected by their political
parties and the third stage is when women are selected by the voters (Matland and
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Montgomery, 2003). Political parties are crucial at the second and third stage of the
election process. Political parties act as gatekeepers to women’s representation because
women need to be selected by their political parties to have their names placed on party
lists. For women to be selected by the voters they need their parties to provide party
support, financial resources and voter education on the importance of voting for women
(Goetz, 2002; Bauer, 2004).
Political ideology has a great impact on the number of women on party lists and
their position on the lists. Research has shown that political parties with high levels of
institutionalization and leftist values tend to elect more women because of their belief in
equality (Caul, 1999; Dahlerup, 2005; Hassim, 2002; Franceschet & Krook, 2008). There
is evidence that countries that have adopted quotas in Africa are left leaning parties such
as Eritrea, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa (Tripp, 2004) . Evidence from studies
of elections show that people vote for the party label rather than the specific individual,
thus once women are selected as party representatives their chances of being voted for are
equal to men in the same party (Krook, 2006). Thus, the most crucial point to get women
elected is to have them on the party lists. Political parties are therefore the gatekeepers
because they have the unique ability to field women candidates for political office.
The qualities of individual candidates may be important in countries with
plurality/majority, single-member district electoral systems. However, studies have
shown that even in these countries, female candidates do as well as male candidates when
directly facing the voters (Matland, 2005; Darcy and Schramm, 1977; Welch, and
Studlar, 1990). Political elites need to ensure that provisions of quota laws are enforced,
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to close loopholes that can be used to disadvantage women even after adopting genderbased quotas (Krook, 2007; Tinker, 2004; Compaore, 2005).
Party systems can be divided into patronage-oriented and bureaucratic selection
systems. In a bureaucratic system there are standard rules and regulations that guide the
selection process, while in the patronage-oriented system loyalty to the ruling party is
more important than rules and regulations (Matland, 2005). Clear bureaucratic procedures
for selecting candidates can have a distinct advantage for women in that political leaders
will have less room to disadvantage women (Matland, 2005). Research has shown that
the patronage-oriented system is more prevalent in new democracies. Women in
parliament in Africa and Latin America have been accused of being loyal to their political
parties and not their voters (Goetz, 2002; Htun, 2006, 2000; Gouws, 2008; Goetz &
Hassim, 2003).
It is important to have multiparty elections that promote competition among
political parties. Multiparty elections help women in that political elites will include
women on their party lists to appeal to the women voter base (Matland, 1998). However
too many political parties are detrimental to women’s representation because parties will
get few seats which leave no room for women. Yoon (2004) argues that African countries
have too many political parties and this has worked against women’s representation. The
ideal is to have a few major parties that will have enough safe seats for women (Yoon,
2004).
Degree of Democratization
African states are new, most of them gaining their independence after 1960. Most
countries in Africa had to fight wars of liberation to gain their independence but even
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after gaining their independence there remains a lot of instability in Africa. To understand
the problem of conflict in Africa one should look at it at a regional level (East, West,
Central, North, and South). East Africa has a long trend of severe armed conflict and has
the highest magnitude of violence in the whole of Africa. The violence in East Africa can
be explained by the highly restricted quality of government, high levels of poverty and
complex social systems (Marshall, 2005).
Central Africa experienced some armed conflict soon after the cold war, which
led to massive dislocation of populations. Post-independence leaders were very
repressive and as a result, rebels started uprisings against these autocratic leaders leading
to instability in Central Africa (Marshall, 2005). West Africa has much lower levels of
violence because it comprises small less populated states. With the collapse of civility in
Liberia in 1989, violence spread in the region (Pankhurst, 2002). Southern Africa is the
only region that shows remarkable improvement in attaining peace and democratic
governments, especially since the end of the apartheid era (Marshall, 2005; Goetz &
Hassim, 2003). Southern Africa has the largest number of democratic regimes in Africa
(Marshall, 2005; Tripp, 2004). North Africa is linked with the problems of the Middle
East and has had periods of violence and unstable governments (Abou-Zeid, 2004).
The main cause of instability in Africa is poor economies and political
marginalization of the majority of the population (Marshall, 2005). There are various
levels of regime types in Africa including democratic, semi-authoritarian regimes, and
authoritarian regimes (Tripp, 2004). Most of the studies on women’s representation have
been done in democratic countries only, ignoring the non-democratic ones. However, in
this study I include all regime types because even in the non-democratic countries women
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have succeeded in increasing their representation in parliament. Two studies that
examined the impact of regime type on women’s representation found no significant
relationship between women representation and regime type (Tripp 2004; Reynolds,
Reilly, & Ellis, 2008). Tripp (2004) in her study of the impact of quotas in Africa found
out that countries that adopted quotas are evenly divided into three categories concerning
regime type: democratic, semi-authoritarian, and authoritarian. This suggests that regime
type in Africa does not determine whether countries are more or less likely to adopt
quotas. The levels of violence differ from region to region thus, it is necessary to test if
there is any correlation between the different regions in Africa and the number of women
in parliament.
Gender-based Quota System
Hundreds of countries worldwide have adopted some form of gender-based
quotas to help increase women’s representation in parliaments. In Africa 30 countries
have adopted some form of gender quota at national level (IDEA, 2013). A lot has been
written on the issue of quotas either as single case studies or at a global level. The
discourse on the issue of quotas is wide ranging from origins, types, and impact. In
general research has shown that the mere introduction of quotas does not result in
uniform increases in female representation (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Longman
2006).
There are three main actors in quota campaigns: women’s movements, political
elites, and international and transnational actors (Krook, 2004; Lindberg, 2004; Dahlerup,
2006). Researchers agree that the main actors in the adoption of quotas are women
(Franceschet & Krook, 2008; Tripp, 2004; Krook, 2004). Women are always in the
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forefront in lobbying for adoption of quotas, even though men are the ones who have the
final say (Krook, 2007). Women in various capacities (such as women’s movements,
women in parliament, or members of NGOs) are the ones always to start the debate and
dialogue on quotas (Tripp, 2004; Krook, 2006; Franceschet, & Krook, 2008).
However, the adoption of quotas is usually made possible with the support of
political elites, who often pursue quotas for strategic reasons (Krook, 2006; ; Meier,
2004). Political elites use quotas to demonstrate a degree of commitment to women as
their voter base without actually intending to alter existing patterns of inequality. Other
players are NGOs and International and regional organizations that have been credited for
providing the basis for gender based quotas. International organizations, such as the
United Nations (UN) Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), and regional organizations, such as African Union (AU),
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern Africa
Development Council (SADC), have been cited as some of the major players in the
debate on gender based quotas (Krook 2004, 2007; Tripp, 2004).
Quotas are a form of affirmative action to help women overcome barriers that
prevent them from gaining political power in the same way as men (Chen, 2010).
Specifications for the quota provisions can be gender neutral or gender based. An oftenused gender-neutral rule is that “neither gender should have more than 60 per cent and
less than 40 per cent of the candidates” (Dahlerup, 2005, p. 38). Another is the 50-50 rule
where women and men split the number of seats in parliament in half. The most common
provision is a minimum of 30 percent. There are different types of quotas but the two
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main dimensions to define quotas are voluntary and legal. There are three types of quotas
in Africa: voluntary candidate quotas, legal candidate quotas, and reserved seats.
Voluntary quotas are quotas that political parties voluntarily adopt in their party
by-laws without the availability of constitutional or electoral laws (Dahlerup, 2005, ;
Matland, 2005). Voluntary candidate quotas stipulate the percentage of women
candidates on party list. Voluntary candidate quotas also known as party quotas are the
most common type of quotas around the world (Dahlerup, 2005; Tripp & Kang, 2008).
Voluntary party quotas were first adopted in the early 1970s by a limited number of
socialist and social democratic parties in Western Europe (Franceschet & Krook, 2008).
Research has shown that center–left-leaning parties tend to favor candidate quotas than
liberal and conservative parties because quotas correspond to the party’s general goals of
social equality ( Dahlerup, 2002; Hassim 2002; Opello 2006, Franceschet & Krook,
2008).
Legal quotas are mandated by law. Legal quotas are introduced either through
amending the constitution or introducing different types of legislation (Dahlerup, 2005).
Research has shown that legal quotas are prevalent in developing countries, especially
Africa and Latin America. The main reason for this distribution is that legislative quotas
are the newest kind of quota policy, appearing first only in the 1990s (Franceschet &
Krook, 2008; Krook 2006). There is a greater reliance on constitutionally mandated
quotas in Africa, maybe because of lack of trust with political parties and to ensure that
women representation is enforced (Chen, 2010).
Legal quotas either can be candidate quotas or reserved seats. Legal candidate
quotas force all political parties to adopt a certain percentage of women on their lists
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(Chen, 2010). Reserved seats are seats set aside for women by law. Reserved seats are
common mostly in Africa and Latin America (Tripp, 2006). Reserved seats can be
elected or appointed. Women may run for reserved seats in their districts and can be
elected either by an electoral college of men and women (Uganda), or by women in each
district/province (Rwanda). Another variant of the reserved seats system is the womenonly list in which only women can vie for these seats on a nationwide basis regardless of
party affiliation or district (Goetz, 2002).
Examples of elected reserved seats include Uganda where 56 seats are reserved
for women who are elected one from each district. In Rwanda, 30 percent of the seats are
reserved for women who are elected by a special procedure (Powley, 2005; Longman,
2006). In Tanzania 20 percent of the seats are reserved for women and are allocated to
political parties in proportion to the number of parliamentary seats won in an election
(Tripp 2003; Longman, 2006). Other countries such as Kenya, Egypt, and Djibouti have
reserved seats for women who are appointed by the president (Tripp, 2004).
One question that begs an answer on the discourse of quotas is whether there is a
difference in effectiveness between legal quotas and voluntary quotas. There is no
evidence that legal quotas are more efficient in electing women to parliament than
voluntary quotas (Chen, 2010). A comparison between the Nordic case and Latin
America reveals that legal quota systems do not automatically lead to higher
representation for women than systems with only party quotas (Dahlerup, 2005).
Supporters of quotas argue that institutional mechanisms of exclusion are the
main barrier to women’s representation and as such, the burden of change should fall on
these institutions. The use of quotas is one way of removing the institutional barriers to
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women representation; however, it is not clear how effective quotas are in increasing the
number of women in parliament. It is argued that the impact of quotas is based on the
type of quotas adopted. Researchers largely agree that reserved seats generally produce
small changes in the number of women in parliaments. However, recent developments in
Africa show that reserved seats can work to increase women’s representation. The equal
representation of men and women in Rwanda is largely attributed to a constitutional
quota (reserved seats) which reserves 24 of the 80 seats in the lower house for women
and guarantees 30 percent of the seats in the lower house to women (Shvedova, 2006). In
Uganda, women hold 31.3 percent of seats in parliament due to the system of reserved
seats. The success of reserved seats in these countries may be because legal quotas are
binding to all parties and there are penalties for noncompliance (Krook, 2007).
Furthermore, women can still compete for seats outside the reserved seats (Tripp, 2004).
Tripp and Kang (2008) argue that previous research on women representation were done
using pre-2000 data and as such do not capture the recent developments in Africa and
other developing countries in the world. Thus, this paper helps explain this new
phenomenon.
Another argument is that voluntary party quotas are more effective than other
types of quotas because they are voluntary measures, adopted from concerns about
electoral advantage (Leijenaar, 1997). Thus, political elites who freely adopt quotas are
willing to promote women representation. However, in most case studies a 30 percent
quota system does not always result in 30 percent of women being elected. Most political
parties will put women on the bottom of the party lists and as such, few women are
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elected. One major weakness of voluntary quotas is that they are not enforceable and as
such may not lead to increase in women representation.
The main argument for legal quotas is that they are enforceable but an
investigation into various electoral laws shows that very few countries have rules about
the ranking order of the candidates (Htun, 2006; Matland & Donley, 1996). Furthermore,
sanctions for non-compliance that are essential for the implementation of candidate
quotas are rarely enforced (Compaore, 2005; Htun, 2000; Meier, 2004). Research has
shown that the effectiveness of legal quotas is based on the specificity of the law, the
availability of sanctions for non-compliance, and the willingness of political elites to
enforce the rules and sanctions (Krook, 2007, Chen, 2010; Dahlerup, 2005). However,
very few countries have sanctions for noncompliance and they rarely enforce them
(Chen, 2010, Htun, 2000). Of the four countries with legislative candidate quotas in
Africa, Angola has no ranking rules or sanctions for non-compliance; Burkina Faso has
sanctions for non-compliance but no ranking rules; Senegal and Mauritania have both
ranking rules and sanctions for non-compliance (IDEA, 2013).
Party structure and ideology also influence the effectiveness of gender quotas.
Quotas work well in multi-party systems with left leaning parties (Krook, 2007; Caul,
1999). Quotas are more easily adopted in situations where there are several parties
because they will tend to compete with each. Larger parties tend to respond to
innovations initiated by smaller parties, and larger parties are better able to enforce party
or national regulations (Franceschet, & Krook, 2008, Caul, 1999). There is evidence that
countries that have adopted quotas are left leaning parties. Eritrea, Mozambique,
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Namibia, and South Africa are examples of countries with left leaning parties in power
that have adopted quotas in Africa (Tripp, 2004).
The success of quotas also depends on how well the male political elites accept
the idea of female representation (Krook, 2007). It is very important that the male
political elites embrace the idea of women leaders for the quota system to work. Thus,
quotas that result from sustained grassroots mobilization are more likely to bring positive
outcomes for women than quotas imposed from above, inspired mainly by the deliberate
strategies of political elites (Franceschet, & Krook, 2008).
Socioeconomic Factors
The overall expansion of women’s capabilities and opportunities is one of the
main factors that help women rise to leadership positions. Socioeconomic factors such as
life expectancy, percentage of women in the labor force, percentage of women in higher
education are crucial in the election of women to parliament because of several reasons.
The structural explanation holds that the elimination of large socioeconomic disparities
enhances the supply of qualified aspirants. Economic development expands education
and professional opportunities for women and weakens traditional gender arrangements
that prevent women to participate in politics (Piscopo, 2006). When women become
equals with men in the social sphere such as levels of literacy, workforce participation,
and university education, they are more likely to be seen as men’s equals in the political
sphere and thus, increase their chances to rise to political leadership positions (Piscopo,
2006). All these factors increase women’s political resources and reduce existing barriers
to political activity. It is important to note that the impact of socioeconomic and cultural
factors is more significant in industrialized democracies than Africa. Industrialized
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democracies identify the lack of resources as the reason for limited women representation
and advocate for gradual empowering of women through improving education for
women, participation of women in the job market, and provision of social welfare
necessities (Dahlerup, 2005; Hughes, 2009; Reynolds, 1999; Yoon, 2004). On the other
hand, Africa has made tremendous progress in women representation even in countries
with very low shares of women in education and labor force and with very low levels of
economic development. In this section of the paper, I discuss the socio-economic factors
and their role in promoting women to political leadership positions.
Education
The growing presence of women in parliament has been explained by the overall
expansion in women’s capabilities and opportunities such as increased number of women
with access to formal education (Htun, 2000; Yoon, 2004; Reynolds, 1999; Hughes,
2009). Improvements in the number of women enrolled in secondary school and tertiary
education means that there are more qualified women who can be recruited by political
parties (Htun, 2000). Educational credentials have always distinguished political elites
from ordinary citizens thus the more educated women are the larger the pool of qualified
women who can run for political office (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999). Education of
women does not only expand the pool of qualified candidates but it also provides an
educated women voter base, which is more likely to vote for women (Kenworthy and
Malami, 1999).
Education brings enlightenment, which helps erode some cultural stereotypes
about women, which prevent society from voting for women. Women need the human
and financial capital that comes with education to stand for office (Paxton, Hughes, and
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Green 2006). This is evidenced in some African countries. For example in South Africa
Women in parliament are from well-educated and affluent families (Britton, 2006). Post
conflict countries in Africa such as Rwanda, Eritrea, and Namibia women who got their
education while in exile were able to participate in the transition process and run for
office (Bauer, 2004; Hale, 2001a).
Women’s Participation in Labor Force
Research has shown that participation in the labor force helps women build
confidence, build networks, and build political contacts that will help them when they
decide to run for political office. Participation in the labor force provides finance to help
launch their campaigns (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999). Research has also shown that
certain types of professions such as law are overrepresented in parliaments and as such
the greater the number of women in these professions the greater the chances of more
women elected to parliament (Hughes, 2009; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999). Thus, it is
important to point out that participation in the formal sector is more important than
participation in the labor-intensive subsistence agricultural sector (Yoon, 2004).
Participation of women in the formal labor force helps in changing the perceptions of
women in society because women will be seen performing well in the public sphere
(Kenworthy and Malami, 1999). Participation in the labor force also helps women in that
they learn skills such as presiding meetings, making presentations, and supervising
others, which are useful when pursuing public office (Yoon, 2004).
Economic Development
The level of a country’s economic development represented by the country’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita affects women’s general welfare in that it
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weakens traditional values that normally oppress women. In most cases improvements in
economic development is usually accompanied with decrease in fertility rate, increase in
urbanization, increased access to education, increased women’s participation in the labor
force, and positive attitudes towards women (Matland, 1998; Htun, 2000; Yoon, 2004;
Hughes, 2009). Economic development creates time saving devices that frees up time for
women to run for office (Paxton, Hughes, and Green, 2006; Kenworthy and Malami,
1999).
The role of economic development in the election of women to parliament has
been established in developed countries, but in Africa, research has shown no strong
correlations between economic development and women representation (Tripp, 2004;
Yoon, 2004). Both the wealthiest and the poorest countries in Africa are represented
among countries with 25 percent women representation . Yoon (2004) used GDP per
capita as an indicator of economic development and found that adverse economic
conditions have no significant effect on women representation in African parliaments. A
possible explanation for these findings is that adverse economic conditions can
sometimes open up access for women to political positions. Women use economic
hardships to appeal to frustrated voters (Geisler, 2006).
Cultural Factors
Culture shapes society’s attitudes and stereotypes towards women. Perceptions of
women as leaders are shaped by cultural norms. These perceptions affect the decision of
women to run for political office as well as the decision of voters to vote for women
(Yoon, 2004). For example when women participated in wars of liberation gender
differences were set aside. Women were treated as equals with men and were allowed
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access to political education (Hale, 2001a). However, when women came back from war
they were expected to go back to being obedient wives and mothers (Hale, 2001a).
Society culture was not ready to accept the new lifestyle that women had enjoyed during
the war. Independent educated women were regarded as undesirable and a threat to
traditional culture (Geisler, 2006). As a result, the young educated women turned away
from formal politics and joined NGOs where they had some degree of autonomy (Geisler,
1995).
Various factors influence society’s perceptions of women. Socialization of girls
and boys is one way that society defines the roles of men and women. Socialization of
girls and boys builds cultural perceptions of society on women leaders. Cultural
perceptions hinder decisions by women to run for political office and decisions by voters
to vote for women (Yoon, 2008). Thus eliminating traditional cultural barriers that
oppress women elevates their public standing and improves their opportunities for
political involvement (Piscopo, 2006).
Culture is also shaped by the surrounding environment and as such, culture tends
to be regional. For example, the northern region comprises of six Arab countries with
Islam as the dominant religion. In the southern and western regions, culture is also shaped
by regional organizations such as SADC and ECOWAS. African regions are divided into
North, South, East,West, and Central.
Role of Religion
Religion is another factor that also contributes to the definition of gender roles.
Research has shown that some religions are more patriarchal than others are. Catholicism
and Islam have been identified as patriarchal religions, which constrain the political
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involvement of women (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Paxton, Hughes, & Green, 2006).
Protestants are more favorable to women’s involvement in politics because their
religion’s belief in equality.
Research has shown that countries or parties that tend to have higher percentages
of Protestants would have more female representation than Catholic and Muslim
(Reynolds, 1999; Krook, 2006). For example, Western Europe and Scandinavia countries
that have more Protestants appear to be more gender-neutral than Catholic Italy.
Comparisons between Western Europe and the Middle East showed that Protestantism
permits greater gender equality than Islam (Inglehart, Norris, & Welzel, 2002). Research
has also shown that countries with higher protestant populations are more likely to adopt
quotas than countries with high catholic and Muslim populations. One reason why
Protestants favor the election of women is that the idea of quotas corresponds to the
religion’s belief of equality.
The impact of Islamic religion on women’s representation is clear in the Arab
states where women’s participation in politics is very low (Sabbagh, 2006). Islam is
blamed for its patriarchal nature, which presents a strong psychological barrier among
Arab populations regarding women representation. However, Sabbagh (2006) argues that
Islam is not the main reason for the incremental development of the state of women in
Arab states, as evidenced by the success of Muslim women outside the Arab states such
as Bangladesh and India. The problem in the Arab states is a combination of factors such
as neo-patriarchy, culture and interpretation of religion, social norms and attitudes that
act together to prevent women representation.
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Islamic culture presumes that women’s place is in the home and as such cannot
participate in politics (Sabbagh, 2006). Another reason why Arab women fail to
participate in politics is that it is not safe because elections are characterized by violence,
which women shy away from (Sabbagh, 2006). In some Arab states like Saudi Arabia,
women are not even allowed to vote. While other countries outside the Arab states have
made commitments to support women representation through ratifying international
conventions such as CEDAW and Beijing conference, the first reference to women’s
representation among Arab states was at the Arab heads of state Summit in Tunis in May
2004 (Sabbagh, 2006).
Contextual Factors
In addition to institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural factors, there are
contextual factors that had an impact on women’s representation in Africa. These factors
include prolonged conflict, women’s movements, and international and transnational
organizations. Prolonged conflict stands out, in that it is a random occurrence appearing
in some countries in Africa and has created opportunities for women to rise to political
leadership positions. Women’s movements and international and transnational
organizations are external factors that have instituted ideas that helped women in Africa
to gain political representation.
Prolonged Conflict
When African countries gained their independence from colonial rule, they
adopted the western types of governments such as the Westminster parliament for
Anglophone colonies and presidential systems in Francophone colonies (Pankhurst,
2002). However, these new governments failed to establish democratic practices. By
48

1964, roughly two-thirds of independent African countries had become one party state
(Yoon, 2004). By 1970, about 70 coups or coup attempts had occurred in Africa leading
to military rule and single party governments (Bauer & Britton, 2006). As a result,
constitutions were abandoned and most parliaments became rubber stamps of the ruling
party. As a result, political instability became widespread in Africa. Researchers argue
that this prolonged conflict that occurred in Africa during this period created a platform
for women to rise to political leadership positions (Hughes, 2009; Bauer, 2006).
Conflict in Africa comes in different forms such as revolutionary wars, ethnic
wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides (Marshall, Gurr, & Harff,
2009). Conflict can also be in the form of an authoritarian ruler (Franceschet & Krook,
2008). There are several case studies that have shown the importance of conflict and
post-conflict transitions on increasing the number of women representatives (Franceschet
& Krook, 2008; Gouws, 2008; Britton, 2006; Bauer, 2006; Ballington, 2004). Firstly,
conflict disrupted gender relations, which were reconfigured during the transition to
peace. Women took up arms from outside the country or took on male roles at home
while men were fighting, in prison, or dead (Longman, 2006). Women experienced high
degrees of emancipation during the struggle and were exposed to active political
education (Hale, 2001a). Conflict also produced a cadre of women capable of leading.
Women fought besides men and some acquired formal education while in exile and at
home. This formidable cadre of women participated in drafting the constitutions and laws
during the transition period (Longman, 2006; Gouws, 2008, Geisler, 1995). During
conflict, women were exposed to the global movements of women, which inspired and
strengthened their local movements. In South Africa, Namibia, and Rwanda, women used
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the brief window of opportunity to influence the writing of the constitution and to
pressure their political parties to advance women to parliament (Britton, 2006; Powley,
2005).
Prolonged conflict also created a gender imbalance in the population. More men
died during the conflict leaving women with no choice but to take over men‘s
responsibilities (Powley, 2005). A case in point is Rwanda where at the aftermath of the
genocide 70 percent of the population was female (Faiola, 2008, Powley, 2005). Given
this demographic imbalance, women immediately assumed roles previously assigned to
men and in many cases developed skills they would not otherwise have acquired (Faiola,
2008).
Because of prolonged conflict, most women spent years in exile where they
mastered skills such as collaboration, networking, and mass action and these skills
became valuable tools during the transition period. In addition, those women in exile
became familiar with international women’s movements (Bauer, 2006; Tripp, 2006;
Hughes, 2009). For example in South Africa women movements helped create the
Gender Advisory Committee (GAC) which became part of women representation in the
new constitutional negotiations (Convention for a Democratic South Africa, CODESA)
(Goetz & Hassim, 2003). Through the constitution, women were able to influence the
adoption of the multimember district electoral system with party-list proportional
representation (Britton, 2006). This system has been identified to favor the election of
women worldwide (Matland & Taylor, 1997; Welch & Studlar, 1990). International
women movements influenced Namibian women while they were in exile from the late
1960s to the late 1980s when tens of thousands of young Namibians left the country for
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the rest of Africa, Europe, and North America. When they came back in the early 1990s,
they had new feminist ideas (Geisler, 2006; Bauer, 2006). As was the case in South
Africa, Namibian former exile women entered parliament in large numbers. Exile
experience equipped them with skills such as high degrees of autonomy, self-confidence,
proficiency in English and public speaking, and advanced degrees, which led them to
participate in formal politics (Bauer, 2004, 2006; Gouws, 2008).
The role of conflict in Africa has been noted as one of the factors that influenced
the fast track model in women’s representation (Dahlerup & Freidnvall, 2005; Dahlerup,
1998; Yoon, 2004). Research has shown that many of the post-conflict countries
increased the percentage of women in parliament during the transition process through
drafting gender friendly constitutions and adopting quota laws (Chen, 2010). History has
shown that it is easier to adopt a gender quota system in a new political system than in an
older system where most of the seats are already occupied by men (Tripp, 2001a; Yoon,
2001, Creevey, 2006).
Role of Women’s Movements and NGOs
One question that has been raised is whether women are driving the movement for
increased representation in Africa. The answer to this question is critical for two main
reasons. Firstly, it can be argued that if women are the driving force behind the pressure
for increased women’s representation then the movement is likely to persist. Secondly, if
women are the driving force then they are more likely to demand public policies that
advance women’s livelihood (Htun, 2006). There is evidence that Africa has the most
active women movements (Tripp 2001b; 2004). Countries with the most active women’s
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movements in Africa include Botswana, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Tanzania, and Uganda (Tripp, 2004).
Women’s movements in Africa have been credited for pushing the demand for
women representation (Bauer, 2004, Geisler, 2006; Tripp, 2004). Women’s movements
across Africa uses a variety of tools to get women elected to parliament. They lobby for
institutional changes, sponsor voter education, fundraise and participate in party politics,
and conduct meetings and seminars to promote the election of women to parliament
(Geisler, 2006; Tahri, 2004; Bauer, 2006; Longman, 2006). A case in point is that of
Uganda where in 1989 a group of women went to talk to president Museveni about the
need for women representatives in the parliament citing the role women played in the
struggle for independence. In response, President Museveni appointed nine women to
parliament thus beginning the policy of reserved seats for women in Uganda (Goetz,
2002). By 2003, 25 percent of members of parliament were women in Uganda (Tripp,
2004). Other documented cases of local women’s movements are found in southern
Africa. In South Africa the ANC women movement lobbied for 30 percent quota for
women and achieved 26 percent women’s representation in their first democratic election
in 1994 (Britton, 2006; Tripp, 2004; Geisler, 2000).
Namibia presents another excellent example of how women movements have
contributed to increase the number of women parliamentarians. In the year 1999, Sister
Namibia, a long-standing feminist organization based in Windhoek, organized a
conference for all women, which led to the launching of the Namibian women’s
manifesto (Bauer, 2006). In 2000 a Namibian women’s manifesto network (NWMN) was
born. The NWMN organized countrywide mobilization to persuade political officials to
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adopt the 50/50 bill, which will make it a law to have 50 percent women in parliament.
NWMN also encouraged political parties to draft zebra lists, which alternate men and
women on party lists. These efforts led to increased number of women in parliament in
Namibia from 7 percent in 1994 to 25 percent in 2001 (Tripp, 2001a).
Another case in point is Rwanda where women’s movements campaigned for
policies that empowered women (Longman, 2006). In Rwanda although women could
vote since they achieved their independence in 1962, they still needed their husband’s
approval “in commerce, to register a business, buy land, act as witness, or undertake
court action” (Longman, 2006, p. 135). Since the 1980s, women’s involvement in civil
society has saved as a base for political empowerment in Rwanda. The thriving civil
society responded to practical needs of the people such as economic ventures. Economic
projects both at local and national levels were introduced. By 1989, this thriving civil
society began to demand political reform. Women led the demand for human rights. For
example the Rwandan Association for Human rights led by Monique Mujawamariya
(Longman, 2006). In several African countries, women’s movements helped in providing
educational opportunities for women, improve leadership skills of women, and encourage
women political involvement.
While to a large extent women’s movements contributed to the increase in women
representation in Africa, the relationship between the women in parliament and women in
the civil society have not stayed strong, there is no unity between them (Creevey, 2006;
Meena, 2004; Geisler, 2006; Bauer, 2004). One argument advanced is that women in
parliament are more loyal to party elites than their constituencies and as such have not
enacted policies that help women (Sabbagh, 2006). On the other hand, NGOs are
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criticized for not being political enough to work together with women parliamentarians in
building policies that benefit women (Geisler, 1995). As a result, there is a divide
between the women in politics and those in civic organizations. This division act as a
barrier to policy formulations that benefit women. As such, the efficacy of increasing
women’s representation becomes questionable (Geisler, 1995).
International and Transnational Organizations
The role of international organizations in promoting women to political leadership
positions is one important factor that cannot be ignored. International organizations and
transnational actors participate in the discourse of women’s representation by imposing
international norms of equality, through international emulation, and international tipping
(Krook, 2006). International organizations and INGOs impose international norms tying
political reforms to monetary aid (Burnet, 2008). The direct influence of international
organizations is also seen in post conflict countries under the UN Resolution 1325 of
October 2000, which called on member states to ensure women’s participation in postconflict regimes (Krook, 2006). Thus, direct international efforts to institute quotas
increased after 2002 and countries such as Rwanda and Eritrea were affected by the
resolution (Krook, 2006). In Senegal, the US-based National Democratic Institute
persuaded political parties to adopt gender quotas (Bauer & Britton, 2006). The
Senegalese women’s movement translated the resolution into the country’s four legal
languages and used it to raise public awareness (Mpoumou, 2004)
Transnational emulation is a process by which countries copy ideas from each
other. Transnational emulation has been a great influence in Africa because of conflicts
that send men and women into exile. During periods of conflict several women and men
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were scattered around the world where they learnt new ideas of gender equality which
they brought back to their countries after the conflicts ended (Bauer, 2004; Geisler,
2000). A case in point is the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which developed in refugee
camps in Uganda and was influenced by the policies of President Museveni. When the
RPF won the elections in Rwanda, they introduced the system of reserved seats for
women similar to the Ugandan system (Burnet, 2008). In Southern Africa, the Women
National Council of South Africa is credited for influencing other women’s movements
in Botswana, Namibia, Kenya, and Zambia (Geisler 2000; Hassim 2002). In Sudan, there
was a proliferation of liberal leftist parties formed in exile against the ruling Islamist
party (Hale, 2001b).
International tipping occurs when women who are already in the process of
demanding representation are aided by events going on internationally (Krook, 2006).
The Beijing declaration and platform for action of 1995 and the United Nations (UN)
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW, passed in 1979) are two main examples of international tipping (Goering,
2006). They helped to tip over the debates on women’s representation in favor of women
(Krook 2006). Women movements in Africa were inspired by these international
gatherings and used them to justify the need for women in parliaments in Africa (Tripp
2006; Longman, 2006, Krook, 2007). Equal participation of women in political decisionmaking is one of the cornerstones of CEDAW adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1979. Currently 179 countries are party to it and bound to take measures to
promote women’s participation in decision-making and leadership positions (CEDAW,
2013).
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Beijing conference of 1995 generated renewed pressure for the implementation of
the CEDAW provisions. CEDAW and the Beijing conference established norms of
equality for all, which made it easy for governments to adopt quotas. Those who chose to
adopt quotas justified them as a needed form of affirmative action to do away with the
historical discrimination and barriers that prevented women’s rise to political power
(Dahlerup, 2002). The idea of quotas began in 1990 when the UN Economic and Social
Council endorsed a target of 30 percent women in decision-making positions in the world
by 1995. However, in 1995, only 10 percent of the world’s parliamentary members were
women (Chen, 2010). In 1995, the Beijing Platform again pledged the need to increase
women's representation, and has been very influential. Women’s movements all over the
world have attempted to give the controversial demand for gender quotas legitimacy by
referring to the Platform for Action (Chen, 2010, Franceschet & Krook, 2008). In Africa
most countries introduced quotas after 1995 with the exception of Uganda (1989),
Tanzania (1985), South Africa (1994), and Mozambique (1994) (; Tripp, 2004; Yoon,
2008).
There are several African gatherings and resolutions that also promote women
representation such as the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC (Krook, 2004, 2006; Tripp, 2004;
Kasse, 2004). The UN Decade of Women Nairobi conference of 1985 had a great impact
on African countries that adopted quotas (Geisler, 2000; Tripp, 2001a). For example, the
African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa instituted a gender quota in 1989 after
the conference. Tanzania reserved 15 seats for women in 1989 (Yoon, 2008). Ugandan
women demanded political rights after attending the conference (Tamale, 2004). The
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1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development committed member states to use
any method to ensure a minimum of 30 percent women in parliament.
Implications for Women’s Substantive Representation
Several arguments have been brought forward to justify the need for women
representatives in parliament. One central reason for electing women to parliament is that
women legislators can better represent the interests of women in policymaking
(Dahlerup, 2005). The argument is that the presence of women in parliament will lead to
prioritization of women’s issues and encourage men to pay attention to women’s issues
(Franceschet and Krook 2008). Substantive representation can be defined as the
functional role that women in parliament play in policy making that enables them to pass
laws that benefit women. It is not enough just to increase the number of women in
parliament but it is imperative that women are included in the decision making process
(Clots-Figueras, 2011; Rehavi, 2007). There is a debate on how best to measure the
success of women in parliament (Karam & Lovenduski, 2005). Some researchers argue
that women are elected to parliament so that they can pass legislations that favor
women’s interests. Thus, the success of women in parliament is measured by the laws
that are passed which favor women (Bauer & Britton, 2006). On the other hand, some
researchers argue that women in parliament are successful when they are able to change
the legislative environment to be more sensitive to issues that affect women (Burnet,
2008). For example by placing women’s issues on the agenda and forcing men to
consider women’s issues is an important step that women in parliament have done. What
is clear is that substantive representation includes both the policy process and policy
outcomes (Franceschet & Piscopo 2008). Substantive representation as a process involves
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redefining political priorities and changing institutional features and gender bias in the
legislative environment (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Goetz, 2010). Substantive
representation as outcome means the actual laws enacted by parliament, which promote
women’s interests. Thus, when it comes to evaluating women’s substantive role in
parliament, it is not only the policy outcomes that matter, but also the process that women
legislators go through to get a bill passed. As a result, there are several ways to measure
the substantive success of women in parliament.
It is also important to point out the reflections about the concept of women’s
interests. Some feminists argue that there is no such thing as women’s interests because
women are different and have different needs. Women’s interests are not only shaped by
their gender but by a whole host of other factors such as race, culture, and economic
status (Franceschet and Krook, 2008). While woman’s interests are not homogenous, yet
there is a general trend that women often come together to achieve a common goal
(Ballington, 2004). The concept of women’s interests is used in this paper with the
understanding that women’s interests are contextual, subjective and evolutionary
(Franceschet and Krook, 2008).
Researchers have used various measures of substantive representation of women
and as such, there are conflicting assessments of women’s substantive representation
around the world (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). Some researchers argue that there are
no gender differences in policy preferences because politicians are more interested in
winning elections so they tend to lean towards the interests of the median voter (Ferreira,
& Gyourko, 2011). In addition, politicians both male and female tend to vote along party
lines and as such, increase in women’s representation has no effect on policy outcomes.
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However, research has shown that there are gender differences in policy preferences and
women in parliament tend to support different policies from their male counterparts
(Campa 2011; Funk and Gathmann, 2008). Thus, increasing women’s representation
can increase influence on policies that women prefer (Clots-Figueras, 2011).
Literature shows that women favor redistribution policies, they support childrelated expenditures, quality healthcare, and quality education (Clots-Figueras, 2011;
Campa, 2011). Funk and Gathmann (2008) studied individual voting preferences of men
and women in Switzerland where they use direct democracy in which all citizens directly
decide on a broad range of policies at the ballot box. Their study found out that there are
large gender differences in approval for policies on health issues, environmental
protection, defense spending, and social welfare. Literature also shows that female
legislators have a differential impact on public expenditure decisions compared to their
male counterparts. Women tend to invest more in schools and hospitals than men do
(Clots-Figueras, 2011). Rehavi (2007) found out that the dramatic increase of women in
the Unites States legislature over the past quarter century led to a 15% increase in the
share of public health spending (check on this data). Generally, women’s concerns
include violence against women, environmental protection, public health, and social
security (Funk & Gathmann, 2008; Goetz, 2010). In Africa women legislatures have
lobbied on issues of domestic violence, land rights, family law, HIV/AIDS, and
inheritance laws (Bauer and Britton, 2006; Goetz, 2010).
It is clear in literature that women have different policy preferences than men, but
it is not clear if women legislators are able to influence policy outcomes. Most studies on
gender quotas conclude that adopting quotas increases the number of women in
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parliament but does not have an effect on policy outcomes (Campa, 2011; Tinker, 2004).
However, a few studies on Indian local government showed that female representation
mattered in policy adoption. The increase in the number of women in local councils in
India resulted in increase in the share of government expenditure in public hospitals and
schools (Clots-Figueras, 2011; Rehavi, 2007). While the issue of women’s representation
in Africa is relatively new and not much time has passed to assess the substantive impact
of women case study research shows that women in parliament have made inroads in
areas of family law, inheritance law, and sexual harassment laws (Bauer and Britton,
2006; Disney, 2006; Karam and Lovenduski, 2005). Researchers agree that women in
parliaments in Africa have made some impact on institutional culture by changing men’s
and society’s perceptions of women as political leaders (Bauer & Britton, 2006; Karam
and Lovenduski, 2005). In their own small way, women in parliaments in Africa have
made changes that improve the welfare of women in Africa. For example in Rwanda the
country’s female minister of education has greatly reduced female drop-out rate by
sending social workers to the homes of the girls who drop out of school and work with
their families to ensure that the girls go back to school (Goering, 2006). In Uganda,
women have managed to overcome traditional patron-client system and allowed more
resources to go towards local projects that help women (Tinker, 2004). Women have also
focused on ensuring effective implementation of government programs that help women
(Tinker, 2004). Another achievement is that the presence of women in parliament has
greatly changed the agendas of parliaments in Africa. However, there is still a lot of work
to be done. The patriarchal nature of parliaments is still very prevalent and it hinders
women from making more policy changes that are needed to improve the lives of women
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in Africa (Disney, 2006; Tinker 2004). Several laws still need to be altered to ensure that
they are women friendly and gender sensitive. There is still need to change public
attitudes towards women (Karam & Lovenduski, 2005).
Several reasons have been brought forward to explain the failure by women to
influence policy outcomes. Some argue that female legislators are bound by party
doctrine and cannot get their parties to take up issues that affect women (Ballington,
2004). However one can argue that in all party controlled political systems all candidates
male or female are bound by party preferences, thus it is not a gender problem (Childs
and Krook, 2008). It is also possible that women fail during the bargaining process (Funk
and Gathmann, 2008). Karam and Lovenduski (2005) pointed out four factors that affect
the ability of female legislators to influence public policy; 1) the economic and political
context in which the parliament functions, 2) the background and experience of the
elected women, 3) the number of women in parliament, and 4) the rules and procedures
of parliament. They argue that the economic and political context in which the parliament
functions can have a positive or negative impact on women. a case in point is the PR-List
electoral system, which alienates elected officials from their constituents because people
vote for the party and not for individuals (Meena, 2004). Some women elected to
parliament lack the necessary expertise needed to do the job. On the other hand, some
women have family or political ties to the party elites and as such have some amount of
influence because of their background (Karam and Lovenduski, 2005). Clots-Figueras
(2011) also found out that the status of women leaders in India mattered in terms of
policy preferences. The rules and procedures of parliament were established by man and
as such, they work best men. Women legislatures need to learn the rules and use them to
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their advantage or work to change the rules to suit their needs (Karam & Lovenduski,
2005). Researchers argue that a critical mass of women is needed for substantive
representation to occur. The presence of women in large numbers removes tokenism and
allows the development of female partnerships that lobby for women’s interests (Karam
& Lovenduski, 2005).
Women in parliament in Africa face many obstacles that prevent them from
advancing policies that favor women. They are confronted with a masculine model of
politics, which is organized to suit male norms, values, and lifestyle (Mutume, 2004). In
South Africa, women faced structural challenges such as lack of female toilets, gyms, and
childcare facilities in parliament (Geisler, 2000). Women also complained about the
hours of work, which did not give them time to take care of their families (Geisler, 2000).
Furthermore, most women in parliament in Africa are working under governments
controlled by a single party where power is vested in the president and parliament is
rendered powerless (Mutume, 2004). Such strong political parties exert strong discipline
on their members whether female or male who have no choice but to follow party agenda
(Mutume, 2004).
Research has also shown that women struggle to integrate in parliamentary life
because they lack knowledge of the law making process (Ballington, 2004; Geisler, 2000;
Karam and Lovenduski, 2005). Some of the women who have been elected to parliament
through gender quotas did not have the qualifications needed to meet the demands of
their new jobs. Most of them were elected because of their involvement in party politics
and not based on their qualifications (Mutume, 2004). As such, they could not cope with
the demands of their parliamentary duties. Suggested solutions to this problem include
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provision of specific training that will meet the needs of the women and also provision of
support staff to help in researching and explaining various policy issues (Ballington,
2004; Geisler, 2000; Karam and Lovenduski, 2005).
Another barrier to substantive representation of women in parliament is the
adoption of gender quotas. Some researchers argue that the use of gender quotas lead to
election or appointment of unqualified women who are less experienced, and less
autonomous. Gender quotas reinforce the negative stereotyping of women who are seen
as mere tokens of male political elites (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Morna, 2004). In
Africa, the impact of quotas on women’s substantive representation is made worse
because of the rampant use of reserved seats. The use of reserved seats has been criticized
because women who are elected or appointed through reserved seats lack a support base
such as voting constituencies, political parties or civic organization (Ballington, 2004;
Chen, 2010; ; Meena, 2004). The problem with reserved seats is that they prevent women
from developing their own constituencies because they are elected by special Electoral
College and not the voters and sometimes they are appointed by the president of the
country (Ballington, 2004; Geisler, 2006; ; Meena, 2004). Reserved seats create separate
electoral rolls and districts for women, and elections for women are sometimes held
weeks after the general elections (Franceschet and Krook, 2008). As a result, these
women are treated differently from men and are isolated from the voter base (Franceschet
and Krook, 2008). The system of reserved seats underpins patronage networks and
strengthens allegiance to political elites so much that women who are elected through
reserved seats become accountable to the male elites and not the voting constituencies
(Ballington, 2004; Goetz, 2002; Tamale, 2004). To improve the substantive
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representation of women, women need to run on specific issues that they represent to get
support from their constituencies (Hassim, 2002).
Reserved seats do not address the real obstacles that prevent women from being
directly elected to parliament. Therefore women in parliament need to encourage their
parties to address these deeper power imbalances to allow women not only representation
in numbers but also in substance (Ballington, 2004). While women in parliament are
struggling to break through the entrenched patriarchal nature of the legislative process,
yet research shows that female legislatures have made progress in certain major policy
areas such as education and health and in specific areas such as violence against women,
sexual harassment, reproduction, child welfare, and gender quotas (Franceschet &
Piscopo, 2008). In Africa female legislatures have achieved success in areas of domestic
violence, land rights, family law, HIV/AIDS, and inheritance laws (Bauer and Britton,
2006; Goetz, 2010).
Summary
This chapter reviewed literature on the factors that influence the election of
women to parliament and the implications of women’s representation on policy
outcomes. The review showed that there are country specific factors, which include
institutional mechanisms, socioeconomic factors, and cultural factors that influence
women representation in Africa. The impact of these factors varies from country to
country. In addition to these countries' specific factors, there are international events and
gatherings that also affect women representation in Africa. International linkages through
local women’s movements shaped the discourse of women representation in Africa.
There is no single factor that explains the new trends in the discourse of women’s
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representation in Africa; rather one has to consider a multiple of factors. Furthermore, it
is not clear in literature the extent to which women in parliament have been able to
influence public policy to favor the interests of women. Women in parliament face many
obstacles when they get to parliament, which prevents them from representing their
constituencies. There are a few studies that have shown that women in parliament have
managed to make inroads in certain policy areas such as violence against women,
reproduction, redistribution, public health, and education.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I develop a conceptual framework taking into account the
theoretical underpinnings outlined in chapter 2 above. The framework seeks to bring an
understanding of the factors that affect women’s representation and the presumed
relationships between the factors. In addition, the framework outlines the factors that
affect the ability of female legislators to influence public policy that favor women and the
interactions among them. I also outline the hypotheses that emerge from the framework.
The Rationale
There are several interconnected factors that explain the increased number of
women parliamentarians in Africa. These factors can be grouped into three main
categories that include political institutional mechanisms, socioeconomic and cultural
factors, and contextual factors. Political institutional mechanisms include electoral
systems and laws, transitions to democracy, political parties, and regime types. Figure 3.1
is a depiction of the various factors and their relationships. Figure 3.1 is a flow-chart
diagram, which shows relationships between the various factors that affect the number of
women in parliament and their substantive influence in policy making. There are three
vectors; socioeconomic, contextual, and institutional which affect the percentage of
women in parliament. The number of women in parliament affects the substantive role of
women in policymaking. Research has shown that these political institutional factors are
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easier to change than social and economic factors and as such, women tend to target
institutional changes to increase women representation in parliament. A case in point is
the adoption of gender-based quotas. Most countries that have adopted gender-based
quotas have managed to increase the number of women in parliament in Africa and
around the world.
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Figure 3.1: A Model of Factors Affecting Women’s Representation in Africa
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There are different types of gender quotas such as voluntary candidate quotas,
legal candidate quotas, and reserved seats. The impact of quotas on women’s
representation depends in part on the type of quotas. Voluntary candidate quotas are
argued to be the most effective in increasing women’s representation because political
parties that adopt them are willing to promote women parliamentarians. However, the
adoption of quotas does not always lead to increase in women’s representation. The
effectiveness of quotas hinges upon the type of quota, the target set by the quota, wording
of the quota, enforcement of sanctions, perceived legitimacy of the quota, commitment of
the party elites, and the electoral system (Ballington, 2004; Dahlerup, 2005; Htun, 2005;
Krook, 2007; 2008).
Electoral systems have an impact on the effectiveness of quotas in that certain
types of quotas work well with certain type of electoral system. Research has shown that
proportional representation system with closed list and high district magnitudes system
work well with voluntary quotas. On the other hand, plurality/majority electoral system
works well with reserved seats. Thus, there is a need for the electoral system to match
with the type of quotas.
Furthermore, the electoral systems also affect the decision to adopt quotas.
Proportional representation system makes it easy to adopt gender quotas because political
parties tend to compete with each other more than in majority/plurality systems.
Adoption of quotas is also influenced by recent conflicts that swept across Africa.
Women in countries that just came out of conflict were able to negotiate new
constitutions that are women friendly. They were also able to change electoral laws that
favor the election of women in parliament. Thus to some extent prolonged conflict acted
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to the advantage of women. Besides prolonged conflict, the adoption of quotas was
facilitated by the wave of democratization that swept across Africa beginning in the
1990s.
Most countries in Africa moved from one party state to multiparty state and this led to
competition between parties. Most ruling parties introduced gender quotas and included
women in party lists so as to appeal to the women voters.
In conjunction with the wave of democracy in Africa after 1990 was the wave of
support for women’s representation in the international community. During the same
period of the early 1990s, several international conferences were held to promote
women’s agendas. Cases in point are the CEDAW, and the Beijing Platform for Action.
These conferences provided inspiration to women movements as well as new African
governments to adopt policies that promote women representation.
Institutional changes are not usually adopted without the support of political parties.
Political parties play a major role in the election of women to parliament. Political parties
act as gatekeepers for women representation because they determine who goes on the
party list. Political parties ensure that the provisions of gender quotas are met and
enforced. The two main characteristics of political parties that enhance women
representation is the political ideology of the party and the availability of more than one
party. Leftist parties tend to favor women representation because the inclusion of women
in parliament corresponds to the party’s goals of social equity. Multi party states
encourage competition and diffusion of ideas among political parties and this usually
work in favor of women.
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Institutional mechanisms create a demand for women candidates and that demand
cannot be met if there are no qualified women candidates. Socioeconomic factors such as
education, participation of women in the labor force and the level of economic
development of a country are also accountable for the increase in number of women in
parliament in that they prepare qualified women candidates. The general improvement in
the welfare of women has led to the creation of qualified women candidates to run for
political office and also increased the number of informed women voters. Another
economic factor that has a bearing on women’s representation is the country’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The argument is that countries with high GDP have
the capacity to improve women welfare and as such increase the chances of women being
elected to parliament. Economic development expands education and professional
opportunities for women and weakens traditional gender arrangements that prevent
women to participate in politics.
Another factor that influences women’s representation is the culture of a society.
Culture affects the level of acceptance of women leaders. Strong patriarchal cultures tend
to socialize women to stay in the private domain and not participate in the public domain.
It takes a long time for a culture to change and accept women as leaders. Religion is one
cultural factor that affects people’s perceptions of women leaders. It is argued that
countries that have higher percentages of Christians particularly Protestants would have
more female representation than any other religion such as Islam.
The discourse of women’s representation in Africa has also been affected by
external factors such as the history of women’s movements and the norms and values of
international and transnational organizations. Thus, countries deeply embedded in world
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polity through their INGO membership are more likely to adopt world norms, values, and
cultures standards. World values of women rights and inclusion in decision-making
processes helped increase women representation in Africa. The ratification of CEDAW is
one way to measure the commitment of a country towards women rights (Paxton,
Hughes, and Green 2006). The discourse of women’s movements and international
organizations after 1990 did not only advocate for women’s representation but also
stressed the need for a critical mass of 30 percent women in parliament. Thus, countries
that got their independence after 1990 are more likely to have more women
representation than those that got their independence early.
It is important to point out that this conceptual framework is not the ideal based
on the takings from the literature review. There are some factors that are raised in
literature which are very important in the context of Africa but which cannot be
operationalized in this dissertation because of the methodology used. The use of
quantitative analysis makes it difficult to capture some of the determinants of women’s
representation in Africa. Literature points out the importance of the transitional process
of coming out of conflict as an important factor in women’s representation in Africa but
this factor cannot be conceptualized in this dissertation. The role that religion plays in
affecting local politics and tribal conflicts could also not be conceptualized in this
dissertation. Other determinants of women’s representation highlighted in literature such
as party ideology and international linkages could not be used in this dissertation because
of unavailability of data for those factors. However, despite these limitations the
conceptual framework provided in Figure 3.1 managed to conceptualize most of the
determinants of women’s representation identified in literature.
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Substantive Representation of Female Parliamentarians
The rapid increase of women in parliament in Africa has not been followed by a
significant substantive representation of women’s interests (Bauer and Britton, 2006;
Goetz & Hassim, 2003; Tripp, 2004). Women are elected to parliament with the
expectation that they will represent issues that affect women. Literature suggests that
women are more concerned with redistribution policies that help the poor, protecting
children’s and women’s rights, protecting the environment, and quality health care.
It is not clear in literature how the increase in women’s representation affects their
ability to influence public policy to favor women. The second part of this paper examines
the substantive representation of women in Africa. Substantive representation includes
both the policy process and policy outcomes. The policy process includes placing policy
issues that affect women on the agenda, and changing institutional features and gender
bias in the legislative environment (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Goetz, 2010). Policy
outcomes are laws enacted by parliament that improve the welfare of women. In this
dissertation, only policy outcomes are examined because of unavailability of data on
policy process and the difficulty of operationalizing policy process factors. Substantive
representation is a broad and complex process that is represented by several indicators
(Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). Various studies used different indicators of substantive
representation and as such, there are conflicting results on how women in parliament
affect public policy. Some of the indicators of women’s substantive representation
identified in literature are women friendly bills introduced, women friendly laws that are
passed, and the amount of public expenditure that goes towards those issues that women
care for such as health, education, environment, and social welfare. Case study research
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in Africa has shown that women in parliament have been able to make substantial
changes in policy areas such as domestic violence, land rights, family law, HIV/AIDS,
and inheritance laws (Bauer and Britton, 2006; Goetz, 2010). In this paper, I use public
expenditure on health and education as indicators of women’s substantive representation
because there is data available for these indicators.
Literature points out several factors that affect the ability of women to make
substantive changes in parliament. The number of women in parliament is important if
women are to succeed in promoting policies that help other women. A critical mass of 30
% has been suggested in literature. However, some researchers argue that it is not so
much the number of women but the quality of women elected to parliament. There is
need to elect women who are qualified to do the job and who can influence the political
elite. Thus, the education level of the women candidates plays a role if women are to
successfully do their work in parliament.
Another factor that affects the substantive representation of women is the type of
electoral laws. The PR-List system has the greatest advantage to get more women elected
to power but at the same time, it alienates women from the voting constituents. Thus,
women elected through the PR-list system tend to be more loyal to the party than their
constituents are. The same argument has been brought forward about gender quotas.
Women elected or appointed through gender quotas lack an organizational base to
support them. In particular, women who are elected or appointed through reserved seats
lack a support base such as voting constituencies, political parties or civic organization
(Ballington, 2004; Chen, 2010; ; Meena, 2004). Women who are elected through reserved
seats become accountable to the male elites and not the voting constituencies (Goetz,
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2002; Tamale, 2004). The use of gender quotas especially reserved seats has been
criticized in that it purports the negative stereotyping of women. “Quota women” are
viewed as mere tokens who have no power to influence policy. To understand the
concept of women’s substantive representation one has to take all these factors into
account. Figure 3.1 is a depiction of the interactions of all the factors around substantive
representation.
Research Hypotheses
There are two main research questions addressed in this paper: (1) what factors
are driving women’s representations in Africa; (2) what impact do women in parliament
have on public policy? Based on the literature review above I answer these two questions
using the following hypotheses:
Institutional Factors
•

Countries with multiparty elections experience significantly higher percentages of
women’s representation in parliament.

•

Countries with fewer parties with seats in parliament experience significantly
higher percentages of women’s representation.

•

Countries with gender quotas experience significantly higher percentages of
women’s representation in parliament.

•

Countries with Reserved Seats experience significantly higher percentages of
women’s representation in parliament than countries with voluntary quotas.

•

Countries with proportional representation experience significantly higher
percentages of women’s representation in parliament.
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•

Countries with High democratization (Polity IV score of 5 or higher) experience
significantly higher percentages of women’s representation in parliament.

Contextual Factors
•

Countries that experience some type of internal conflict experience significantly
higher percentages of women’s representation in parliament.

•

Countries that experience heavy magnitude of internal conflict experience
significantly higher percentages of women’s representation in parliament.

•

Countries that ratified the treaty of CEDAW experience significantly higher
percentages of women’s representation in parliament.

•

Countries that ratified the treaty of CEDAW early experience significantly higher
percentages of women’s representation in parliament.

Substantive Representation
•

Countries that have higher percentages of women in parliament experience
significantly higher amounts of public expenditure in health and education.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I clarify the research methods used in this dissertation. This
chapter consist five sections. The first section, research design, I describe the time series
cross sectional design and the reasons for using this particular research design. In the
second section, operational variables, I describe the variables used in this study and how I
choose to operationalize them. The third section, data sources, I describe all the data
sources and their reliability and validity. In the fourth section, I describe the statistical
procedure used in this dissertation and in the final section, I present the descriptive
statistics.
Research Design
In this study, I make use of time series cross sectional design (TSCS). The TSCS
design examines the differences between two or more groups on one or more dependent
variables over a certain period of time. In this case, it involves cross-national
comparisons of 53 African countries on women’s representation in parliament and their
substantive representation over a period of 21 years (1990-2010). This design is
appropriate for this study because it allows me to compare large quantities of country
level data, it allows me to compare both space (cross-national) and time (panel data)
factors, and it also allows me to make use of secondary data, which is economical and
readily available.
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The advantages of using TSCS design are that time series cross sectional data
allows more variability, less collinearity, and more degrees of freedom, which help make
estimates more efficient. The combination of time series with cross-sections enhances the
quality and quantity of data which helps solve the problem of a small-N (Gujarati, 2003).
The problem with a small sample is that the explanatory variables exceed the degrees of
freedom required to model the relationship between the dependent and independent
variables. The problem of a small-N is solved by pooling data in time series cross
sectional analysis (Gujarati, 2003; Schmidt, 1997). For example in this study, I examine
the dependent variable percentage of women in parliament in 53 African countries over a
period of twenty-one years (from 1990 to 2010). Thus, my pooled data set contains a total
of 53*21=1113 observations.
Pooled TSCS models also enhance the variability of variables, which usually have
negligible variability under a simple time series or cross sectional analysis. TSCS
analysis captures not only the variation of what emerges through space and time, but the
variation of these two dimensions simultaneously (Schmidt, 1997). TSCS also gives
information on the time ordering of events and more importantly, TSCS controls for
unobserved heterogeneity, which is one of the problems of non-experimental research.
Unit of analysis is 53 African countries excluding South Sudan because it is a
fairly new country beginning in 2011 and the period under study is between 1990 and
2010. Previous studies on women’s representation in African focused on sub-Saharan
Africa only leaving out North Africa, but this study has all 53 African countries to fill
that gap in literature. In addition, it is important to take note of the variations in the two
regions (Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa) when carrying out statistical analysis.
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I make use of secondary data collected from various public sources. Secondary
data is data already collected and readily available from different sources (Singleton &
Straits, 2009). I used data from well-known reliable and valid sources that other
researchers have used before and took note of any problems related to the collection of
data. In cases where there is more than one source of data, I cross checked the different
sources to corroborate the data. The descriptions of all data sources are presented in the
section that follows.
There are advantages and disadvantages of using archival data. One advantage of
secondary data is that it is more publicly available allowing for true research as well as
replication and validation studies (Rudestam and Newton, 2007). Secondly, secondary
data enables researchers to analyze large social units such as cross-national studies.
Secondary data sourced from archives is generally more objective than even primary
survey data since it is free from contamination by respondent perceptions or memories of
the phenomenon of interest (Singleton & Straits, 2009). A third advantage is that
researchers can use secondary data from surveys and censuses to answer questions or test
hypotheses that are far removed from the research intentions or informational
requirements of the scholars or agencies whose studies or initiatives generated the data
(Singleton & Straits, 2009). This enhances the credibility of the new research since it
removes the possibility that the purpose or intention of the research could have
influenced the design of the research questions, survey instrument, and populations
sampled (Rudestam and Newton 2007). Secondary data research also requires less
money, less time and fewer personnel. Finally, secondary data can be combined with
other types of data to investigate phenomena more thoroughly.
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One disadvantage of using available data is that archival data sets often suffer
from missing, incomplete, or compromised data (Rudestam and Newton 2007). For
example in this study, some of the data that can be used to capture cultural variables had
too many missing cases and could not be used for this study. This weakness is even more
so for time series data. There are however several ways of dealing with the problem of
missing data such as listwise/ casewise deletion of missing data, single imputation, and
Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Multiple Imputation (Allison, 1999). Other
disadvantage of archival data is that the researchers have no control over how data was
collected hence compromising the validity and reliability of the data. To solve this
problem I make use of credible data sources with established validity and reliability.
After collecting data on all variables from various sources, I systematically
categorized the data to suit the needs of this study.
Operational Variables for Women’s Representation and
Women’s Substantive Representation
Dependent Variables
Percentage of Women in Parliament
The dependent variable is the percentage of women elected to the lower and upper houses
for bicameral parliaments or single house for unicameral parliaments. There are 19 out of
53 countries in Africa with bicameral parliaments (IPU, 2013). Data on the dependent
variable is available for all 53 countries from 1990 to 2010 with a few missing data
points.
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Women’s Substantive Representation
Substantive representation measures the impact of female legislatures on public
policy. I operationalize substantive representation as Public expenditure in health and
education.

Total public expenditure on education and health (current and capital)

expressed as a percentage of total government expenditure in a given fiscal year. The
variable can also be calculated based on Gross Domestic product (GDP). I use public
expenditure on health and education as a percentage of total government expenditure
because in this way I can assess a government's policy emphasis on education or health
relative to that of other public investments. This measure reflects also the commitment of
a government to invest in health and education. I chose the variable public expenditure in
health and education because they have data available and they have also been used in
previous research (Clots-Figueras, 2011; Rehavi, 2007 ; Funk & Gathmann, 2008). The
use of public spending as a variable has been found useful in that it is directly comparable
across countries and it can be classified into broad categories that are salient to voters.

Independent Variables
Political institutional variables
Electoral system: I operationalize electoral systems using a four-category nominal
variable, which include proportional representation system, plurality/majority system,
mixed system, and no provisions for direct elections. No provisions stands for countries
that have no provisions for a direct electoral process, members of parliament are
appointed by the president or a council of Elders. No provision is the base category.
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Gender quotas: Gender quotas include all countries with gender quotas at national
level only. I operationalize gender quotas using a four-category nominal variable, which
include voluntary, legal, reserved seats, and no quotas. No quotas is the base category.

Political parties: Political party is a continuous variable. I operationalize political
party variable in several ways. First as the number of all political parties that participated
in the elections, secondly as the number of political parties which got seats in the
parliament and thirdly as the number of political parties with the majority of the seats.
These differences will show the importance of party thresh hold in affecting the number
of women in parliament.
Regime type: The regime type variable captures the level of democracy in a
country and is an ordinal variable using a scale constructed by Polity IV. The scale ranges
from minus 10(-10, fully institutionalized autocracy) to plus 10 (+10, fully
institutionalized democracy), with higher scores indicating greater democracy. I
transform this scale to range from 0-20 for easier analysis. The Polity scores can also be
converted to regime categories. Polity iv recommends a three-part categorization of
"autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5) and "democracies" (+6 to +10). These
categories can be used as dummy variables in the analysis.
Degree of political freedom: The degree of political freedom measures the
political rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals in a country. Political rights include
the right to vote freely in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political
parties, and elect representatives. The degree of political freedom is a categorical variable
with three categories: free, partially free, and not free. Partially free is the base category
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Contextual Variables
Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW): CEDAW is an international agreement that affirms principles
of fundamental human rights and equality for women around the world. Countries that
ratify the treaty are obliged to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women in
their countries. I operationalize the Ratification of CEDAW variable in two ways. First
Ratification of CEDAW is a categorical variable with two categories, 1) countries that
ratified CEDAW treaty and 2) countries that did not. Secondly, I create a cumulative
index of the number of years under CEDAW.
Internal conflict: To analyze the effect of political conflict I use the variable
internal conflict, which is nominal variable with four categories; revolutionary wars,
ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides/politicides. Revolutionary wars are
defined as “episodes of violent conflict between governments and politically organized
groups that seek to overthrow the government, to replace its leader, or to seize power in
one region” (Marshall, Gurr, & Harff, 2009, p. 5). Ethnic wars are “episodes of violent
conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal
minorities in which the challengers seek major changes in their status” (Marshall, Gurr,
& Harff, 2009, p. 5). Adverse regime changes are defined as “major, adverse shifts in
patterns of governance, including major abrupt shifts away from more open, electoral
systems to more closed, authoritarian systems; revolutionary changes in political elites”
(Marshall, Gurr, & Harff, 2009, p. 10). Genocide (victims defined by ethnic group) and
politicides (victims defined by political party affiliation) events occur when “promotion,
execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents
82

result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized noncommunal group” (Marshall, Gurr, & Harff, 2009, p. 7).
Control Variables
Percentage of women in secondary education: The percentage of women
enrolled in secondary schools, which is measured as the percent of students currently,
enrolled in secondary schools that are female.
Percentage of women in tertiary education: The percentage of women enrolled
in tertiary education which is measured as the percent of students currently enrolled in
tertiary education who are female.
Percentage of women in the labor force: The percentage of women participating
in the labor force, which is measured as the percent of the population 15 years or older
who are economically active who are female.
Total fertility rate: The total fertility rate, which is measured as the number of
children a woman would bear if her child bearing follows the current fertility patterns and
she lives through her entire childbearing years
Level of economic development: level of economic development will be
measured by the real gross domestic product per capita in US dollars. GDP include
Religion: Religion is a categorical variable representing the type and size of
religion in a country. The categories include Christianity, Islam, Traditional, and other. I
also operationalize religion as the percentage of Christians in the country.
Region: Region is another way to capture the effect of culture since different regions tend
to follow the same social and economic culture. I operationalize region as a categorical
variable, which includes North, South, East, West, and Central.
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Data Sources
International Parliamentary Union (IPU)
The dependent variable (percentage of women in parliament) is available from
IPU. IPU is an international organization of Parliaments established in 1889. IPU focuses
on worldwide parliamentary dialogue to work on peace and cooperation. IPU fosters the
exchange of experience among parliaments and contributes to the defense and promotion
of human rights (Palmieri & Jabre, 2005). IPU collects data on women in parliaments
from all countries around the world. Currently it has data on 189 countries, which include
all 53 independent African countries. The proportion of seats held by women in national
parliaments is the number of seats held by women members in single or lower chambers
of national parliaments, expressed as a percentage of all occupied seats (IPU, 2013).
National parliaments can be bicameral or unicameral and IPU has data for both upper
house and lower house for bicameral parliaments. For international comparisons, the
single or lower house is considered in calculating the indicator. The data is available for
single countries, regional comparisons and world averages ().
IPU data is the most widely used source of data on women representation because
their data is obtained from official statistics received from parliaments and is regarded as
the most reliable (Palmieri & Jabre, 2005). National parliaments provide updated data
after an election or parliamentary renewal. National parliaments also transmit their data
to the IPU at least once a year and when the numbers change significantly. After each
general election, IPU administers a questionnaire to parliaments to solicit the latest
available data. IPU also uses other sources to obtain information, such as the electoral
management body, parliamentary web sites or Internet searches ( IPU, 2013). Additional
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information gathered from other sources is regularly crosschecked with parliament. The
data is collated and updated on a monthly basis, and are available on the IPU website.
Data on all African countries is available on the website.
Polity IV Project
Two variables regime type and internal conflict are obtained from Polity IV Project.
Polity IV collects data on authority characteristics of states in the world and this data can
be used for comparable quantitative analysis. The aim of the project is to develop
longitudinal indicators of political structures and regime change that can be used by
researchers interested in the area of study. The type of regime is indicated by a POLITY
index which is a measure of the “institutionalized regime authority of the central state;
the index scale ranges from minus 10(-10, fully institutionalized autocracy) to plus 10
(+10, fully institutionalized democracy) (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2010). Regime types
are measured using three norms; personal (executive recruitment), substantive
(defectiveness and responsiveness-executive constraints), and participation (political
competition) (p. 1). The rationale behind these norms is that political systems should
enable non-elites to influence political elites in accepted ways. Thus, these norms help
measure the extent to which political participation is regulated or institutionalized.
According to polity, IV an authoritarian regime is defined by the presence of authority
traits that suppress competitive political participation and where the leaders exercise
power with few institutional constraints (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2010, p. 10).
POLITY indices are computed for each country in the world for each year since 1800.
Their data is the most widely used by researchers who monitor regime change and study
the effect of various regime types.
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Data on internal conflict is from the Polity IV Political Instability Task Force
(PITF) formerly known as State Failure Problem Set. The Instability Task Force
measures four distinct state failure events, which are revolutionary wars, ethnic wars,
adverse regime changes, and genocides/politicides. There are two minimum thresholds to
include an event in the dataset; mobilization threshold and conflict intensity. Mobilization
threshold is measured by the number of people mobilized into the conflict be it armed
agents, demonstrators or troops. In the case of a revolutionary war, the parties should
mobilize 1000 or more people into the conflict. Conflict intensity threshold is measured
by the number of deaths directly related to the conflict. In the case of revolutionary wars,
at least 1000 direct conflict related deaths are needed before an event is considered a
revolutionary war (Marshall, Gurr, & Harff, 2009). The data is recorded in a case-year
format where a separate case is entered each year the conflict continues. A brief
description of the event is entered the first year the event occurs. Sometimes state failures
are complex that is two types of state failures can occur at the same time. In such cases a
consolidated variable is entered which shows the complex state failure (Marshall, Gurr, &
Harff, 2009).
Adverse regime changes are defined as “major, adverse shifts in patterns of
governance, including major abrupt shifts away from more open, electoral systems to
more closed, authoritarian systems; revolutionary changes in political elites” (Marshall,
Gurr, & Harff, 2009, p. 10). Adverse regime changes are measured by a drop in POLITY
index score over a period of three years or less. These changes can happen as a result of a
coup, fiat, or popular referendum. A six-point drop in the POLITY score indicates a
substantial change in authority characteristics of the government. Another way to
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measure adverse political changes is when the central authority collapses. Central
authority may collapse due to revolutionary changes resulting in a new government or
due to contested state dissolution when a state separate into new territorial redefined
administrative units as was the recent case in Sudan. Collapse of the central authority can
also occur when a state loses control of a large part of the country due to a combination
of internal pressures (Marshall, Gurr, & Harff, 2009).
Genocide and politicides events occur when “promotion, execution, and/or
implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents result in the
deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group”
(Marshall, Gurr, & Harff, 2009, p. 7). In genocides, the victims are defined by their
ethno-linguistic or religious characteristics while in politicides the victims are defined by
their political opposition. For an event to be coded a genocide or politicide there must be
evidence of mass murder of unarmed civilians and the killings have to be persistent for at
least 6 months. The beginning date is the month and year when the killings started and
the end date is the month and year when the last serious atrocities occurred.
Data from Polity IV is widely used by researchers because of the accuracy and
consistency of the coding of the constituent authority variables. Polity IV has been
collecting data since mid-1970s thus their data is regarded as very credible (Marshall,
Gurr, & Jaggers, 2010). Data is collected form “multiple historical sources from each
country and a variety of standard sources” (p. 5). Historical sources are constantly
revisited to take into account any new developments and the data is adjusted accordingly.
The constant updating of the data makes it more accurate and improves the validity and
reliability of the data. Polity IV data has been tested for reliability over the years through
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use of various testing procedures. Firstly, researchers have tested the data for internal
consistence and the few errors that were discovered were corrected (Marshall, Gurr, &
Jaggers, 2010). Secondly, polity IV makes use of different coders to cross check the
coding. For example in the year 2000 inter-coder reliability tests were conducted by two
teams, one from the university of Colorado and the other from the university of
Maryland. Coding is constantly reviewed, revised, and refined and sources of data are
constantly revisited to ensure validity of the data. Thirdly, the annual update of the scores
helps maintain a high degree of reliability and consistence in the data (Marshall, Gurr, &
Jaggers, 2010). Polity IV also monitors real time events and updates the scores annually.
There is general confidence with the data among researchers.
Freedom House
Data on degree of political freedom is also available on the Freedom House
website. Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization that supports,
monitors, and advocate for the expansion of freedom around the world. It works through
three lenses, analysis, advocacy and action (Freedom House, 2013). Through the analysis
lens, Freedom House conducts rigorous research methodology and provides information
on the state of freedom worldwide. Freedom House advocates for policies that advance
human rights and democracy around the world. Freedom House works directly with
advocates of democracy worldwide by providing resources that include training, expert
advice, grants and exchange opportunities. Freedom House defines freedom as “the
opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the
government and/or other centers of potential domination” (Freedom House, 2013).
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Freedom House derives their definition of freedom from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which includes freedom of religion, expression, and
assembly; freedom from torture; and the right to take part in the government. Data is
collected through the Freedom in the World survey. The survey is administered annually
and it provides information on the state of global freedom as experienced by individuals.
Unlike the Polity IV data set, which rates the performance of governments, the Freedom
House survey rates the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals. The
survey measures two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House,
2013). Political rights include the right to vote freely in legitimate elections, compete for
public office, join political parties, and elect representatives. Political rights enable
people to participate freely in the political process. Civil liberties allow for “the freedoms
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal
autonomy without interference from the state” (Freedom House, 2013).
The methodology of the survey is largely based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The assumption is that freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal
democratic societies. After the survey is administered a rigorous process of analysis and
evaluation is conducted which ensures objectivity. The ratings process is based on a
checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political
rights questions are grouped into three subcategories. Each subcategory gets a score on
the scale of 0 to 4, where a score of 0 represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest
degree of rights or liberties present. The highest score that can be awarded to the political
rights checklist is 40 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 10 questions) (Freedom House,
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2013). The highest score that can be awarded to the civil liberties checklist is 60 (or a
total score of 4 for each of the 15 questions).
African Election Database
The data for political parties is available in the African election database, which is a
database of election results in Sub-Saharan Africa. Election data is collected from
electoral authorities from each country in the database. The purpose of the African
Elections Database is to provide a comprehensive archive of past and present election
results for Sub-Saharan Africa countries (African Election Database, 2013). Each
country's election page starts with a political profile, which gives an overview of the
political leadership and a brief history of the political situation in the country since its
independence. A list of political parties and coalitions are found at the end of the political
profile.
The site posts only definitive results, which are usually released one to two weeks
after the election, rather than the provisional results that are released soon after an
election (African Election Database, 2013). The election results on the site do not include
invalid or blank votes in the final total. This means that the percentages are calculated
after removing the invalid votes. The data base corroborate their data from a variety of
sources including, local online newspapers, official government records, and electoral
observer mission reports.
World Fact Book
Data for the variable religion is available from the World Fact Book. The World Fact
book is a CIA database site that contains wide-ranging, hard-to-locate information about
the geography, people, governments, economies, communications, and militaries, for 267
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geographic entities. There are nine primary information categories and 100 subcategories
for most entities. Formerly the Web site and the published Factbook were only updated
annually but since November 2001, there has been more frequent online updating. The
online Factbook is updated on a weekly schedule.
A variety of sources are used and rigorous objective analysis is carried out to
come up with the data in the Factbook. As such, the Factbook is regarded as a reliable
and consistent source of data by most researchers. The Web version of the Factbook is
accessed an average of nearly 380,000 times each month (World Fact Book, 2013). The
data from the Fact Book uses estimates from surveys, censuses, and registration systems.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Structural variables such as percentage of women in the labor force, percentage of
women in secondary education, percentage of women in tertiary education and total
fertility rates are available from the UNDP web site. The percentage of women enrolled
in secondary schools is measured as the share of students enrolled in secondary school
who are female. The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) defines
secondary education as the ISCED levels 2 and 3. The percentage of women enrolled in
tertiary education is measured as the share of students enrolled in tertiary education who
are female (UNDP, 2013). The ISCED defines tertiary education as the ISCED levels 5
and 6, which include schools that help prepare students for professions (UNDP, 2013).
Data on education enrollment helps assess the gender parity concerning participation in
secondary and tertiary education. This assessment identifies the educationally
disadvantaged groups in society. Fifty percent is regarded as a good level of gender
disparity in education.
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The percentage of women participating in the labor force is measured as the share
of the economically active adult population who are female (UNDP, 2013). The adult
economically active rate is the percent of the population aged 15 years or over who
actively take part in economic activities (UNDP, 2013). The total fertility rate is a widely
used summary indicator of fertility (UNDP, 2013). Total fertility is measured as the
number of children a woman would bear if her child bearing follows the current fertility
patterns and she lives through her entire child bearing years (UNDP, 2013). Total fertility
shows a picture of the number of children women are currently having.
Data on education is compiled by the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). The UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) collects data from
national governments through a UIS questionnaire (Kumar & Fukuda-Parr, 2009; Sudhir
& Amartya, 1994). Data on labor force is compiled by the International Labor Office
(ILO) from a variety of sources, which include the labor force sample survey, household
surveys, population censuses, and official estimates provided by National Statistical
Services to ILO. Data on fertility is compiled by the Population Division of the UN
Secretariat using demographic data from various countries. The demographic data is
given as five-year averages (UNDP, 2013).
The Statistical division of UN takes measures to ensure the reliability and validity
of their data. The various departments of UN that compile data generally obtain their data
from national sources or official national publications. They use electronic error detection
systems that check for arithmetic errors and inconsistencies and trend analysis for
implausible results. Any queries are taken up with the country representatives reporting
the data to make corrections or provide explanations. Nationally reported data is also
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adjusted where necessary to take account of problems of under-reporting or overreporting (Kumar & Fukuda-Parr, 2009; Sudhir & Amartya, 1994). In the case of labor
data where there are national differences in the scope of data, methodologies for
collecting data, and country specific definitions of labor force components, the ILO
harmonizes the data to account for these differences in national data (Kumar & FukudaParr, 2009). ILO uses model estimates where national data are not available or for years
for which no real data exist (Kumar & Fukuda-Parr, 2009). Data are available for 126
economies.
Another indicator is the percentage of women in the labor force. The data on labor
force is compiled by the International Labor Force (ILO). ILO relies on household labor
force surveys which are generally the most comprehensive and comparable sources for
labor statistics. Other possible sources include population censuses, official estimates and
administrative records such as employment office records and social insurance statistics.
The ILO also takes advantage of existing compilations held by various organizations,
such as International Labor Office (Bureau of Statistics), United Nations Statistics
Division, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World
Bank, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Statistical Office
of the European Union (EUROSTAT), United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
UN Statistical division also collects data on government expenditure on education
and on health. Public expenditure on health refers to expenditure on health care incurred
by public funds. Public funds are state, regional and local Government bodies and social
security schemes. Public expenditure on education refers to the total amount of public
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funds spent on education. Total public expenditure on education can be expressed as a
percentage of the Gross National Income (GNI) in a given financial year or as a
percentage of GDP. Public expenditure on education is calculated by dividing total public
expenditure on education in a given financial year by the GNI of the country for the
corresponding year and multiply by 100. Total public expenditure on education should
include all education expenditures incurred by all concerned ministries and all levels of
administration.
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW)
The variable ratification of CEDW will be drawn from this source. One reason for
countries to adopt measures that increase women representation is the country’s link to
the world polity and the impact of international norms. As such, State ratification of
CEDAW has been used as an indicator of country-level commitment to women’s political
representation (Paxton & Hughes, 2006). Signatories to the convention are urged to take
steps to promote gender equality. Thus, parties to CEDAW are more likely to increase
women participation in political and public life. CEDAW is an expert body established in
1982, composed of 23 experts on women's issues from around the world. CEDAW
watches over the progress for women made in countries that are States parties to
CEDAW. A country becomes a State party by ratifying or acceding to the Convention
and thereby accepting a legal obligation to counteract discrimination against women. The
Committee monitors the implementation of national measures to fulfill this obligation.
The Committee reviews national reports submitted by the States parties within one year
of ratification or accession, and thereafter every four years. The Committee also makes
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recommendations on any issue affecting women to which it believes the States parties
should devote more attention. A list of all parties to CEDAW is available at the
committee’s website.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
The independent variables gender-based quota and electoral systems were
obtained from IDEA. IDEA is an intergovernmental organization that aims to, provide
knowledge to democracy builders. IDEA provides various resources to support
democratic reform in all parts of the world. IDEA has various databases including the
Quota Project, which is The Global Database of Quotas for Women and the ACE project,
which is the database for electoral systems. The ACE project database has all the
countries and the type of electoral systems they use. The Quota Project contains
information on the use of electoral quotas for women. The database has data on all
countries in the world with some kind of gender-based quotas. The database contains
among other things the percentage of women in parliament, the type of quotas and when
they were adopted, and political parties involved.
What is also unique about the two databases is that it provides sources of the data
and further references for each country and each region. The databases get its information
from a variety of sources such as country constitutions, political party constitutions,
political databases, and country electoral laws. IDEA works in partnership with IPU and
Stockholm University. Their data is regarded as reliable by most researchers and is the
most used source for gender quotas.
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Statistical Procedure
The statistical procedure is in two parts descriptive analysis and multivariate
analysis. I begin by conducting descriptive analysis of all the variables used in the
dissertation. Descriptive statistics provide a quantitative description of how the variables
vary across countries and over time. Descriptive statistics also provide simple summaries
about the sample under study and these summaries help to show the patterns in the data.
Some examples of descriptive statistics include measures of central tendency such as the
mean, mode and median and measures of variability such as standard deviation and
variance. For the purpose of this dissertation, I make use of the mean and how it changes
over time, I also make use of standard deviations to see how much the variables vary
from the mean. I also use frequencies particularly for categorical variables.
In this dissertation, I use descriptive statistics to understand what is happening in
women’s representation in Africa at an aggregate level. Descriptive statistics help to
paint a bigger picture of women’s representation in Africa. Descriptive statistics help
show the variations in the variables across countries and how they have evolved over
time. An understanding of the descriptive statistics helps to formulate a well-specified
econometric model.
For multivariate analysis I make use of Panel data analysis first to analyze the
determinants of cross-national variation in the percentage of parliamentary seats held by
women in Africa and secondly to analyze the effect of women’s representation on public
expenditure on health. Panel data analysis is a method of studying a particular subject
within multiple sites, periodically observed over a defined period. Panel data analysis
enables researchers to undertake longitudinal analyses using repeated observations of
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enough cross-sections (Plümper, Troeger & Manow, 2005). Panel data involve at least
two dimensions: a cross-sectional dimension and a time series dimension. In this study, I
examine the dependent variable percentage of women in parliament in 53 African
countries over a period of twenty-one years (from 1990 to 2010). Thus my pooled data
set, sometimes called time series cross-sectional data, contains a total of 53*21=1113
observations. If there are no missing values, the data set is called a balanced panel, but if
there are missing values, the data set is referred to as an unbalanced panel (Gujarati,
2003). In this case, I have an unbalanced panel because there are missing values.
The benefits of panel data are that panel data allows more variability, less
collinearity, and more degrees of freedom, which help make estimates more efficient.
Panel data also gives information on the time-ordering of events and more importantly,
panel data controls for unobserved heterogeneity, which is one of the problems of nonexperimental research. The combination of time series with cross-sections can enhance
the quality and quantity of data in ways that would be impossible using only one of these
two dimensions (Gujarati, 2003). The problem of a small-N is solved by pooling data in
panel analysis (Gujarati, 2003).
There are two main types of panel data analytic models; fixed effects models and
random effects models (Gujarati, 2003). There are different types of Fixed Effects
Models depending on whether the variations are on the slopes or intercepts, The first
Fixed Effects Model can have constant slope coefficients with variations in intercept over
country or time or both (Plümper, Troeger & Manow, 2005).
The Random Effects Model is a time series cross-sectional regression model with an
intercept that is a random effect (Cheng, 2003). This model assumes that the intercept is a
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random outcome variable. The different types of random effects model are error
components models, random parameters model, dynamic panel model, and robust panel
model.
In this chapter, I described the research methods used in this dissertation. I began
by describing the scope of the research and the variables used in this dissertation. I also
provided the reasoning for use of the times-series cross-sectional research design. I
outlined the statistical procedure, which includes a descriptive statistics analysis and
panel data analysis. The following chapter presents the descriptive statistics of all the
variables used in the analysis.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

In this chapter, I provide descriptive statistics about the data included in this
dissertation. Descriptive statistics show the average and variation in each variable. The
descriptive statistics also show how the variables evolved over time. Understanding this
variation helps develop a well-specified econometric model. I examine the descriptive
statistics for each group of variables; dependent variables, institutional variables, and
contextual variables. The table showing summary statistics for socioeconomic (control)
variables is attached in Appendix 1.
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
In this dissertation I use three dependent variables; the percentage of women in
parliament, public expenditure in health as a percentage of GDP and public expenditure
in education as a percentage of GDP. I start by presenting descriptive statistics for the
percentage of women in parliament followed by the descriptive statistics for Public
expenditure in health and education as a percentage of GDP.
Descriptive Statistics: Percentage of Women in Parliament
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable percentage of women in
parliament are presented in Table 5.1. The statistics show the means, standard deviation,
maximum, and minimums for each variable. The average percentage of women in
parliament is 10.42%. There is a lot of variation in the percentage of women in
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parliament (std. dev. = 8.41) meaning that a few countries might be driving the
percentage of women in parliament. There is a wide gap between the minimum of 0%
and the maximum of 56%. Table 5.1 also shows how the average percentage of women in
parliament changes over time from 7.21% in the period 1990 to 1995 to 15.9% in the
period 2006 and 2010. This clearly shows that women’s representation in Africa has
increased in the period 1990 and 2010.
Table 5.1
Summary Statistics for Percentage of Women in Parliament
Changes in mean percentages over
time
1990
1996
2006
2001 to
Min Max to
to
to
2005
1995
2000
2010

Total for all years 1990 to 2010
Variable Obs.

Mean

%
Women

10.42

1113

Std.
Dev.
8.41

0 56.3

7.21

8.19

11.07

15.9

There is also variation in the percentage of women in parliament in Africa
overtime as shown in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1 shows the mean increase in women’s
representation over time from 1990 to 2010. The graph shows how women’s
representation in Africa has evolved over time. The overall level of average women’s
representation has increased from 1990 to 2010 with a sharp increase in 2000.
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Figure 5.1: Percentage of Women in Parliament over Time (1990 to 2010)

Between the years 2000 and 2010, average percentage of women in parliament in
Africa rose from 8.57% in 1984 to 17.3% in 2010, which represents a significant increase
over a short period of time. Figure 5.1 confirms the notion that there has been a rapid
increase in women’s representation in Africa in the past two decades and the multivariate
analysis in the following chapter provides an understanding of why there was this rapid
increase in women’s representation in Africa. As a result of these variations across
countries and over time, it is important to examine these changes at country level.
Table 5.2 shows the mean percentage of women in parliament for each country
for five different time periods. The time periods in Table 5.2 include the total for all 21
years and 4 five year terms to show the variations across time. Table 5.2 shows the
variations in women’s representation across countries and over time. Overall, from the
total column, which shows the averages for the whole period 1990 to 2010; the mean
percentage of women in parliament in Africa ranges from 0.86% in Comoros and 27% in
Mozambique. Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, and Uganda the top 5
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Table 5.2
Average Percentage of Women in Parliament for Each
Country

5.5

1990
to
1995
5.27

1996
to
2000
4.58

2001
to
2005
5.08

2006
to
2010
7.1

8

1990
to
1995
5.7

1996
to
2000
6.96

7.3

2006
to
2010
12.5

Liberia

Angola

15.45

11.17

11.9

15.4

24.2

Libya

1.69

0

0

0

7.1

Benin

6.52

3.72

7.08

6.48

9.36

Madagascar

5.85

4.57

4.56

6.1

8.42

Botswana
Burkina
Faso
Burundi

10.26

6.67

8.8

15.82

10.5

Malawi

9.62

7.7

6.14

10.24

14.8

8.35

3.7

6.52

10.26

13.9

Mali

7.67

2.3

8.24

11

10.2

16.75

13.1

6

17.82

30.8

Mauritania

6.3

0

2.3

3.76

20.42

Cameroon
Cape
Verde
CAR

10.3

12.93

8.24

7.58

11.9

Mauritius

9.35

7.1

7.6

5.7

17.44

12.38

11.27

10.4

11.1

17

Morocco

4.41

0.5

0.6

6.72

10.62

6.42

3.75

4.26

7.94

10.3

Mozambique

27.03

17.28

26.16

30.96

35.68

Chad

6.74

8.2

8.18

4.58

5.72

Namibia

20.3

10.63

20.56

25.56

26.4

Comoros

0.86

0

0

0.6

3

Niger

5.21

4.5

1.2

3.44

11.86

Congo
Cote
d'Ivoire
DRC

7.29

5.83

5.76

10.06

7.78

Nigeria

5.82

6.7

5.38

4.32

6.7

7.44

5.52

7.38

8.5

8.74

Rwanda

26.56

6.43

17.1

34.94

51.8

5.81

5.07

2

7.2

9.12

S T and P

9.03

10.05

8.02

9.1

8.74

Djibouti

4.54

0

0

6.48

12.6

Senegal

15.48

12.37

11.86

17.28

21.02

Egypt
Equatorial
Guinea
Eritrea

3.06

3.62

2.04

2.42

4.06

Seychelles

24.92

21.65

25.78

27.04

25.86

9.97

10.4

7.78

7.6

14

Sierra Leone

9.46

5

7.8

12.22

13.2

17.48

10.5

19.74

19.08

22

Somalia

2.37

0.67

0

0

9.16

9.21

5

2

7

23

South Africa

24.94

10.2

26.9

30.4

35.22

Gabon

10.59

10.83

8.3

9.2.0

14

Sudan

10.46

7.67

6.18

9.7

18.86

Gambia

7.91

7.8

3.16

10.96

9.78

Swaziland

6.06

3.52

3.1

6.18

11.96

Ghana

8.99

8

9

9.38

9.78

Tanzania

19.51

11.2

17.28

20.76

30.46

Guinea
Guinea
Bissau
Kenya

12.05

7

7.2

15.1

19.4

Togo

5.38

3.87

1.94

6.16

9.86

12.14

16.67

9.56

9.04

12.4

Tunisia

12.13

4.7

7.8

13.76

23.76

4.77

2.37

3.24

5.7

8.24

Uganda

21.51

16.53

18.06

23.16

29.28

Lesotho

9.02

4.6

4.28

8.54

19.5

Zambia

10.45

6.68

9.9

11.62

14.34

Zimbabwe

12.89

11.62

14.56

9.86

15.78

Country

Total

Algeria

Ethiopia

Country

Total

2001 to
2005

Notes: DRC is Democratic Republic of Congo, CAR is Central Africa Republic, S T and P is Sao Tome and
Principe
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countries with a mean above 20% and Comoros, Libya, morocco, and Somalia are the
bottom 4 countries with a mean below 5%. It is interesting to note that all the top five
countries have gender quotas except for Seychelles. On the other hand, two of the bottom
countries Morocco and Somalia also have gender quotas. It is important to point out that
the total averages for the top and bottom countries are affected by the high and low
percentages respectively at the beginning of the period under study. All the top five
countries had relatively high percentages of women representatives in parliament in 1990
except for Rwanda and all the bottom 4 countries had no women representatives in
parliament in 1990 except for Morocco and Somalia, which had only one woman
representative in parliament. There is however, a huge gap between top countries and the
bottom countries and as such, there is need to understand the determinants for women’s
representation so as to understand this variation across countries. Several patterns emerge
from Table 5.2. There are countries that made a dramatic increase over the 21 years such
as Tunisia (4.7% to 23.76%), Ethiopia (5% to 22.98%), Lesotho (4.6% to 19.54%),
Mauritania (0% to 20.42%) and Rwanda (6.43% to 51.8%). These five countries belong
to different regions Tunisia is from the north, Lesotho is from the south, Mauritania is
from the west and Ethiopia and Rwanda are from the East. The mean percentages for
women’s representation for these five countries more than tripled from the period 1990 to
1995 to the period 2005 to 2010. Three of the five countries Tunisia, Mauritania, and
Rwanda have gender quotas and Ethiopia and Lesotho do not have gender quotas.
Rwanda and Lesotho have proportional representation, Ethiopia and Mauritania have
majority electoral system, and Tunisia has a mixed electoral system. Thus, these five
countries that made great strides in women’s representation do not have one thing in
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common. This means that there are various factors that are driving women’s
representation in Africa.
On the other hand there are also countries that decreased in the mean percentage
of women in parliament between the period 1990 to 2010 including Cameroon (from
12.93 to 11.9%), Sao Tome Principe (from 10.05% to 8.74%), and Chad (from 8.2% to
5.72%). Of the three countries that declined in women’s representation Cameroon is the
only one with gender quotas. It is interesting to note that these three countries are all from
central Africa. Other countries made very small changes in the mean percentage of
women in parliament over the 21 years such as Ghana (from 8% to 9.78%), Egypt (3.62%
to 4.06%) and Nigeria which remained the same at 6.7%.
There are four countries (Comoros, Djibouti, Libya, and Mauritania) that had no
women representatives in parliament in 1990. Of the four countries, Libya had women in
parliament as late as 2005 but was able to average 7.1% between 2005 and 2010.
Comoros and Djibouti had women in parliament in the year 2000, and Mauritania in
1995. Comoros is the only country that did not increase much in the mean percentage of
women in parliament in the period 2005 to 2010 and Mauritania made the greatest change
from 0% in the period 1990 to 1995 to 20.42% in the period 2005 to 2010. Mauritania is
from West Africa and has legislative gender quotas and majority electoral system.
There are interesting observations in the period of 1995 to 2000. Firstly, a few
countries more than doubled the mean percentage of women in parliament such as Benin
(3% to 7%), South Africa (10.2% to 26.9%), Rwanda (6.43% to 17.15%) and Namibia
(10.63% to 20.56%). South Africa and Rwanda came out of conflict during this period
and were able to adopt gender quotas and this may explain this jump in women’s
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representation. In the same period from 1995 to 2000, several countries went down in the
mean percentage of women in parliament such as Burundi (13.1% to 6%), Guinea Bissau
(16.67% to 9.56%), and Niger (4.5% to 1.2%).
In addition, to understand how women’s representation in Africa varies across
countries I presented the summary statistics for each country in Appendix 2. Appendix 2
shows the summary statistics for the percentage of women in parliament for each country.
The mean percentage of women in parliament in Africa ranges from 0.86% in Comoros
and 27% in Mozambique. Only three countries (Mozambique, Rwanda, and Namibia)
have means above 20%, which implies that they are among the countries with high
percentages of women’s representation. Rwanda and South Africa have high standard
deviations (19.05 and 11.83 respectively) which suggest a sharp increase in women’s
representation over the time period 1990 to 2010.
The dependent variable percent women in parliament not only vary across
countries and over time but also across regions. African countries are divided into 5
regions, North, South, East, West, and Central (see Appendix 3) for the list of countries
in each region). North Africa has six countries, Southern Africa has nine countries, East
Africa has 13 countries, West Africa has 16 countries, and Central Africa has nine
countries. Table 5.3 shows the summary statistics for the percentage of women over the
five regions of Africa. The total column presents the means and standard deviation for the
period 1990 to 2010. In the total column, the average percentages of women in
parliament in Africa range from 12.95% in West Africa to 22.62% in Southern Africa.
East Africa has the second largest mean in women’s representation. East Africa and
Southern Africa also have the highest standard deviations (14.1 and 12.21 respectively)
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Table 5.3
Summary Statistics for Percentage of Women across Regions
Total
1990 to 1995
1995 to 2000
2000 to 2005
2005 to 2010
Std.
Std.
Std.
Std.
Std.
Region Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Dev.
Dev.
Dev.
Dev.
Dev.
West
13
5.14 6.51
4.26 6.66
3.51 9.14
4.53 1.91
4.48
North

15.3

8.97

3.63

2.9

3.53

3.19

6.28

5.43

11.9

7.61

East

22.2

14.1

7.62

7.45

9.34

8.75 13.47

11.34

20.9

13

South

22.6

12.2

8.77

5.86 13.38

8.84 16.58

9.57

20.5

9.71

14

10.1

8.69

4.92

4

11.7

7.01

Central

7.16

4.4

8.74

which suggest a wide variation among the countries. The variations across the different
time periods also show that East and Southern Africa have the largest mean and standard
deviation except for the period 1990 to 1995 where Central Africa has the largest mean. It
is possible that a few countries might be driving the percentages of women in these two
regions. A case in point is South Africa, which has very high percentages of women in
parliament and may be driving the mean percentage for Southern Africa. In East Africa
Rwanda, which has, the highest percentage of women in parliament in the whole world
may be driving the mean percentages in East Africa.
Another explanation for the larger mean in West and Southern Africa may be that
post 1995 Southern Africa and East Africa have been relatively stable politically and
most countries in these regions have been able to establish democracy in the same time
period. In addition both Southern Africa and East African have the highest percentage of
countries that adopted gender quotas (see Table 5:10). Furthermore, four countries in
Southern Africa came out of internal conflict after 1990, which is one of the factors
driving women’s representation in Africa (Bauer & Britton, 2006). On the other hand,
West Africa and Central Africa have politically unstable countries, which are constantly
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engaged in political strife and internal conflict (Marshall, 2005). In addition, West Africa
and Central Africa have the highest percentage of countries that have not adopted gender
quotas (see Table 5:10).
Descriptive Statistics: Public Expenditure in Health as a Percentage of GDP
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable public expenditure on health are
presented in Table 5.4. The statistics show the means, standard deviation, maximum, and
minimums for each variable. The average percentage of public expenditure on health is
5.43%, which means that on average the government spend 5.4% of GDP on public
health. There is some variation in the share of public expenditure on health (std. dev. =
2.19). There has been a relatively sharp increase in public expenditure on health over the
period 1995 to 2010 the share of public expenditure on health rose from 1.7% to 16.06%.
The average percentage changes in public expenditure on health over time shows very
small changes from one time period to another.
Table 5.4
Summary Statistics for Public Expenditure in Health as a Percentage of GDP
Total for all years 1990 to 2010
Changes in mean percentages over time
Std.
1990 to
1996 to
2001 to 2006 to
Variable
Mean Obs.
Min Max
Dev.
1995
2000
2005
2010
Health
5.43 811
2.19 1.7 16.1
4.98
5.09
5.38
5.93
expenditure

Figure 5.2 shows how the share of public expenditure on health evolved over
time. There is a steady increase in public expenditure in health from 1995 to 2000 and a
slightly sharp increase after 2000. It is interesting to note that the share of public
expenditure on health for most countries did not change much between 1990 and 2010 as
shown by the small standard deviations.
107

Public Expenditure on Health (as % of
GDP)
7
Percentage

6
5
4
3
2

Public Expenditure on
Health (as % of GDP)

1
0
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Years

Figure 5.2: Public Expenditure on Health (as % of GDP) over Time (1990 to 2010)
The descriptive statistics for the dependent variable Public expenditure in health
as percentage of GDP are presented in Table 5.5. The statistics show the means for each
country for four time periods. The period 1990 to 1995 was eliminated because of
missing data. From the total column, which represents the mean and standard deviation
for 21 years, the size of public expenditures in health as a percentage of GDP ranges from
2.68% in Angola and 13.6% in Sierra Leon. Sierra Leon is the only country with an
average above 10%, which implies that the majority of countries in Africa on average
spend less than 10% of their public expenditure on health. It is also important to note that
there is not much variation in public expenditure in health over the 21 years as noted by
the relatively small standard deviations.
A few countries stand out from Table 5.5. Botswana, Burundi, Liberia, and
Rwanda more than doubled the share of public health expenditure in the period 2005 to
2010. The share of public health expenditure in Chad, Egypt, Mali, and Eretria fell in the

108

period 2005 to 2010. There is not much variation across the time periods as indicated by
the small standard deviations.
Table 5.5
Average Percentage for Public Expenditure on Health (as % of GDP)
3.78

1995 to
2000
3.85

2000 to
2005
3.58

2005 to
2010
3.83

7.35

1995 to
2000
5.15

2000 to
2005
5.09

2005 to
2010
10.93

Angola

2.68

2.13

2.5

Libya

3.43

3.47

3.62

3.19

Benin

4.48

4.44

4.39

Madagascar

3.66

3.32

3.71

4.11

Botswana
Burkina
Faso
Burundi

6.21

6.67

8.14

Malawi

6.31

5.58

6.45

7.18

4.82

5.65

6.37

Mali

6.1

6.68

6.25

5.55

8.83

5.77

8.63

12.7

Mauritania

4.82

4.91

5.41

4.18

Cameroon

4.72

4.63

4.8

4.91

Mauritius

4.26

3.55

4.11

5.26

Cape Verde

4.66

4.66

4.85

4.38

Morocco

0

0

0

0

CAR

3.82

3.64

3.91

3.96

Mozambique

5.15

4.9

5.58

4.98

Chad

5.31

5.72

5.93

4.18

Namibia

6.7

6.68

6.53

6.99

Comoros

5.57

3.46

3.05

4.09

Niger

4.32

3.5

4.19

5.44

Congo

2.69

2.91

2.48

2.58

Nigeria

5.43

4.94

5.84

5.71

Cote d'Ivoire

5.04

5.78

3.94

5.37

Rwanda

6.6

4.67

5.53

10.03

5.5

4.32

5.08

7.45

S T and P

8.62

8.61

10

7.29

Djibouti

6.06

5.16

6.01

7.41

Senegal

4.98

4.19

5.22

5.74

Egypt
Equatorial
Guinea
Eritrea

5.12

5.01

5.69

4.9

Seychelles

4.52

5.31

4.62

3.49

3.22

3.66

2.4

3.08

Sierra Leone

13.6

14.6

13.1

12.92

3.93

4.41

4.07

3.18

Somalia

2.58

2.63

2.25

0

Ethiopia

4.14

3.57

4.56

4.52

South Africa

8.6

8.47

8.82

8.74

Gabon

2.99

2.9

3

3.08

Sudan

4.54

3.77

3.81

6.28

Gambia

5.8

5.67

5.99

5.64

Swaziland

5.74

5.37

5.58

6.44

Ghana

5.32

5.07

5.67

5.23

Tanzania

4.25

3.42

3.63

5.84

Guinea
Guinea
Bissau
Kenya

5.49

5.62

5.54

5.29

Togo

5.72

4.66

5.7

7.03

6.44

6.53

5.95

6.83

Tunisia

6

5.75

5.99

6.22

4.43

4.33

4.45

4.54

Uganda

7.3

5.95

7.58

8.68

Lesotho

7.74

7.18

7.01

8.96

Zambia

6.18

6.02

6.55

6.08

Zimbabwe

8.87

9.04

8.1

0

Country

Total

Algeria

DRC

Country

Total

Liberia

3.19

4.58

4.23

5.53

Notes: DRC is Democratic Republic of Congo, CAR is Central Africa Republic, S Tand P is Sao Tome and
Principe
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Appendix 4 shows the summary statistics for public expenditure in health variable
for each country. The size of public expenditures in health as a percentage of GDP ranges
from 2.68% in Angola and 13.6% in Sierra Leon. Sierra Leon is the only country with an
average above 10%, which implies that the majority of countries in Africa on average
spend less than 10% of their public expenditure on health. It is also important to note that
there is not much variation in public expenditure on health over time as noted by the
relatively small standard deviations.
Table 5.6 presents the summary statistics for public expenditure on health as a
percentage of GDP across five regions in Africa. The size of public expenditure on health
as a percentage of GDP ranges from 4.67% in Central Africa to 7.43% in Southern
Africa. Similar to the variation of public expenditure in health across countries the share
of public expenditure on health did not change much between 1990 and 2010 across the
regions as shown by the small standard deviations. The mean percentage of public
expenditure on health rose by one or two percentage points for all five regions over 21
years.
Table 5.6
Summary Statistics for Public Expenditure on Health as a Percentage of GDP over
Region
1990 to 1995
1995 to 2000
2000 to 2005
2005 to 2010
Std.
Region Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean
Dev.
West
5.55
2.56 5.72
2.52 5.81
2.81
6.31
2.41
North
4.21
1.13 4.37
0.92 4.54
1.17
4.89
1.38
East
4.13
1.02 4.27
1.09 4.95
1.81
6.16
2.91
South
6.14
1.61 6.38
1.64 6.68
1.19
7.19
14.9
Central
4.56
1.73 4.27
1.94 4.46
2.4
4.41
1.87
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Descriptive Statistics: Public Expenditure in Education as a Percentage of GDP
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable public expenditure on education
are presented in Table 5.7. The statistics show the means, standard deviation, maximum,
and minimums for the 21 year period. The average percentage of public expenditure on
education is 4.51% meaning that on average the government spends 4.51% of GDP on
public education. There is not much variation in the in the share of public expenditure on
education as shown by the relatively small changes in the mean percentage of public
expenditure on health from one time period to another. Overall, there has been a
relatively sharp increase in public expenditure on education between 1990 and 2010 the
share of public expenditure on education rose from 0.58 to 16.06.
Table 5.7
Summary Statistics for Public Expenditure on Education as a Percentage of GDP
Total for all years 1990 to 2010
Variable
Education
expenditure

Obs. Mean
466

4.51

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

2.27 0.58

16.1

Changes in mean percentages over time
1990 to 1996 to
2001 to
2006 to
1995
2000
2005
2010
4.48

4.16

4.57

4.77

Figure 5.3 shows the changes in public expenditure on education from 1990 to
2010. What a stand out in Figure 5.3 is that the share of public expenditure on education
is not stable it changes from year to year. The share of public expenditure on education
rose between 1990 and 1994, fell sharply in 1998, and has remained relatively steady
between 2000 and 2010. The fluctuations in public expenditure on education shows the
instability of this variable and the possibility of other important factors that affect public
expenditure on health which are outside the scope of this dissertation.
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Figure 5.3: Public Expenditure on Education as a Percentage of GDP
The descriptive statistics for public expenditure on education are presented in
Table 5.8. Table 5.8 presents the means for public expenditure on education as a
percentage of GDP across five time periods. What stands out from Table 5.8 is that there
is a lot of missing data for this variable. Sao Tome Principe and Somalia had no data on
public expenditure on education at all.
For countries with no standard deviation, it does not mean that there was no
variation for that period; it is because there was only one observation for that period.
Despite the problem of missing data, some patterns still emerge from Table 5.8. From the
total column, the share of public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP ranges
from .84% in Nigeria to 12.54% in Lesotho. Three countries Comoros, Ethiopia, and
Lesotho show a sharp increase in the mean percentage of public expenditure on education
across the four time periods. Central Africa Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, and
Seychelles show a decrease in the mean percentage of public expenditure on education
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across the four time periods. Public expenditure on education in Kenya, Mauritius, and
South Africa remained the same over the time period.
Table 5.8
Average Percentage for Public Expenditure on Education (as % of GDP)
1990
to
1995

1995
to
2000

2000
to
2005

2005
to
2010

199
5 to
200
0

200
0 to
200
5

9.55

13.3

13.5

0

0

0

13.4
2
2.77

2005
to
2010

Country

Algeria

4.34

0

0

0

4.34

Lesotho

Angola

2.71

0

2.59

2.58

3.01

Liberia

12.5
4
2.77

Benin
Botswan
a
Burkina
Faso
Burundi
Cameroo
n
Cape
Verde
CAR

3.61

0

3.05

3.66

3.96

Libya

2.67

0

2.67

0

0

7.61

6.29

0

9.52

7.86

Madagascar

2.89

2.14

2.35

3.22

3.19

3.74

3.45

1.44

4.46

4.37

Malawi

4.53

3.63

5.21

4.36

4.63

4.9

4.05

3.58

4.55

8.22

Mali

3.79

0

3.17

3.89

4.23

3.06

3.09

1.93

3.06

3.26

Mauritania

3.01

0

2.39

2.88

3.61

6.4

0

4.38

7.61

6.08

Mauritius

3.64

3.33

3.88

3.89

3.39

1.58

2.2

1.67

1.56

1.3

5.51

5.39

5.5

5.65

5.48

Chad

2.43

0

2.45

2.05

2.96

4.13

0

3

4.83

5.01

Comoros

5.07

0

3.78

3.81

7.61

Morocco
Mozambiqu
e
Namibia

7.04

0

8.01

6.6

6.85

Congo
Cote
d'Ivoire
DRC

3.97

5.64

4.07

2.54

6.22

Niger

3.22

3

1

2.78

3.91

4.51

5.59

3.93

4.28

4.41

Nigeria

0.84

0.85

0

0

0

2.5

0

0

0

2.5

Rwanda

4.12

0

3.66

4.4

4.39

Djibouti

8.02

0

6.92

8.55

8.34

Senegal

4.14

0

3.17

3.84

5.25

Egypt
Equatori
al
Guinea

4.36

4.37

4.67

4.8

3.81

Seychelles

6.31

8.36

6.34

5.33

5.01

0.85

0

1.23

0.6

0

Sierra
Leone

4.16

0

4.94

4.36

3.58

Eritrea

3.52

0

3.69

3.72

2.12

5.51

5.81

5.78

5.22

5.4

Ethiopia

4.09

2.37

3.16

3.69

5.15

10.3

8.51

12.1

0

0

Gabon

3.28

2.81

3.44

0

0

6.2

5.42

5.18

6.24

7.52
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Country

South
Africa
Sudan
Swaziland

Tota
l

199
0 to
199
5

Tota
l

Table 5.8—Continued
1990
to
1995

Country

Tota
l

Tanzania

4.27

199
0 to
199
5
2.13

5.51

Togo

4.07

5.68

4.24

3.8

3.88

2.2

2.43

Tunisia

6.26

6.03

6.36

6.4

6.39

5.25

0

0

Uganda

3.58

0

2.46

4.95

3.47

5.5

6.4

6.86

Zambia

1.96

2.15

2.08

2.27

1.22

1995
to
2000

2000
to
2005

2005
to
2010

Country

Tota
l

Gambia

3.48

3.6

3.65

2.35

4.3

Ghana

5.27

0

4.11

5.4

Guinea
Guinea
Bissau
Kenya

2.19

2

2.43

5.24

0

6.22

6.15

199
5 to
200
0
1.94

200
0 to
200
5
0

200
5 to
201
0
6.5

Zimbabwe 3.37
0 3.34 4.31 2.49
Notes: Omitted Sao Tome Principe and Somalia because of missing data for all years. CAR is Central
Africa Republic, DRC is Democratic Republic of Congo

Appendix 5 shows the summary statistics for public expenditure in education
variable for each country. The size of public expenditures in health as a percentage of
GDP ranges from 0.84% in Nigeria and 12.54% in Lesotho. Lesotho is the only country
with an average above 10%, which implies that the majority of countries in Africa on
average spend less than 10% of their public expenditure on education. It is also important
to note that there is not much variation in public expenditure on education over time as
noted by the relatively small standard deviations.
Table 5.9 shows the variation of public expenditure on education across regions.
There is not much variation across regions and over time as indicated by the law standard
deviations. This again might be due to missing data. The Western region stands out as the
only region with a gradual increase in public expenditure on health. The mean percentage
of public expenditure on education decreased over the time period in Central Africa
(from 3.47 to 2.72).
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Table 5.9
Summary Statistics for Public Expenditure on Education as % of GDP across Regions
Total

1990 to 1995

1995 to 2000

2000 to 2005

2005 to 2010

Std.
Std.
Std.
Std.
Std.
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Dev.
Dev.
Dev.
Dev.
Dev.
5.65
1.4
5.58
1.09
6.14
2.4
5.75 0.71 5.14 1.11

Region Mean
North
South

6.1

3.31

3.47

1.45

2.43

0.9

2.14

0.88

6.25

3.16

East

4.74

1.93

4.68

2.05

4.05

1.87

4.97

1.8

5.17

1.97

West

3.86

1.24

3.34

1.63

3.47

0.89

3.82

1.29

4.4

0.97

Central

2.54

1.14

3.47

1.45

2.43

0.9

2.14

0.88

2.72

1.29

Descriptive Statistics for Institutional Variables
There are eight institutional variables, which include total parties, parties with
seats, parties with major seats, polity IV scale, gender quotas, electoral system, degree of
political freedom, and regime type. Gender quotas, electoral system, degree of political
freedom, and regime type are categorical variables and total parties, parties with seats,
parties with major seats, and polity IV scale are continuous variables. I present the
descriptive statistics for each categorical variable first and then present the summary
statistics for the continuous variables.
Table 5.10 illustrates the frequencies of gender quotas overall and for each region.
Gender quotas have four categories representing the different types of quotas: voluntary,
legislative, reserved seats, and no quotas. The overall frequencies for gender quotas from
Table 5.7 shows that there are 10 countries with voluntary quotas, four countries with
legislative candidate quotas, and 12 countries with reserved seats (see Appendix 6 for the
complete list of countries with gender quotas). There are 26 countries out of 53 with
gender quotas.
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Table 5.10
Gender Quotas across Regions
Quota Type
Overall North South East
West
Central
Freq.
Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq.
Freq.
Voluntary
10
2
5
0
2
1
Legislative
4
0
0
0
3
1
Reserved seats
12
3
0
8
1
0
No quotas
27
1
4
5
10
7
Total
53
6
9
13
16
9

There are no time variations in gender quotas over the period 1990 to 2010
because no country changed their quota type. The most likely variation that can be
analyzed for gender quotas are regional variations. Table 5.10 shows the frequencies of
gender quotas in each region. West Africa has the highest number of countries that have
not yet adopted gender quotas (10 out of 16) followed by Central Africa with (7 out of 9).
East Africa has the highest number of countries (8 out of 13) with reserved seats and
reserved seats are the only type of quotas in the region. The only other region with
reserved seats is North Africa and half of the countries in the region northern region have
adopted reserved seats. Southern Africa has the highest number of countries with
voluntary quotas (5 out of 9) and voluntary quotas are the only type of quotas in the
region.
Table 5.11 illustrates the frequencies for the variable electoral system. The
variable Electoral systems fall into three main categories. 1) plurality/majority systems
which include First Past the Post (FPTP); Two Round System (TRS); Block Vote (BV);
Party Block Vote (PBV). 2) Proportional representation systems, which include;
Proportional representation with party lists (List PR); Mixed Member Proportional
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(MMP). 3) Mixed systems, which include Parallel. Lastly four countries, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Eritrea have no provisions for
direct elections (see Appendix 7 for the complete list of countries and their electoral
systems). The frequencies from Table 5.11 for electoral systems shows that the majority
of African countries (27 out of 53) have majority electoral system, followed by
proportional representation system (16 out of 53), mixed system (6 out of 53), and lastly
(4 out of 53) of the countries have no provisions for direct electoral process, members of
parliament are appointed by the president or a council of Elders.
Table 5.11
Electoral Systems across Regions
Electoral System
Overall North South East West Central
Freq.
Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq.
Proportional
16
2
4
2
5
3
Majority
27
1
5
8
9
4
Mixed
6
2
0
1
2
1
No Provision
4
1
0
2
0
1
Total
53
6
9
13
16
9

Just like gender quotas, electoral systems in Africa did not change over the period
under study. As such, I examined regional variations in the type of electoral systems.
Table 5.11 present the frequencies for the different electoral systems across the five
regions. All the different types of electoral systems are fairly distributed across the five
regions. The majority system is more frequent in three regions West, East, and South
where more than half of the countries use the majority system. Proportional
representation is more frequent in Southern region where 4 out of 9 countries have

117

adopted the system. It is interesting to note that the countries that have no provision for
direct elections are also spread across the regions.
Table 5.12 illustrates the percentages of countries for the variable regime type
over time. There are three main regime types in Africa, which are autocracy, democracy,
and anocracy. There has been a great shift in the level of democracy from 1990 to 2010.
There are several regime changes that occurred in the period 1990 to 2010 and as such, it
is possible to examine these changes over time. Table 5.12 illustrates these changes in
regime types in different time periods from 1990 to 2010. What stands out from Table
5.12 is the drastic decline in the number of countries with autocratic rule from 37 in 1990
to 4 in 2010. Although most countries have not moved to democracy, there has been a
steady increase in the percentage of countries with democratic rule. As of 2010, the most
common regime type in Africa is anocracy (30 out of 53 of African counties). Polity IV
describes anocracy as those countries that are in between democracy and autocracy,
which are in the process of changing from autocracy to democracy but are not yet
democratic. Thus, it is not surprising that most countries in Africa fall under this regime
type because most countries in Africa are moving towards democracy as evidenced by
multi-party elections, but they also have autocratic tendencies such as autocratic leaders
who want to rule until they die. The second frequent regime type in 2010 is democracy.
In 2010, about 19 countries had democratic rule. It is interesting to note that in 2010 only
four African countries were under autocratic rule. This move from autocratic rule to
democracy is argued to be one of the factors driving women’s representation in Africa.
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Table 5.12
Number of Countries for Each Regime Type from 19902010 (N =53)
Variable
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Autocracy
37
14
9
5
4
Anocracy
9
26
33
31
30
Democracy
7
13
11
17
19
Table 5.13 illustrates the number of countries under each category of the variable
degree of political freedom. Freedom House ranks degrees of political freedom into three
categories; free, partially free, and not free. In 2010 only nine countries experienced
political freedom while 21 African countries were not free and 23 were partially free.
Although the percentage of countries that are free is low, there has been a steady increase
in the percentage of countries with political freedom from 7% in 1990 to 17% in 2010. In
addition, the number of countries with partial political freedom rose steadily from 19 in
1990 to 23 in 2010. The number of countries that are not politically free has declined
over time from 30 in 1990 to 21 in 2010. The rise in women’s representation in Africa
can be attributed to these changes in degrees of political freedom in the past 21 years.
Table 5.13
Number of Countries for Each Degree of Political
Freedom from 1990-2010 (N=53)
Variable
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Free
4
9
9
11
9
Partially free
19
20
25
24
23
Not free
30
24
19
18
21
Table 5.14 illustrates the means, standard deviation, minimums, and maximums
for the continuous institutional variables. The average number of political parties in
African countries has risen from 1.64 in 1990 to 9 political parties in 2010. This is
evidence of the move towards democracy through multiparty elections. The average
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number of political parties with at least one seat in parliament has also risen from 1.24 in
1990 to 8 in 2010. The average number of parties with more than five seats in parliament
did not change much between 1990 and 2010. On average, three parties have more than
five seats in parliament. This is good for women’s representation in parliament because
research has shown that women fair better when there are a few major parties that can
win enough seats to include women on the party lists. In 2010, there was more variation
in the number of political parties and the number of seats held by the parties, as shown by
their large standard deviations (10.44 and 9.83 respectively). This means that there are a
few countries that have many political parties hence influencing the average of political
parties in Africa. Overall, the minimum number of political parties is zero because of
those countries that do not hold direct elections and the maximum is 68 parties, which is
way too many parties to help women get elected to parliament. On average, the Polity IV
scale has risen from 6.2 in 1990 to 12.9 in 2010. This means that more countries are
moving from total autocracy towards democracy. In 2010, Polity IV scale had on average
a score of 12.86, which is a score for countries that are in between total democracy (21)
and total autocracy (1).
Table 5.14
Summary Statistics for Institutional Variables
Variable

Total parties
Parties with seats
Parties with major
seats
Polity IV scale

1990
Std.
Mean
Dev
1.64

2.07

1.25

1.31

1.06

0.82

6.2

4.81

1995
Std.
Mean
Dev
6.47
5.25

2000
Std.
Mean
Dev.
5.66
4.86

2005
Std.
Mean
Dev.

4.79

4.36

4.6

4.04

7.64
5.87

5.46
4.06

2.62

1.93

2.57

2.03

3.19

10.47

5.62

11.18

4.99

12.41
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2010
Std.
Min
Dev.
9.4
10.44
7.55

9.83

2.42

2.98

2.17

5.33

12.9

5.19

Descriptive Statistics for Contextual Variables
There are four contextual variables used in this dissertation, which include
ratification of CEDAW, years in CEDAW, type of conflict, and magnitude of conflict.
Only years in CEDAW is a continuous variable and the rest are categorical variables. The
descriptive statistics for contextual variables are presented in Table 5.15 below. Table
5.15 illustrates the number of countries for each contextual variable from 1990 to 2010
and mean and standard deviation for years in CEDAW. The average number of years
since ratification of CEDAW increased sharply from about 3 years in 1990 to 20 years in
2010.
There is some variation across countries in the years 2005 and 2010 as reflected
by the large standard deviations. The number of countries not engaged in any type of
conflict has risen from 39 in 1990 to 43 in 2010. The number of countries engaged in
conflict rose in the year 1995 where four countries were engaged in revolutionary
conflict, eight countries were involved in ethnic conflict and five countries were involved
in other types of conflict. The number of countries experiencing heavy conflict had
decreased from four countries in 1990 to zero countries in 2005 however, the number of
countries experiencing mild conflict has remained steady over the years.
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Table 5.15
Number of Countries for Contextual Variables from 1990 – 2010 (N=53)
Variable
Ratification of
CDAW
Years in CEDAW

1990

1995

2.87 (3.2)

2000

6.32
(4.89)

2005

10.74 (5.81)

2010

15.45
(6.41)

20.26
(6.92)

Yes CEDAW

28

43

48

48

48

No CEDAW

25

10

5

5

5

Type of conflict
No conflict
Revolutionary

39
3

36
4

41
4

43
0

43
0

Ethnic

5

8

5

8

8

Civil violence

2

2

2

2

2

Other

4

3

1

0

0

40

38

40

44

45

Mild conflict

9

13

11

9

8

Heavy conflict

4

2

2

0

0

Conflict magnitude
No conflict

Notes: Years in CEDAW shows means and standard deviation in parenthesis

Conclusion
In this chapter, I described the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
data analysis. I presented the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and the
descriptive statistics for institutional and contextual variables. The descriptive statistics
showed variations across countries, across regions, and across time. The descriptive
statistics illustrated some patterns between variables and there is a need to carry out
bivariate and multivariate analysis to further investigate these patterns and relationships.
The following chapter outlines the results from the bivariate and multivariate analysis.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS: BIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

The previous chapter discussed the results of the descriptive statistics and
summary statistics for all continuous variables for all the years are presented in Appendix
8. In this chapter, I present the bivariate results and the multivariate results, which were
conducted to further understand the relationships between the dependent variables and
the independent variables. The bivariate and multivariate analysis helps understand the
determinants of women’s representation in Africa and to examine the substantive
representation of women in parliament. I start by presenting the bivariate results followed
by the multivariate results.
Results: Bivariate Analysis
Bivariate analysis involves the analysis of two variables so as to determine the empirical
relationships between them. Bivariate analysis helps to understand the relationships
between the dependent variables and the independent variables. Bivariate results help to
identify any barriers to multivariate models. There are several ways of conducting
bivariate analysis depending on the level of measurement of the variables. For the
purposes of this paper, I use percentage tables for nominal and ordinal variables and
correlations and scatter plots for continuous and interval variables. Firstly, I present the
results of bivariate analysis for women’s representation and institutional, contextual, and
socioeconomic variables. Secondly, I present the results of the bivariate analysis for
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public expenditure in health as a percentage of GDP. Lastly, I present the bivariate
analysis for public expenditure in education as a percentage of GDP.
Table 6.1 present the share of each dependent variable for each category of the
political institutional variables for the entire period 1990 to 2010. Countries with
voluntary quotas and reserved seats have the highest mean percentage of women in
parliament and countries with no gender quotas have the least mean percentage of women
in parliament. However there is a lot of variation in each category as shown by the large
standard deviation and this means that the countries do not group together well. There are
a few countries driving the percentage of women in parliament. Countries with
proportional representation and mixed electoral systems have the highest mean
percentage of women and countries with majority electoral system and those that do not
have provisions for direct elections have the least mean percentage of women in
parliament. Once again, there is a lot of variation among countries in each category
because of the large standard deviations.
It is interesting to note that countries that do not have political freedom have
higher mean percentage in women’s representation than countries that have high degree
of political freedom. This result is contrary to literature, which suggests that political
freedom is necessary to increase the number of women in parliament. One possible
explanation is that even countries that have no political freedom the country leaders
support women causes to strengthen their support from women. Some undemocratic
leaders have adopted gender quotas to appeal to the women voters and to gain
international support.
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Table 6.1 also present the share of public expenditure on health and education for
each category of institutional variables although I do not expect much correlation
between the two groups. The share of public expenditure on health and education is fairly
distributed across all institutional variables and there in not much variation either.
Table 6.1
Share of Each Dependent Variable for Political Institutional Variables
% Women
Variable

# of countries/ obs.

Gender Quotas
Voluntary
Legislative
Reserved seats
No quotas
Electoral System
Proportional
Majority
Mixed
No Provision
Degree of Political Freedom
Not Free
Partially free
Free

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Health
expenditure
Mean

Std. Dev.

Education
expenditure
Mean

Std. Dev.

10
4
12
27

17.56
18.07
17.29
8

9.7
6.69
11.9
5.9

6.42
4.96
6.02
5.13

2.46
1.34
2.5
2.01

4.9
4.06
5.36
4.32

1.59
0.96
1.91
2.47

16
27

13.48
8.28

10.61
5.95

5.82
5.47

2.34
2.3

5.26
4.13

2.93
1.81

6
4

13.14
7.18

7.69
9.07

5.14
3.48

1.1
0.81

4.58
3.44

2.08
1.13

193
458
462

12.65
8.87
10.99

7.92
8.43
8.32

6.14
4.77
5.71

1.75
1.65
2.61

5.45
4.02
4.48

2.65
1.76
2.31

Table 6.2 presents the share of each dependent variable for each category of
contextual variables for the entire period 1990-2010. Again, I do not expect much
correlation between public expenditure on health and education and the different
categories of contextual variables. The share of public expenditure on health and
education is fairly distributed across all contextual variables except for other type of
conflict, which has law percentages of public expenditure on health and education.
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Countries with no internal conflict have the highest mean percentage of women’s
representation but with a high standard deviation, which suggests a lot of country
variation. Countries that went through ethnic conflict also have high country variations as
noted by the high standard deviation. Countries that had civil violence and revolutionary
conflict have lower mean percentages of women in parliament but they have less
variation as indicated by low standard deviation. As expected countries that ratified
CEDAW have higher mean percentage in women’s representation than countries that did
not.
Table 6.2
Share of Each Dependent Variable for Contextual Variables
% Women
Variable

# of countries/
obs.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Health
expenditure

Education
expenditure

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Type of conflict
No conflict

793

10.63

8.85

5.43

2.08

4.5

2.33

Revolutionary

52

6.46

3.65

6.61

4.33

4.15

1

Other

20

9.55

4.78

2.53

0.71

3.14

1.2

Ethnic

130

9.54

7.98

5.41

1.83

4.02

1.6

Civil violence
Ratification of
CEDAW
No

63

6.58

2.14

4.52

0.91

3.52

1.78

2

9.71

4.21

5.47

2.2

4.49

2.29

Yes

51

15.44

7.72

4.97

1.96

4.74

2.15

Analysis of Correlations
For all the interval independent variables, I used correlations to examine the
bivariate relationships among them and the dependent variables. The statistics for the
correlations are presented in Table 6.3. Table 6.3 presents the correlations of the three
dependent variables (% women, public expenditure in education as a percentage of GDP,
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and public health expenditure as a percentage of GDP) and the independent variables;
total parties, parties with seats, number of years under CEDAW, conflict magnitude,
labor participation for women, total fertility, per-capita GDP, and % Christian.
Analysis of correlations helps identify the strength and direction of relationships
between dependent variables and independent variables. The dependent variable percent
women in parliament has a very weak (correlation coefficient below .0) positive
relationship with two variables parties with seats and conflict magnitude. The percentage
of women in parliament has a moderate (correlation coefficient above .2 and below .5)
positive relationship with total parties, years in CEDAW, female participation in the labor
market, per-capita GDP, and percent Christian. Percentage of women in parliament has a
moderate negative relationship with total fertility, which means that countries where
women have fewer babies tend to have more women in parliament. There were no
surprises in the correlations between percent women and the independent variables.
The dependent variable public expenditure in health has weak (correlation
coefficient below .0) positive correlations with parties with seats, years in CEDAW,
female participation in the labor market, per-capita GDP, and percent Christian and a
weak negative relationship with conflict magnitude. The inverse relationship with
conflict magnitude means that countries with weak conflict magnitude tend to spend
more in public health. Public expenditure in health has a moderate (correlation coefficient
above .2 and below .5) positive relationship with percent women and total parties and has
a moderate negative relationship with total fertility. Again, there were no surprises from
the correlation results for public expenditure on health.
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The dependent variable public expenditure on education has a weak (correlation
coefficient above below .1) positive relationship with total parties and a weak negative
relationship with conflict magnitude. Public expenditure on education has a moderate
(correlation coefficient above .2 and below .5) positive relationship with percent women,
total parties, per-capita GDP, and percent Christian. Public expenditure on education has
moderate negative relationship with parties with seats, years in CEDAW, female
participation in the labor market, and total fertility. What is surprising is the inverse
relationship between public expenditure on education and years in CEDAW because one
would expect that ratification of CEDAW would increase public spending on education
since more women will be encouraged to go to school. Another interesting observation is
the inverse relationship between public expenditure on education and female labor
participation this means that as more women participate in the labor market countries
spend less on public education. This may be because women will be contributing to the
expenditure of education since they have a source of income and will not rely on
government help
The analyses of correlations between independent variables help to assess the
extent to which multicollinearity is a threat to multivariate analysis. The results show that
there are no highly correlated independent variables. The strongest bivariate correlation
occurred between total parties and parties with seats (0.88) and between per-capita GDP
and total fertility. There is need to pay attention to these variables when conducting the
multivariate analysis.
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Table 6.3
Correlation for Interval Variables
Education
expenditure
Education
expenditure
Health
expenditure
% Women
Total parties
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Parties with
seats
Years in
CEDAW
Conflict
Magnitude
Labor
participation
Total Fertility
Per-capita
GDP
% Christian

Health
expenditure

%
Women

Total
parties

Parties
with
seats

Years in
CEDAW

Conflict
Magnitude

Labor
participation

Total
Fertility

Percapita
GDP

%
Christian

1
0.32

1

0.11

0.38

1

0.1

0.11

0.25

1

-0.15

-0.03

0.07

0.85

1

-0.15

0.05

0.29

0.13

0.24

1

-0.06

-0.04

0

-0.17

-0.14

-0.07

1

-0.2

0.04

0.21

0.04

-0.01

0.27

0.15

1

-0.42

-0.17

-0.17

-0.01

0.09

-0.13

0.2

0.4

1

0.15

0.05

0.23

0.1

0.02

0.1

-0.15

-0.37

-0.72

1

0.2

0.1

0.28

0.17

0.02

0.08

0.12

0.43

-0.07

0.18
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1

One of the objectives of this dissertation is to examine the substantive
representation of women. The correlation between women’s representation and public
health expenditure as percentage of GDP is .38, which suggests a moderate positive
correlation. The scatter plot in Figure 6.1 also shows this moderate positive correlation.
This means that as the percentage of women in parliament increases the size of public
expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP also increases.
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Figure 6.1: Scatter Plot: Public Expenditure on Health and Percentage of Women in
Parliament
The correlation between women’s representation and public expenditure on
education as percentage of GDP is .11, which suggests a weak positive correlation. The
positive correlation

means that as the percentage of women in parliament increases the

share of public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP also increases. Figure
6.2 shows this weak positive correlation. The weak correlation might be because the
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variable public expenditure on health has a lot of missing values. This weak relationship
might pose problems in the multivariate analysis.
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Figure 6.2: Scatter Plot: Public Expenditure on Education and Percentage of Women in
Parliament
The absence of highly correlated independent variables in this model and the
presence of both intra-state and intra-time variations in most of the variables suggest that
there are no immediate barriers to multivariate analysis. Correlations can only answer the
simplest hypothesis of weather there is a relationship between variables but cannot
answer the complex hypothesis of the factors driving women’s representation in Africa.
In addition, correlations can tell us the direction of the relationship between variables but
cannot tell us weather that relationship is empirically significant. As such, there is a need
to carryout multivariate analysis to see if these relationships are empirically significant
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and if the relationships are consistent. The results of the multivariate analysis are
presented below.
Results: Multivariate Analysis
As noted earlier, I make use of Time-series Cross-sectional data analysis (TSCS)
first to analyze the determinants of cross-national variation in the percentage of
parliamentary seats held by women in Africa and secondly to analyze the effect of
women’s representation on public policy. The basic model for my analysis is presented
below. I tested three models. The first model tested for the effects of socioeconomic
variables, institutional variables, and contextual variables on the percentage of women in
parliament.

Where: INST is the vector for institutional variables, CONT is the vector for contextual
variables, SOCECO is the vector for socioeconomic variables, α is a parameter,
are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and ε is a randomly
distributed error term. The dependent variable is the percentage of women in parliament.
The institutional variables are Gender quotas, Electoral systems, Regime type, Degree of
political freedom and Political parties. Socioeconomic variables include; percentage of
women in formal labor force, total fertility rate, religion, regions and Per-capita GDP.
Contextual variables include; internal conflict, magnitude of conflict, ratification of
CEDAW, number of years in CEDAW.
The second model tested for the effects of women’s representation in parliament
on public expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP.
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Where: women is the vector for women’s representation, other is the vector for control
variables, α is a parameter,

are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and ε

is a randomly distributed error term. The dependent variable is public expenditure on
health as a percentage of GDP.
The third model tested for the effects of women’s representation in parliament on
public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP.

Where: women is the vector for women’s representation, other is the vector for control
variables, α is a parameter,

are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and ε

is a randomly distributed error term. The dependent variable is public expenditure on
education as a percentage of GDP.
There are two types of econometric models that can be used to analyze Timeseries Cross-sectional data that is fixed effects or random effects. To decide on whether
to use fixed effects model or random effects model I used the Hausman specification test,
which tests whether there is significant correlation between the unobserved specific
random effects and the regressors (Gujurati, 2003). The results of the Hausman
specification test (see Appendix 9) established that there is correlation (chi2 = 152.47, p <
.00) hence, the fixed effects model is the best choice because the random effects model is
inconsistently estimated (Gujurati, 2003) and fixed effects regressions are most
consistent. Fixed effect regressions coefficients represent the impact of the independent
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variables on the dependent variable over time and all purely cross-sectional variation is
absorbed by the intercepts.
There are several implications to adopting this estimation strategy. First, the
model drops out time invariant variables since it only estimates the impact of time variant
variables only. Secondly, the fixed effects model also deflates the effects of the other
independent variables. Thirdly, the use of state-specific intercepts leads to the capture of
all country-specific uniqueness or omitted variables that would otherwise be included in
the model’s error term (Kohler & Kreuter, 2012). In this dissertation variables such as
cultural norms and perceptions of people on women leaders maybe captured in the error
term.
There are also several advantages to using fixed effects model in the present
research context. First, the use of fixed effects model deals with two statistical threats, the
heterogeneity of the dataset as well as the omitted variable bias. ”The fixed-effects model
controls for all time-invariant differences between the countries, so the estimated
coefficients of the fixed-effects models cannot be biased because of omitted timeinvariant characteristics” ( Kohler & Kreuter (2012)). In addition, the use of fixed effects
facilitates estimating the impact of having women in parliament on public policy. The
second part of this dissertation aims at analyzing the substantial representation of women
in parliament. Thus, by using the country fixed effects, the coefficients on the health and
education expenditure variable can be interpreted as indicating whether or not the
inclusion of women in parliament had an impact on the amount of public expenditure on
health and education within a country compared to what would have been observed with
less or no women in parliament (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). After addressing
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heteroskedasticity and omitted variable bias using the fixed effects, I tested the models
for first order serial correlation using a Wooldridge test. The test came out significant
(F(1,50) = 1262.367, p <.0000) and failed to reject the null hypothesis of no first-order
autocorrelation. To correct for possible heteroskedasticity or correlation problems I make
use of fixed effects model with robust standard errors. The use of robust standard errors
helps increase the validity of the results.
I start by presenting the results of the fixed effects model on women’s
representation and then present the results of the fixed effects models on public
expenditure on health and education
Results: Fixed Effects Model on Women’s Representation
One of the objectives of this dissertation is to test new variables identified in
literature as contextual causes for the changes in women’s representation in parliaments
in Africa. As such, the independent variables for the first model are divided into three
groups; institutional variables, contextual variables, and socioeconomic variables. Most
literature on women’s representation identifies socioeconomic and institutional variables
as the predictors of women’s representation. However, recent studies focusing on
developing countries have identified certain contextual factors that explain the increase in
women’s representation. To test the effects of each of these sets of variables, I tested each
set separately starting with a base model (Model A) containing political institutional
variables the model which explains 35% of the variation in the percentage of women in
parliament (r2 = .35). I then added the contextual variables (Model B) and the model
explains 39% of the variation in the percentage of women in parliament (r 2 = .39).
Finally, I added the socioeconomic variables, which also act as the control variables to
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get the full model (Model C). The full model explains 49% of the variation in the
percentage of women in parliament (r2 = .49). The results of the estimates for the three
models are presented in Table 6.4 below.
The coefficients and significance of all sets of variables remained consistent
supporting the relative robustness of the results. The only exceptions are democracy,
which is significant only in Model A and the constant which not significant only in
Model C. The direction of the coefficients did not change and the full model explains the
greatest variation in women’s representation compared to the two previous models. Since
the results of the full model did not differ much from the previous models, it means the
full model is robust to the specification containing all three sets of independent variables.
As such, I present in detail the results of the full model in the following paragraphs.
To test the sensitivity of this empirical analysis I also observed the stability of
coefficients and their significance in different model specifications. Firstly, I observed
the stability of coefficients and their significance from the fixed effects model with robust
standard errors, which corrects for potential heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation and
with those from the model without robust standard errors. The results are presented in
Appendix 10. The results show that the coefficients and their significance for political
institutional variables and contextual variables remain consistent except for one or two
variables indicating the relative robustness of these results. There is more variation in the
coefficients and their significance for socioeconomic variables. There are more
significant socioeconomic variables in the fixed effects model than in the fixed effects
model with robust standard errors suggesting the instability of these variables. To correct
for this instability in control variables I removed some variables that were capturing the
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same concept. The models in Table 6.4 contain some variables that are operationalized in
two different ways such as level of democracy, which is operationalized as regime type
and Polity IV scale. Religion is operationalized as percentage of Christians in a country
and dominant religion. Number of political parties is operationalized as parties with
major seats and parties with seats. Finally, ratification of CEDAW is operationalized as
the number of years since a country ratified CEDAW and weather a country ratified
CEDAW or not. Using these variables together might cause multicollinearity as such I
tested various models using different variables so as to come up with the best-specified
model. As a result, I dropped regime type, percentage of Christians, and major seats. The
use of years in CEDAW or ratification of CEDAW results in different outcomes in
control variables. The use of the variable ratification of CEDAW (Model A in Table 6.5)
results in more significant variables than using years in CEDAW (Model B in Table 6.5).
On the other hand, years in CEDAW is the only significant contextual variable. As such,
I present both models in Table 6.5 to show this difference in variable outcomes but I use
Model A to present the results. The results of the final models are presented in Table 6.5.
The results include the coefficients, standard error (SE), and the significance level for each
independent variable. Model A explains 44% of the variation in the percentage of women

in parliament (r2 overall = .44).
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Table 6.4
Regression Results for Percentage of Women in Parliament
Fixed Effects Model with Robust Standard Errors
Variable

Model A

Model B

Model C

Constant
Total number of parties

7.60*** (1.96)
.31** (.14)

4.64*** (1.89)
.27** (.14)

9.64* (5.95)
.30** (.13)

Parties with seats
Parties major seats

-.2 (.14)
-.15 (.25)

-.24* (.14)
-.14 (.23)

-.28** (.13)
-.10 (.21)

Polity IV scale
Voluntary

-.23 (.16)
6.38*** (1.79)

-.26* (.14)
3.56** (1.72)

-.30** .(,14)
3.26** (1.62)

Legislative
Reserved seats

9.67*** (1.99)
9.43*** (2.48)

6.15** (3.07)
6.92*** (2.11)

6.43** (2.98)
6.55*** (2.11)

Proportional
Mixed

7.36** (2.85)
4.19*** (1.58)

8.0*** (2.6)
4.08*** (1.28)

8.52*** (2.64)
7.64*** (1.94)

No provision
Free

.77 (3.92)
.46 (1.55)

1.92 (4.03)
1.11 (1.37)

3.35 (3.19)
.58 (1.23)

Not free
Autocracy
Democracy

-1.04 (.8)
-1.84 (1.9)
1.93** (.96)

-1.26* (.78)
-.04 (1.98)
.46 (.83)

-1.33* (.80)
-.06 (1.97)
.66 (.85)

Years in CEDAW

.41*** (.06)

.34*** (.19)

Revolutionary
More than one conflict

1.05 (1.79)
.33 (2.94)

.88 (1.78)
-.24 (2.85)

Ethnic
Civil violence
No CEDAW
Mild conflict
Heavy conflict

-1.46 (2.12)
.19 (1.51)
.24 (1.34)
-1.07 (1.50)
-3.23* (1.91)

-1.72 (1.88)
-.1 (1.43)
.25 (1.24)
-.77 (1.39)
-2.36 (1.96)

Labor Participation
Total Fertility
Per Capita GDP
%Christian
South

-.03 (.07)
-1.22 (.98)
0.00** (0.00)
.03 (.09)
-8.17*** (3.13)

East
West
Central
Islam
Traditional religion
No dominant religion

4.4* (2.33)
4.74* (2.83)
.45 (2.89)
1.01 (2.17)
3.29 (2.6)
-2.73 (2.58)

R2

0.35

0.39

0.49

Observations

1068

1063

1063

Notes: *, **,*** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% levels respectively
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The results of the fixed effects model on women’s representation presented in
Table 6.5 confirm the hypothesis that political institutional variables are the main drivers
of women’s representation in Africa. There are 9 significant political institutional
predictors of women’s representation including number of political parties, number of
political parties with seats, voluntary quotas, legislative quotas, reserved seats,
proportional representation, mixed electoral system, Polity IV scale, and not free.
This is the first time the variables total parties and parties with seats have been
tested and both are significant predictors of women’s representation. The variable total
parties has the expected positive effect which shows that multi-party elections help
increase the number of women elected to parliament.
Parties with seats have the expected negative coefficients indicating that countries with
fewer parties with seats in parliament have more women representatives in parliament.
Another surprising result under institutional variables is the variable representing
the Polity IV scale, which is a significant predictor of women’s representation but with
negative coefficients. This means that more countries that are democratic are likely to
witness smaller women’s representation in parliament. These results confirm current
literature, which suggests that periods of instability have facilitated the election of more
women to parliament in Africa. Three dummy variables for gender quotas (voluntary,
legislative, and reserved seats) are also significant predictors of women’s representation.
What is noteworthy is that contrary to previous findings, reserved seats seem to have a
greater impact on women’s representation followed by legislative gender quotas and
lastly voluntary quotas as compared to no quotas.
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Table 6.5
Regression Results for Percentage of Women in Parliament
Fixed Effects Model with Robust Standard Errors
Variable
Model A
17.55*** (5.99)
Constant
.30** (.13)
Total number of parties
-.27** (.14)
Parties with seats
3.74** (1.74)
Gender Quotas: Voluntary
6.74** (2.64)
Legislative
7.32*** (2.32)
Reserved seats
7.96*** (2.32)
Electoral System: Proportional
8.39*** (1.81)
Mixed system
1.94 (2.21)
Other
.12 (1.29)
Political freedom: Free
-1.52** (.71)
Not free
-.19** (.08)
Polity IV scale
Dropped
Ratification of CEDAW: Years in CEDAW
.57 (12.8)
No CEDAW
.37 (1.65)
Conflict type: Ethnic
2.89 (2.81)
Revolutionary
2.39 (2.26)
Civil violence
3.16 (2.52)
no conflict
-.01 (1.33)
Conflict magnitude: Mild
.59 (1.89)
Heavy conflict
.08* (.05)
Control: Labor Participation
-3.35*** (.70)
Total Fertility
.00*** (.00)
Per Capita GDP
.28 (1.67)
slam
.87 (1.39)
Traditional religion
-5.57*** (1.93)
No dominant religion
-11.79*** (3.36)
South
2.62 (2.01)
East
.43 (2.24)
West
-.79 (1.92)
Central
0.46
R-sq: Within
0.45
R-sq: Between
0.44
R-sq: Overall
1063
Observations

Model B
7.5 (6.42)
.30** (13)
-.30** (.14)
3.04 (1.71)
6.23* (1.71)
6.63*** (2.17)
8.24*** (2.26)
7.66*** (1.83)
2.67 (2.67)
1.05 (1.20)
-1.29* (.75)
-.27*** (.07)
.35*** (.10)
Dropped
-.51 (1.64)
2.16 (2.70)
1.27 (2.11)
1.86 (2.45)
-.19 (1.39)
-1.08 (2.01)
-.02 (.06)
-1.06 (.92)
.00 (.00)
.15 (1.49)
2.26 (1.39)
-3.25* (1.74)
-7.94*** (2.92)
4.63** (2.12)
5.74 (2.21)
.94 (1.77)
0.48
0.53
0.50
1063

Notes: *, **,*** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% levels respectively. Model B shows the
effect of using years in CEDAW instead of ratification of CEDAW.
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Not surprisingly, proportional representation is a positive significant predictor of
women’s representation. Research has shown that proportional representation system is
the most favorable electoral system for women. Surprisingly mixed electoral system is
also a positive significant predictor of women’s representation and has a greater impact
than proportional representation. Mixed electoral systems include some level of
proportional representation and that can be helpful to women. The variable not free has
the expected negative coefficient and is a significant predictor of women’s representation.
This means that countries that do not have political freedom tend to have fewer women
representatives in parliament. Finally, the variable free is not a significant predictor of
women’s representation although it has the expected negative coefficient.
It is surprising that there are no significant contextual predictors of women’s
representation. The lack of significant contextual variables is contrary to the hypothesis
that there are factors specific to Africa that are driving women’s representation. The only
significant contextual variable is years in CEDAW as shown in Model B in Table 6.5.
The positive coefficient of years in CEDAW shows that countries that ratified the
convention early tend to have more women in parliament. However using years in
CEDAW instead of ratification of CEDAW reduces the number of significant variables
and as such, Model B is not the best model to use. If I use years in CEDAW instead of
ratification of CEDAW the following variables become insignificant voluntary quotas,
legislative quotas, not free, per-capita GDP, and traditional religion. Unexpectedly the
variable representing the number of years since a country ratified the U.N. treaty of
CEDAW is not a significant predictor of women’s representation. This might be due to
the fact that 98% of African countries have ratified CEDAW so the only difference will
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be when the country ratified CEDAW and not weather the country ratified or not. The
dummy variables for internal conflict and magnitude of conflict are not significant
predictors of women’s representation.
Surprisingly most of the control variables are significant predictors of women’s
representation contrary to previous research, which found socioeconomic variables as
insignificant predictors of women’s representation in Africa. Per-capita GDP is a positive
significant predictor of women’s representation meaning that as per-capita GDP increases
the number of women in parliament also increases. Total fertility is a significant predictor
of women’s representation and as expected, with a negative coefficient sign indicating
that countries with low total fertility are more likely to have higher women’s
representation. Participation of women in the labor force is a positive significant
predictor of women’s representation only at .1 significant levels. This means that as more
women participate in the labor market more women are likely to be elected to parliament.
In line with previous research, dummy variables for religion are not significant. What is
noteworthy is that countries that do not have a dominant religion have a negative
significant relationship with women’s representation. This means that countries that have
a wide variety of religions tend to have fewer women in parliament. Surprisingly
Southern region is a significant predictor of women’s representation with a negative
coefficient. This means that countries that belong to the southern region have fewer
women in parliament compared to other regions. This is surprising since currently there
are four countries in Southern Africa that are in the top ten countries in Africa with high
percentage of women in parliament.

142

Regional Analysis for Women’s Representation
I tested the sensitivity of the results for each region by observing the changes in
coefficients and significance in fixed effects models with robust standard errors for each
region. The results are presented in Table 6.6. The results in Table 6.6 show that there are
different factors driving women’s representation across regions. There are five significant
political institutional variables (total parties, parties with seats, reserved seats, mixed and
other electoral system) under North Africa. The coefficient for total parties has a negative
sign indicating that a decrease in the number of political parties results in more women in
parliament. This is in line with previous research, which showed that too many political
parties are not good for women’s representation because parties will get too few seats,
which will be appointed to male elites, leaving not enough seats for women. The ideal is
to have a few parties that can get enough seats to include women in the party lists.
Unexpectedly parties with seats have a positive coefficient meaning that an increase in
the number of parties with seats lead to an increase in the percentage of women in
parliament.
This idea works to a certain extent because if there are too many parties with seats
the number of seats that each party gets becomes small hence disadvantaging women. As
expected, reserved seats have a positive impact on women’s representation in North
Africa. Reserved seats are the dominant quota type in North Africa.

143

Table 6.6
Regression Results for Percentage of Women in Parliament by Region
Fixed Effects Model with Robust Standard Errors
Variable
Constant
Total number of parties
Parties with seats
Gender Quotas: Voluntary
Legislative
Reserved seats
Electoral System:
Proportional
Mixed system
Other
Political freedom: Free
Not free
Polity IV scale
Ratification of CEDAW:
No CEDAW
Conflict type: Ethnic
Revolutionary
Civil violence
no conflict
Conflict magnitude: Mild
Heavy conflict
Control: Labor
Participation
Total Fertility
Per Capita GDP
slam
Traditional religion

North

South
14.64**
(5.12)

East
-15.86
(17.62)

.46** (.18)

.18 (.28)

.49* (.32)
8.74***
(2.87)

.06 (.52)

Omitted
4.40**
(1.76)

Omitted

-1.71 (2.28)
7.85***
(1.63)
-10.48**
(4.10)
Omitted

5.53** (2.49)
Omitted

Omitted
10.79***
(3.38)
11.75**
(5.10)
11.12**
(4.50)

Omitted
-2.46 (2.16)

.74 (2.36)
3.11 (10.38)

-1.41 (2.15)
-.60* (.33)

-1.05 (1.42)
-.25* (.17)
-4.37**
(2.01)

-4.32* (2.34)
-.41** (.16)

-.86 (1.24)

-3.86 (2.00)
Omitted
-9.78 (8.41)

Omitted

5.29 (3.46)
.04 (2.32)
-9.62**
(3.86)
-9.36***
(3.16)
-10.31***
(3.44)

-.04 (.13)

-.05 (.06)

.31*** (.05)

Omitted
-.72***
(.24)
.73*** (.14)
5.67 (4.08)

2.33 (1.92)
12.10***
(1.48)
1.29 (4.54)
2.76 (4.80)
1.26 (4.22)
1.71 (1.56)

Omitted

-1.29 (.96)

1.10* (.71)

<.01** (.00)

<.01 (.00)

8.13 (11.33)
Omitted

Omitted
2.58 (4.04)
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Omitted

5.21* (2.96)

7.79 (5.25)
8.21**
(3.83)
-.20 (4.58)

-.79 (2.40)
<.01***
(.00)
4.78 (4.10)
-3.58 (4.07)

West
14.21**
(4.95)
.35***
(.12)
-.66***
(.12)
4.89***
(1.21)
7.95***
(1.92)
2.29*
(1.36)
2.23*
(1.27)
6.66***
(1.15)
Omitted
.81 (.94)
-1.98**
(1.02)
-.03 (.12)
.22***
(.06)
.65 (2.77)
2.35 (2.85)
.73 (2.52)
3.92*
(2.17)
1.67 (1.53)
Omitted
-.03 (.03)
-1.32
(1.00)
<.01 (.00)
-.94 (1.76)
-.12 (.97)

Central
29.66***
(8.57)
.29 (.28)
-.30 (.31)
-1.91 (2.70)
11.09***
(3.76)
Omitted
3.71 (3.56)
2.13 (3.49)
Omitted
Omitted
.34 (1.11)
-.19 (.22)
-.81 (2.14)
-3.97 (3.56)
-8.98***
(3.25)
-5.04* (3.11)
-4.70 (3.25)
1.34 (.95)
.45 (1.89)
-.08 (.10)
-2.27 (1.47)
<.01* (.00)
2.27 (2.63)
3.00 (1.99)

Table 6.6—Continued
Variable
No dominant religion

North

South

East

Central

-.55 (2.42)

West
Omitted

Omitted

2.97* (1.96)

R-sq: Within
R-sq: Between
R-sq: Overall

0.69
0.99
0.81

0.65
0.96
0.82

0.47
0.91
0.71

0.49
0.89
0.62

0.24
0.97
0.45

Obs.

126

189

249

336

168

Omitted

There are three significant political institutional variables in Southern Africa
including total parties, voluntary quotas, and proportional representation. The variable
total parties has the expected positive effect which shows that multi-party elections help
increase the number of women elected to parliament. Voluntary quotas and proportional
representation also have the expected positive effect on women’s representation.
Southern Africa has the largest number of countries with voluntary quotas. There are four
significant institutional variables (reserved seats and proportional representation, mixed
electoral system, and Polity IV scale) in the East region. Reserved seats, proportional
representation, and mixed electoral system have the expected positive coefficients, which
mean that the three variables help increase the percentage of women in parliament. The
results on reserved seats are not surprising since reserved seats are the only gender quotas
in East Africa. Polity IV scale has a negative coefficient meaning that more democratic
countries in East Africa are likely to witness smaller women’s representation in
parliament.
There are five significant institutional variables in West Africa; total parties,
parties with seats, voluntary quotas, legislative quotas, mixed electoral system, and not
free. The coefficients for parties with seats and not free have negative signs reflecting
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that countries with few parties with seats in parliament have a higher percentage of
women in parliament and countries that are not free have fewer female representatives in
parliament respectively. Total parties, voluntary quotas, legislative quotas, and mixed
electoral system have the expected positive impact on women’s representation.
Legislative quota is the only significant political institutional variable in Central Africa
and has the expected positive coefficient.
It is important to note that the results for the regional fixed effects models show
the impact of contextual variables more than in the full model presented in Table 6.5. The
effect of internal conflict is evidenced by the significant positive coefficients of ethnic
conflict in North Africa, and mild conflict in East Africa. In these two regions, internal
conflict had a positive impact on women’s representation. These results indicate that
these two types of conflict helped increase the percentage of women in parliament in
these regions hence confirming previous research conducted in developing countries
(Hughes, 2009). However, internal conflict also has a negative impact on women’s
representation as reflected in the negative coefficient of revolutionary conflict in Central
Africa and mild and heavy conflict in Southern Africa.
Another significant contextual variable is No CEDAW in Sothern and Western
region, which has the expected negative coefficient. The negative coefficient for No
CEDAW suggests that countries that did not ratify CEDAW tend to have fewer women
representatives in parliament. The magnitude of the conflict is only significant in North
Africa where both mild and heavy conflicts have negative coefficients suggesting that the
magnitude of conflict leads to fewer women representatives in parliament. Per-capita
GDP and participation of women in the labor market are the only significant
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socioeconomic predictor of women’s representation in North, and East Africa. Per-capita
GDP and participation of women in the labor market have a positive impact on women’s
representation in the three regions.
Results: Women’s Substantive Representation
The second part of the empirical analysis in this study is to examine the
substantive representation of women in parliament. The assumption is that women who
are elected to parliament push for public policies that help the welfare of women. To test
this hypothesis I conducted two fixed effects regression analysis with public health
expenditure and public education expenditure as the dependent variables and women’s
representation as the independent variable. I will present the results for public
expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP first followed by public expenditure on
education as a percentage of GDP.
Results of Fixed Effect Model on Public Expenditure
on Health as a Percentage of GDP
The results for fixed effects model on public expenditure on health are presented
in Table 6.7. To test the sensitivity of the results I observed the stability of coefficients
and significance of the results between two fixed effects models. From the results in
Table 6.7, the coefficients and significance of women’s representation behave
consistently between the two models confirming the relative robustness of the results.
However, some of the control variables are not consistent between the two models. I
present the results of the fixed effects model with robust standard errors, which controls
for possible problems of heteroskedasticity and correlation.

147

The model explains 36%, 28%, and 28% of the within, between, and overall
variation in public expenditure in health as a percentage of GDP respectively. The results
confirm the hypothesis that the election of women to parliament increases public
expenditure on health. The percentage of women in parliament is a positive significant
predictor of public expenditure in health at 0.01 significance levels. The percentage of
women in parliament is the only positive significant predictor of government expenditure
on health as a percentage of GDP.
There are other six variables (mild conflict, heavy conflict, total fertility, percapita GDP, no dominant religion, and Southern region) which are significant predictors
of public expenditure on health but with negative coefficients. The negative coefficients
for mild and heavy conflict suggest that internal conflict reduces the relative size of
government expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP. In addition, the negative
coefficients for Sothern region suggest that countries in these regions spend less in public
expenditure in health as a percentage of GDP. Surprisingly the coefficient for per-capita
GDP also has a negative sign suggesting that countries with high per-capita GDP spend
less on public expenditure in health.
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Table 6.7
Regression Results for Public Expenditure on Health (as % of GDP)
Variable
Fixed effects model with r Fixed Effects model
8.46*** (1.72)
11.84*** (2.00)
Constant
.06*** (.01)
.05*** (.01)
% Women
.01 (.23)
.00 (.02)
Total parties
.03 (.03)
.03 (.02)
Parties with seats
-.57 (.46)
-.62** (.20)
Gender Quotas: Voluntary
-.61 (.60)
-.55** (.28)
Legislative
.73* (.40)
.73*** (.20)
Reserved seats
Electoral System:
Proportional
Mixed system
Other
Political freedom: Free
Not free
Polity IV scale

-.28 (.60)
.28 (.39)
-.107 (.72)
-.68* (.39)
-.38* (.22)
.03 (.03)

Omitted
-.03 (.96)
Omitted
-.76** (.27)
-.38** (.16)
.03 (.02)

Central
R-sq: Within
R-sq: Between

.15 (.29)
-.77* (.45)
.44 (.82)
-.88* (.54)
-.39 (.49)
-.42** (.12)
-.78** (.37)
-.01 (.02)
-.49** (.22)
-<.01** (.00)
.44 (.80)
-.16 (.30)
-1.01** (.04)
-2.2** (.89)
-1.17 (.84)
.65 (.83)
-1.53* (.83)
0.36
0.28

.13 (.244)
-1.27 (.61)
-.06 (.65)
-1.37** (.64)
-.85 (.63)
-.42 (.32)
-.83 (.54)
-.05 (.02)
-.71*** (.15)
-<.01** (.00)
.49 (.51)
-.08 (.22)
-1.32* (.70)
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
0.37
0.01

R-sq: Overall

0.28

0.01

Observations

779

779

Ratification of CEDAW:
No CEDAW
Conflict type: Ethnic
Revolutionary
Civil violence
no conflict
Conflict magnitude: Mild
Heavy conflict
Control: Labor Participation
Total Fertility
Per Capita GDP
Slam
Traditional religion
No dominant religion
South
East
West

Notes: *, **,*** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% levels respectively
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Results of Fixed Effects Model on Public Expenditure
on Education as a Percentage of GDP
The results of the fixed effects model on public expenditure on education are
presented in Table 6.8. The variable public expenditure on education as a percentage of
GDP has too many missing values and as such, many countries were dropped from the
analysis. The problem of a few observations is that the explanatory variables exceed the
degrees of freedom required to model the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables. When I ran the regression for public expenditure on education
with the full set of independent variables, there was not a single significant predictor of
public expenditure on education (see Appendix 10). To solve this problem of few
observations I decided to reduce the number of control variables and included continuous
variables only. Table 6.8 shows the results of the final fixed effects model with robust
standard errors that correct potential problems of heteroskedasticity and auto correlation.
The fixed effects model with robust standard errors explains 28% of the variation in
public expenditure on education (overall R2= .28).
The results in Table 6.8 confirm the hypothesis that percentage of women in
parliament is a positive significant predictor of public expenditure on education. As
percentage of women in parliament increases public expenditure in education also
increases. There are only two other significant predictors of public expenditure on health
that is participation of women in the labor market and total fertility.
Both total fertility and the participation of women in the labor market have
negative coefficients suggesting an inverse relationship with public expenditure on
education. It make sense that when less women participate in the labor market public
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expenditure on health increases because governments will spend more to educate women
so that they are able to participate in the labor market. The negative coefficients for total
fertility are as expected meaning that countries that have women who have less babies
spend less in public education. Low total fertility means a controlled population.
Table 6.8
Regression Results for Public Expenditure on Education (as %
of GDP)
Fixed effects model with r
Fixed Effects model
Variable
10
Women
Total parties
parties with seats
Polity IV scale
Years in CEDAW
Conflict Magnitude
Labor participation
Total fertility
Per-capita GDP
% Christian
R2: Within
R2:Between
R2: Overall
Observations

9.91*** (1.47)
.03** (.01)
.04* (.02)
-.06* (.03)
.03 (.03)
-.01 (.02)
.01 (.09)
-.03** (.01)
-.77*** (.24)
-<.01 (.00)
-<.01 (.01)
0.17
0.23
0.28
448

14.36*** (1.71)
.02** (.01)
.03 (.02)
-.03 (.03)
.02 (.02)
-.01 (.02)
-.01 (.06)
-.08*** (.01)
-.95*** (.2)
-<.01* (.00)
-.02* (.01)
0.2
0.1
0.12
448
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented the bivariate results as well as the results of the
statistical tests used in this dissertation. The bivariate results showed the relationships
between the dependent variables and the independent variables. For the multivariate
analysis, I presented the results of three models. The first model tested the effects of
factors that affect the percentage of women in parliament, the second model tested the
effects of women’s representation on public expenditure in health, and the third model
tested the effects of women’s representation on public expenditure on education. The
results of the first model show that political institutional variables are the main drivers of
women’s representation in Africa. The results of the second and third model showed that
an increase in the number of women in parliament leads to an increase in public
expenditure on health and public expenditure on education respectively. The following
chapter discusses the implications of the results and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The goal of this dissertation was to examine the determinants of women’s
representation in parliament in Africa and to explore the substantive impact of women in
parliament on public policies that affect women. I relied on an extensive literature review
on women’s representation to construct a contextual model that guided this research. I
developed operational variables and hypothesis, which I tested using econometric models
discussed in chapter 4. I presented the results of the descriptive statistics and econometric
tests in chapter 5 and 6 respectively. In this chapter I discuss the major findings of this
dissertation and their implications and make suggestions for future research
Findings on Women’s Representation
Findings from the descriptive analysis show that there has been a rapid increase in
women’s representation over the period 1990 to 2010. There is also a lot of cross-country
variations in women’s representation in Africa. There are a number of countries with very
high average percentages of women in parliament and some with very low average
percentages of women in parliament. The findings also show that reserved seats are a
prevalent type of gender quotas and the plurality majority electoral system is the most
prevalent electoral system in Africa. There has been an increase in the number of
countries experiencing political freedom in Africa over time although majority of the
countries are partially free. There is also evidence of African countries moving away
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from autocratic rule towards democracy although most countries are still in the middle.
Countries involved in internal conflict fluctuate over time but overall the number of
countries not engaged in internal conflict has increased between 1990 and 2010.
Role of Political Institutional Factors
Generally, the results of the first analysis on women’s representation in Africa
appear consistent with patterns uncovered in previous studies however; there are some
new findings that are contrary to my hypothesis. Research has shown that political
institutional factors are the major drivers of women’s representation in both developing
and developed countries (Tripp, 2004, Yoon, 2004, Matland & Taylor, 1997). The results
support most of the hypothesis on political institutional factors outlined in chapter 3.
Consistent with past research the findings show that political institutional variables are
the main drivers of women’s representation in Africa.
The adoption of gender quotas is indeed a significant predictor of women’s
representation and as hypothesized legal gender quotas have more impact on women’s
representation in Africa than voluntary quotas. There are 26 countries in Africa that had
adopted gender quotas by 2010. The most frequent type of quotas are reserved seats
(12/26). It is not surprising that gender quotas are significant predictors of women in
parliament. What is noteworthy about the findings on gender quotas is that reserved seats
have more impact on women’s representation in Africa than voluntary quotas. These
findings confirm Tripp and Kang’s (2008) research on the global impact of quotas, which
found reserved seats as significant predictors of women’s representation in developing
countries. Tripp and Kang (2008) state that research done pre-2000 found that reserved
seats had no positive effect on women’s representation because few countries had
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adopted gender quotas. Findings from this analysis show that indeed reserved seats can
help more women get elected to parliament. Most developing nations including Latin
America and India are adopting legal quotas to fast track the election of women to
parliament (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005). Reserved seats are help women who usually
lack resources because they do not have to compete with men. In addition, reserved seats
are instituted by law and are usually enshrined into the constitution.
Electoral systems are also positive significant determinants of women’s
representation. There are three main types of electoral system including proportional
representation, plurality/majority system, and mixed system. The most frequent electoral
system in Africa is the plurality/majority system (27/53 countries). As hypothesized,
proportional representation is a strong determinant of women’s representation.
Proportional representation (List-PR) is important to the election of women to parliament
because women do not have to campaign on their own, each party controls the placement
of candidates on the party lists, and voters vote for a party, not for a candidate. Consistent
with the findings of this dissertation previous findings have shown that in countries with
the List-PR electoral system there is a greater chance that women will be elected three to
four times more than in other electoral systems (Shvedova, 2006). Notably mixed
electoral system is also a significant predictor of women’s representation in Africa. This
finding on mixed electoral system is unique to Africa, previous studies found that mixed
electoral system work against women because of the use of single member district and
voters vote for a candidate and not the party (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008; Matland,
2005).
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The results also support the hypothesis that multiparty elections significantly
increase the percentage of women in parliament. It is noteworthy that the results on the
number of political parties and political parties with seats are significant predictors of
women’s representation. This is one of the most significant findings emanating from this
dissertation because this is the first time these variables have been tested in Africa and
the results confirm literature, which states that the introduction of multi-party elections in
Africa has worked to the advantage of women. The second wave of democracy around
1990, which is evidenced by the introduction of multi-party elections, is one of the major
causes for the changes in women’s representation in Africa (Yoon, 2001). This is not
surprising because multiparty elections promote competition among political parties,
which in turn helps women to be elected to parliament. Competition among parties forces
political elites to include women on their party lists so as to appeal to the women voter
base (Matland, 1998). However too many political parties are detrimental to women’s
representation because parties will get few seats which leave no room for women.
African countries have been criticized for having too many political parties and
this has worked against women’s representation. The ideal is to have a few major parties
that will have enough safe seats for women (Yoon, 2004). The findings on parties with
seats support this argument that countries with few parties with seats in parliament have
more women in parliament because party leaders have more seats to work with
(Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2008). The variable Parties with seats is a significant predictor
of women’s representation and have a negative coefficient showing that countries with
fewer parties with seats in parliament have more women representatives in parliament.
This makes sense because fewer parties with a higher percentage of seats are more likely
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to see women being elected to the parliament than several parties with fewer seats
(Matland, 2005).
Democratization in Africa has allowed women to participate in politics but studies
that examined the impact of democracy on women’s representation found no significant
relationship between women representation and democracy (Tripp 2004; Reynolds,
Reilly, & Ellis, 2008). Contrary to the hypothesis that democracy increases the number of
women in parliament, the results show that democracy has no effect on women’s
representation. Polity IV scale is a significant predictor of women’s representation but
with a negative coefficient. Polity IV scale measures the stability of political structures
and regime changes. The findings on Polity IV show that countries that are more
democratic are likely to witness fewer women representatives in parliament. These
findings are consistent with Kunovich & Paxton, 2005 and Paxton, 1997 who also found that
democracy has no effect on women’s representation in developing countries. The variable

not free is also a significant predictor of women’s representation in Africa with the
expected negative coefficient. The negative coefficient means that countries that have
little or no political freedom tend to have fewer women in parliament. This means that
political freedom is important to have more women representatives in parliament.
Role of Contextual Factors
The most surprising finding from this dissertation is that most contextual
variables are not significant predictors of women’s representation in Africa. While I
expected to find more institutional variables as significant predictors of women’s
representation in Africa, I also expected to find some significant contextual variables.
One possible reason for this finding is that most of the contextual variables identified in
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the literature review could not be conceptualized in this dissertation. Coming out of
internal conflict is one important contextual factor in explaining women’s representation
in Africa and this was not captured in this dissertation. The role of women’s movements
is another major contextual determinant of women’s representation, which could not be
conceptualized in this dissertation.
The only contextual variable that is a significant predictor of women’s
representation is the number of years in CEDAW, which supports that hypothesis that
early ratification of CEDAW increases women’s representation in parliament. This
finding shows the importance of ratifying CEDAW, which is a UN initiative to promote
women’s causes such as equal participation of women in political decision-making. This
finding is significant in that it is the first time the variable has been tested and it shows
the effect of the treaty on women’s representation. This finding is one example of the
advantages of cross-section time-series analysis which allows understanding of variations
over time. Although by 2010, most countries in Africa (51 out of 53) had ratified
CEDAW the finding shows that the countries that ratified early have an advantage over
those that ratified late. Thus, the length of time in the treaty is the key to increased
women’s representation in Africa. Krook (2007) explains the effect of CEDAW as
international tipping where ratification of CEDAW helped to tip over the debates on
women’s representation in favor of women.
Contrary to my hypothesis, other contextual variables such as internal conflict and
magnitude of conflict are not significant predictors of women’s representation. However,
the findings from the regional analysis show that internal conflict and magnitude of
conflict are positive significant predictors of women’s representation in North, Southern,
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and Central Africa. These findings on regional analysis have important implications for
the explanation of the role of internal conflict in Africa. While there is not much research
on the impact of internal conflict on women’s representation in Africa, one study by
Hughes (2009) showed that heavy conflict has a positive significant impact on women’s
representation in developing countries. The findings show that the impact of internal
conflict on women’s representation is regional. In some regions of Africa, internal
conflict has increased the number of women representatives in parliament.
Role of Socioeconomic Factors
Most previous research did not find socioeconomic variables to be significant
predictors of women’s representation in Africa and other developing countries; rather the
impact of socioeconomic and cultural factors was more significant in industrialized
democracies than Africa. For industrialized democracies gradual empowering of women
through improving education for women, participation of women in the labor market, and
provision of social welfare necessities was the solution to increase women in parliament
(Dahlerup, 2005; Reynolds, 1999; Yoon, 2004). Findings of this study provide little
evidence in support of this argument. The results in this dissertation indicate that
socioeconomic factors are significant in increasing the percentage of women in
parliament in Africa. In this dissertation, four socioeconomic variables are significant
predictors of women’s representation. One explanation for these findings is that recently
most African countries have improved their socioeconomic status for women.
Among the socioeconomic variables total fertility, per-capita GDP, Southern
region and no dominant religion significant predictors of women’s representation in
Africa. As expected total fertility has an inverse relationship with women’s
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representation, which means that countries with women who have fewer babies tend to
have more women in parliament. This is in agreement with literature on women’s
representation, which argues that when women have fewer babies they are free to do
other things including running for office (Reynolds, 1999). The findings on religion were
surprising in that dominant religion is a significant predictor of women’s representation
with a negative coefficient. This means that countries that have a wide variety of
religions tend to have fewer women in parliament. This is an interesting finding since
previous research had only identified Catholicism and Islam as patriarchal religions,
which constrain the political involvement of women (Kenworthy & Malami 1999;
Paxton, Hughes, & Green, 2006). In this dissertation, Christianity and Islam are not
significant predictors of women’s representation in Africa.
As expected per-capita, GDP is a significant positive predictor of women’s
representation. This means that countries with high per-capita GDP have more women in
parliament. Per-capita GDP is a measure of economic development of a country and it is
likely that countries that have more resources will use them to improve the welfare of
their citizens including women. High per-capita GDP may mean better health and
education for women. However, this is not always guaranteed because allocation of
government resources depends on the desires of political elites. Surprisingly Southern
region is a negative significant predictor of women’s representation. The inverse
relationship between Southern region and women’s representation is very surprising since
currently Southern Africa has some of the top ten countries with high percentages of
women in parliament. It is possible however that a few countries are driving the mean
percentage of women in parliament in Southern Africa.
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Findings on the Substantive Representation of Women in Parliament
The results of the second analysis on the substantive representation of women
confirm the hypothesis that the election of women to parliament increases public
expenditure on health and education. These findings are in agreement with literature,
which asserts that female legislators tend to focus on legislation dealing with issues
related to traditional concerns of women such as education, health, and social welfare
since they are categories related to children and family (Chen, 2010). The few studies that
have examined the impact of women in parliament on public policy have found that an
increase in women’s representation leads to an increase in government expenditure in
health, education and social welfare (Clots-Figueras, 2011; Campa, 2011; Funk and
Gathmann 2008). A case in point is the findings by Chen (2010) which showed that an
increase in the share of female legislators by one percentage point increased the ratio of
government expenditures on health and social welfare to GDP by 0.18 and 0.70
percentage points, respectively. The findings from this dissertation show that a
percentage increase in women’s representation increases the ratio of government
expenditure on health and education to GDP by 0.06 and 0.03 percentage points
respectively.
However it is very important to point out that these results are indicative because
there are other factors that affect public expenditure on health and education which are
outside the scope of this dissertation. Factors such as a health crisis may increase public
expenditure on health. International funding on education or health may reduce the
percentage of GDP that goes towards education and health. Although the percentage of
women in parliament is a positive significant predictor of public expenditure in health
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and education, this does not mean that in reality increased women’s representation is the
direct cause of the increase in the expenditure. There is need for further research to
examine the direct impact of women representatives in parliament on public expenditure
on health and education.
It is worth pointing out that there are only 4 other significant predictors of public
spending on health (total fertility, per-capita GDP, no dominant religion, and Southern
region) and they all have negative coefficients. The findings for total fertility are not
surprising because it is expected that countries with women who have fewer babies will
spend less on public health. What is surprising are the findings on per-capita GDP, one
would expect that countries with high per-capita GDP would spend more on public
health. There are only two (participation of women in the labor market and total fertility)
other significant predictors of public expenditure on education and they both have
negative coefficients. The inverse relationship between public expenditure on education
and participation of women in the labor market means that countries that have fewer
women in the labor market tend to spend more on public education. This maybe because
these countries that have fewer women in the labor market feel the need to encourage
more women by providing access to education.
I expected that factors that increase women’s representation would also increase
public expenditure on health and education since their impact will be indirectly through
women’s representation, but the findings show that political institutional variables and
contextual variables are not significant predictors of public expenditure on health or
public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. The findings are not consistent
with previous studies that found gender quotas as positive significant predictors of public
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spending on health and education. Chen (2010) found that on average, countries, after
introducing gender quotas, tend to spend 3.38 percentage points more on social welfare
than those countries without gender quotas. What is important to note on the findings on
substantive representation is that increasing the number of women representatives in
parliament might lead to an increase in the share of public expenditure on health and
education.
Discussion of the Findings
The findings from this study lend more credence to the support that women’s
representation in Africa has risen sharply in the last two decades. Findings in this study
suggest that political institutional factors are the main drivers of women’s representation
in Africa. This has important implications on the sustainability of this trend in the future.
For example, gender quotas seem to be the main driving force behind the increase of
women representatives in parliament. Most importantly reserved seats seem to have a
greater impact on women’s representation than other quota types. There are two main
problem of relying on reserved seats, firstly there is no guarantee that the reserved seats
will always be there and it is not clear what will happen when the reserved seats are
removed. Secondly, women who are appointed through reserved seats have no
constituency, which can provide them with support if they decide to run for office on
their own or if they want to make policy changes. However, despite these problems with
reserved seats there is need for them particularly in Africa where there are so many
institutional barriers to women’s representation. Research has shown that some of the
main barriers to women’s representation are the formal and informal discrimination
against women and as such, reserved seats and legislative quotas have helped women in
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Africa to overcome these barriers. Examples of these barriers include poor economies,
patriarchal culture, electoral systems such as majority electoral systems, male domination
in parliament, and poor education and health facilities for women. A case in point is
Mauritania, which has the plurality/majority electoral system but adopted legislative
quotas in 2006 and was able to increase the percentage of women in parliament from
3.7% in 2005 to 17.9% in 2006. In addition, most countries that came out of conflict such
as Rwanda, South Africa, and Namibia were able to make use of gender quotas and
proportional representation electoral system to increase the number of women in
parliament.
It is also important to note that not only women benefited from reserved seats
other minority groups such as minority ethnic groups, the disabled and farmers were able
to benefit from reserved seats. Another point to note is that gender quotas are necessary
as an initial step towards empowering women to get into parliament. There is evidence
that more women are being elected to parliament through the normal channels and not
through reserved seats. A case in point is Rwanda where only 30% seats are reserved for
women but currently Rwanda has 56% women in parliament meaning that 26% were
elected through normal channels. Thus, one might safely conclude that gender quotas can
act as the spark to women’s representation in Africa.
Institutional political factors have led to the rapid increase in women’s
representation in Africa thus confirming the idea of the fast track model. Contrary to the
critics of the fast track model who argue that women who are appointed to parliament
lack the power to influence public policy that benefit women causes findings from this
dissertations shows that women representatives in Africa have been able to influence
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public expenditure on health and education. However, these findings do not show if
women representatives were able to change the patriarchal nature of parliaments, which
is a hindrance to women’s substantive representation. Furthermore, if women
representatives fail to change the undemocratic practices of governments it is not clear if
they will be able to sustain this trend in women’s representation.
Findings from this dissertation have shown that women’s representation in Africa
has increased regardless of the level of democracy in the country. There are two possible
explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, the adoption of legal gender quotas has
enabled women to succeed even under autocratic regimes. Secondly, according to Yoon
(2001), democratization is a process and most African countries are in the early stage,
which is symbolized by multi-party elections. Thus it is critical that women who are
getting into parliament under these undemocratic governments fight for changes that will
increase their country’s level of democracy and political freedom.
Findings from this dissertation support the world polity theory, which argues that
social change is a result of external social and ideological forces that influence local
decisions (Krook, 2006). Countries that are more connected with other countries tend to
adopt international ideals, which can help women’s causes. The influence of international
ideals is evidenced by the impact of CEDW in Africa. Countries that ratified CEDAW
early have more women in parliament in Africa. Although in this dissertation I was able
to use only one example of international linkage which is ratification of CEDAW it is
possible in future research to test this theory using more examples of international
connectedness such as the role played by the Beijing conference, the role of African
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organizations such as the African Union, and the role played by international
nongovernmental organizations.
Political parties play a major role in the election of women to parliament.
Findings from this dissertation confirm that multi-party elections help women be elected
to parliament. The findings also confirm that a few parties are better than a lot of parties,
because a few parties can get enough seats to include women. Although most African
countries have many political parties, very few parties are able to get seats in parliament
and as such, women have benefited from multiparty elections. However, it is important to
note that one problem with political parties in Africa is that they use the patronage system
where loyalty to the ruling party is more important than rules and regulations. As a result
of the party patronage system women, representatives have to adhere to party ideals so as
to maintain their positions in parliament hence neglecting their role to initiate change.
Several countries came out of conflict between the years 1990 and 2000. Findings
from this study show that internal conflict work for or against women’s representation in
Africa. Some countries such as South Africa, Rwanda, and Namibia were able to
negotiate new constitutions during the post conflict negotiations that helped increase
women’s representation in parliament. However, other countries such as Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and Lesotho were not able to use post conflict negotiations to help the election of
women to parliament. Countries that benefited from conflict had strong women’s
movements, which had women who participated in the negotiations. On the other hand,
some political leaders took the lead in promoting women’s representation so as to gain
support of women. President of Rwanda has been credited for the increase in women’s
representation in Rwanda because of the support he gives to women.
166

Findings from this dissertation confirm the importance of socioeconomic factors
in helping more women get elected to parliament. Improved education, health, and
economic status of women can help more women get elected to parliament. One problem
of relying on socioeconomic factors to increase the number of women in parliament is
that it is a gradual process. History has shown that it takes time to reap the rewards of
improved socioeconomic status of women. In the Scandinavian countries, it took them 70
years to reach 30 percent women in parliament (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005). There is
however need to improve on the education status of women and general socioeconomic
welfare of women in Africa if women are to make great political gains.
The findings from this dissertation also showed that women in parliament have
the potential to positively impact public policies that affect women such as public
expenditure on education and health. Women representatives in parliament are not just a
number as some have suggested, they have the power to change public policy. Increasing
the number of women in parliament can lead to change in public policies that affect
women and children, thus it is of paramount importance to ensure the representation of
women in parliament.
Implications of the Findings
A number of practical implications are plausible based on the findings in this
research. The findings of this dissertation have implications for women in parliament,
local and international women’s movements, governments, political parties, and
international organizations. Women in parliament have an obligation to initiate political
institutional and policy changes that can help more women get elected to parliament.
Women in parliaments in Africa can do well to fight for gender quotas, in particular
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reserved seats and legislative quotas. There is evidence that legal gender quotas can fast
trek the election of women to parliament in Africa. Women representatives in parliament
can also help by changing the electoral system and adopting electoral systems that help
women get elected to parliament such as the proportional representation system. Women
representatives in parliament should also continue to fight for public policies that help
improve the welfare of women so that they can get to levels, which can help promote
women’s representation. Women representatives in parliament have the power to institute
public policies that further the interest of women and should take advantage of this power
to do so.
In addition to institutional changes, women representatives also need to change
the patriarchal culture of most African parliaments by changing the rules and regulations
of policy adoption in parliament. Women representatives and local women movements
need to work together to put pressure on undemocratic governments so that they can
move towards more democratic practices. Local women’s movements together with
international women’s movements can work together to help spread the discourse on
women’s representation in Africa. International connectedness is important for African
countries to adopt international ideals that promote women’s interests. Local women’s
movements can also organize themselves and participate in post conflict negotiations so
that they can enshrine in the constitution institutional factors that help women such as the
proportional representation system and gender quotas.
Local government leaders also need to understand the institutional and structural
barriers to women’s representation and make the necessary changes to help increase the
percentage of women in parliaments. Government leaders are in a very crucial position to
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help improve the status of women in their countries as some African leaders have already
done. Political parties are gatekeepers of women’s representation particularly in countries
that use the proportional representation system. Party leaders control the names of people
on party lists and they can help women by placing their names on top of the list.
Directions for Future Research
Tripp and Kang (2008) argue that previous research on women’s representation
were done using pre-2000 data and as such do not capture the recent developments in
Africa and other developing countries in the world. This dissertation was able to
accomplish that by using recent data that was able to capture and explain this new
phenomenon. However, there are some important factors that I was not able to capture in
this dissertation because of limited data and lack of resources. I was not able to make use
of variables such as cultural perceptions on women in leadership, the role of women’s
movements and role of NGOs. In addition I could not expand on the complexity of the
determinants of women’s representation such as how religion affects internal conflict and
perceptions of the public on women in parliaments. There is need for future research that
is able to capture these very important determinants of women’s representation in Africa.
Also due to data limitations and the methodology used in this dissertation, I was not able
to examine fully the substantive representation of women. Findings from this dissertation
on the substantive representation of women are indicative and not conclusive. I would
suggest a more comprehensive study of the substantive representation of women at a
micro level so as to understand the policy process as well as policy outcomes. A different
methodology is needed that can capture the role women in parliament play in changing
the legislative process and also in changing public policies that affect women. There is
169

also a need to identify proper control variables for public expenditure on health and
education so as to get the full effect of women’s representation.
Although this dissertation used panel data for a period of 21 years (1990 to 2010),
it is necessary to increase the time period by going back in time. This will help to see the
effect of gender quotas by comparing the period before gender quotas and the period
after. This dissertation has laid a foundation on which to build on and has facilitated a
better understanding of the factors that are driving the representation of women in
parliaments in Africa.
Conclusion
This dissertation made a great contribution in understanding the variations in
women’s representation across countries and regions in Africa, and over time. The
findings of this dissertation show that socioeconomic, institutional, and contextual
variables are significant determinants of women’s representation. Institutional factors
such as gender quotas, electoral system, the number of parties, and the seats that each
party has in parliament have a greater impact on women’s representation in Africa. There
are also contextual factors that are unique to Africa which are driving women’s
representation in some African countries. Women in Africa were able to take advantage
of internal conflict to work to their advantage.
This dissertation also showed that women representatives in parliament have the
potential to positively impact public policy changes that affect women such as public
health and education. It is important to point out the need to provide support to women
representatives in parliament so that they can have the capacity they need to make policy
outcome and policy process changes that can help advance the general welfare of women.
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Women have specific needs that are different from men and as such, there is need for
female representatives in parliament who can represent these unique needs of women.
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics for Socioeconomic variables
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev

Total Fertility
Per Capita GDP
%Christian
South
East
West
Central
Islam
Traditional religion

4.40
2508.76
40.37
0.11
0.25
0.17
0.17
0.43
0.04
0.02

1.32 1.47
3614.41 114.8
33.01
0
0.32
0
0.43
0
0.38
0
0.38
0
0.50
0
0.19
0
0.14
0

No dominant religion

Min

186

Max
7.06
1685.39
100
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Observations
53
53
53
53
53
53
53
53
53
53
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Appendix B:
Summary Statistics for %Women for each country
County
Obs. Mean
Std. Dev Min
Max
5.5
1.86
Algeria
21
2.4
7.7
15.45
7.95
Angola
21
9.5
38.6
6.52
2.53
Benin
21
2.9
10.8
10.26
3.96
Botswana
21
5
17
8.35
4.33
Burkina Faso
21
3.7
15.3
16.75
9.15
Burundi
21
6
32.1
10.3
3.27
Cameroon
21
5.6
14.4
12.38
2.97
Cape Verde
21
7.6
18.1
Central African
6.42
2.94
Republic
21
3.5
10.5
6.74
6.01
Chad
21
0
17.3
0.86
1.39
Comoros
21
0
3
7.29
4.6
Congo
21
1.6
14.3
7.44
1.64
Cote d'Ivoire
21
4.6
8.9
5.81
4.2
DRC
21
0
12
4.54
6
Djibouti
21
0
13.8
3.06
2.35
Egypt
21
1.8
12.7
9.97
4.79
Equatorial Guinea
21
5
18
17.48
7.71
Eritrea
21
0
22
9.21
8.23
Ethiopia
21
2
27.8
10.59
3.21
Gabon
21
5.9
16.7
7.91
4.01
Gambia
21
2
13.2
8.99
1.05
Ghana
21
7.9
10.9
12.05
5.92
Guinea
21
7
19.8
12.14
4.43
Guinea Bissau
21
7.8
20
4.77
2.64
Kenya
21
1.1
9.8
9.02
7.29
Lesotho
21
3.8
25
8
2.75
Liberia
21
5.3
12.5
Libyan Arab
1.69
3.16
Jamahiriya
21
0
7.7
5.85
2.43
Madagascar
21
3.6
12.5
9.62
3.96
Malawi
21
5.6
20.8
7.67
4.38
Mali
21
2.3
12
6.3
8.29
Mauritania
21
0
22.1
9.35
4.7
Mauritius
21
5.7
18.8
4.41
5.05
Morocco
21
0
10.8

188

Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and
Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21

27.03
20.3
5.21
5.82
26.56

7.59
7.35
4.64
1.46
19.05

9.03

3

15.48
24.92
9.46
2.37
24.94
10.46
6.06
19.51
5.38
12.13
21.51
10.45
12.89

4.15
4.4
3.94
4.25
11.83
5.38
4.11
7.32
3.37
7.93
5.57
2.97
2.5
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15.7
6.9
1.2
3.4
4.3

39.2
26.9
12.4
7
56.3

1.8
11.7
16
5
0
2.8
5.3
3.1
11.2
1.2
4.3
12.2
6.6
9.3

18.2
22.7
29.4
14.5
15
44.5
25.6
13.8
30.7
11.1
27.6
31.3
15.2
16.7
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Appendix C: African countries in their regions
North
Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Morocco
Sudan
Tunisia

African regions
South
East
West
Botswana
Burundi
Benin
Lesotho
Comoros
Burkina Faso
Malawi
Djibouti
Cape Verde
Mozambique Eritrea
Cote d
Namibia
Ethiopia
Gambia
South Africa Kenya
Ghana
Swaziland
Madagascar Guinea
Zambia
Mauritius
Guinea Bissau
Rwanda
Liberia
Zimbabwe
Seychelles
Mali
Somalia
Mauritania
Tanzania
Niger
Uganda
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
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Central
Angola
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
DRC
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Congo
Sao Tome Principe
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Appendix D:
Summary Statistics for Public expenditure on Health (% of GDP) for each
country
County
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
DRC
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique

Obs. Mean
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
0
16

Std. Dev

3.78
2.68
4.48
6.21
5.53
8.83
4.72
4.66
3.82
5.31
5.57
2.69
5.04
5.5
6.06
5.12
3.22
3.93
4.14
2.99
5.8
5.32
5.49
6.44
4.43
7.74
7.35
3.43
3.66
6.31
6.1
4.82
4.26
0
5.15

0.4
0.82
0.21
1.94
0.84
3.29
0.33
0.36
0.19
1.07
0.63
0.37
0.9
1.66
1.25
0.58
1.41
0.81
0.67
0.35
0.35
0.64
0.28
0.97
0.21
1.22
3.22
0.62
0.44
1.28
0.68
0.81
0.81
0
0.57
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Min

Max
3.06
1.86
4.1
3.85
4.3
5.31
3.86
3.85
3.47
3.57
2.3
2.11
3.46
3.46
4
3.86
1.7
2.66
2.94
2.5
5.18
4.4
4.93
5.55
4.1
6.27
4.77
2.37
2.8
4.66
4.98
3.51
3.44
0
4.09

4.58
4.95
4.75
10.04
6.74
14.25
5.16
5.1
4.1
8.01
4.53
3.64
6.58
9.59
7.85
6.13
5.89
5.26
4.91
3.59
6.28
7.02
6.04
8.56
4.77
11.08
12.21
4.85
4.49
8.99
7.84
5.96
6
0
5.97

Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
7
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
7

6.7
4.32
5.43
6.6
8.62
4.98
4.52
13.6
2.58
8.6
4.54
5.74
4.25
5.72
6
7.3
6.18
8.87

0.4
1.01
0.88
0.52
1.22
0.74
0.83
1.95
0.19
0.43
1.33
0.56
1.14
1.08
0.23
1.23
0.41
1.19
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6.11
3.19
3.91
4.18
7.02
3.93
3.29
7.77
2.25
7.49
3.36
4.96
3.29
4.56
5.64
5.32
5.6
7.44

7.32
6.05
6.96
10.77
10.89
5.83
5.85
16.01
2.81
9.16
7.33
6.72
6.53
7.65
6.35
9.01
7
10.8
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Appendix E: Summary statistics for public expenditure on education
Country

Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
CAR
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
DRC
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Lybia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger

Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
4.34
0 4.34
1
4.34
2.71
0.29 2.56
7
3.38
3.61
0.49
12
2.89
4.51
7.61
1.26
6
5.74
9.52
3.74
1.21
6
1.44
4.59
4.9
1.8
16
3.24
9.24
3.06
0.43
14
1.93
3.65
6.4
1.1
9
4.38
7.88
1.58
0.32
14
1.19
2.23
2.43
0.58
9
1.59
3.23
5.07
2.2 3.78
3
7.61
3.97
1.73 1.84
8
6.37
4.51
0.85 3.74
17
6.78
2.5
0 2.5
1
2.5
8.02
1.71 3.47
10
9.66
4.36
0.43 3.68
11
4.95
0.85
0.52 0.58
5
1.78
3.52
1.16 1.64
9
5.26
4.09
1.14 2.37
11
5.53
3.28
0.44 2.81
4
3.83
3.48
1.14 2.02
13
5.28
5.27
0.53
7
4.11
5.74
2.19
0.24
12
1.85
2.51
5.24
0
1
5.25
5.25
6.22
0.69
13
5.19
7.34
12.54
2.18
13
8.32
16.06
2.77
0 2.77
1
2.77
2.67
0 2.67
1
2.67
2.89
0.58 1.85
14
3.85
4.53
0.7 3.27
8
5.31
3.79
0.54 2.98
11
4.47
3.01
0.71 2.34
9
4.33
3.64
0.51 3.1
13
4.48
5.51
0.21 4.99
14
5.8
4.13
1.18 2.31
5
5.2
7.04
0.86 6.04
8
8.13
3.22
0.56 2.4
17
4.6

196

Nigeria
Rwanda
S T and P
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

2
8
0
12
9
9
0
17
2
15
4
15
18
4
14
4

0.84
4.12
0
4.14
6.31
4.16
0
5.51
10.3
6.2
4.27
4.07
6.26
3.58
1.96
3.37

0.02
0.98
0
1
1.47
0.66
0
0.36
2.57
1.08
2.6
0.57
0.31
1
0.51
1.14
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0.83
2.57
0
3.15
5.01
3.09
0
5.06
8.51
4.94
1.95
3.4
5.75
2.46
0.8
2.27

0.86
5.67
0
5.63
9.02
4.95
0
6.07
12.15
8.06
6.83
5.68
6.82
4.95
2.82
4.41
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Appendix F: African countries with quotas (26 out of
53)
Legislative
Candidate
Reserved
Voluntary Quotas Quotas
Seats
Algeria
Angola
Burundi
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Djibouti
Cameroon
Mauritania
Egypt
Côte d'Ivoire
Senegal
Eretria
Mali
Kenya
Mozambique
Morocco
Namibia
Niger
South Africa
Rwanda
Tunisia
Somalia
Zimbabwe
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
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Appendix G: African countries and their Electoral system
Electoral Systems in Africa
Proportional
Representation

Plurality/majority

Mixed

Rwanda
South
Africa
Mozambiq
ue

List PR

Uganda

List PR

Tanzania

List PR

Ethiopia

FPT
P
FPT
P
FPT
P

Angola

List PR

Mauritania

TRS Senegal

Burundi

List PR

Malawi

Namibia

List PR

Mauritius

Lesotho
Sao Tome
Cape
Verde
Burkina
Faso

MMP
List PR

Zimbabwe
Gabon

List PR

Zambia

List PR

Djibouti

Benin

List PR

Morocco
Equatorial
Guinea
Guinea
Bissau

List PR

Swaziland
Sierra
Leone

TRS Guinea
Camero
BV on
FPT
P
TRS
FPT
P
PB
V
FPT
P
FPT
P

List PR

Egypt

List PR

Niger
Algeria

List PR
List PR

Liberia
Madagasca
r
Togo
Mali
Kenya
Central
Africa
Republic
Cote
d'Ivoire
Ghana

TRS
FPT
P
FPT
P
TRS
TRS
FPT
P

TRS
FPT
P
FPT
P
201

Tunisia
Sudan
Seychell
es

No Provision

Parall
el
Parall
el
Parall
el
Parall
el
Parall
el
Parall
el

Eritrea

N

DRC
Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya

N

Somalia

N

N

Botswana
Gambia
Congo
Nigeria
Chad
Comoros

FPT
P
FPT
P
TRS
FPT
P
PB
V
TRS

Source: ACE Project IDEA retrieved from http//aceproject.org/
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Appendix H: Summary statistics for all continuous variables (19902010)
Variable
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
% Women
10.42
8.41
0
56.3
Health expenditure
5.43
2.19 1.7 16.01
Education expenditure
4.51
2.27 0.58 16.06
Total number of parties
6.42
6.83
0
68
Parties with seats
5.05
6.07
0
68
Polity IV scale
10.95
5.53
1
21
Years in CEDAW
11.03
7.78
0
30
Female labour participation
57.25
20.49 9.9
90.7
Total Fertility
5.09
1.35 1.47
7.81
Per Capita GDP
%Christian

37.68

32.37
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0

100

Obs.
1113
811
466
1113
1113
1068
1113
1092
1107
1113
1113
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Appendix I: Housman test regression results
Variable

Fixed Effects

Random Effects

Constant

40.71*** (5.40)

18.11*** (3.74)

Total number of parties

.22** (.07)

.30*** (.07)

Parties with seats

-.21** (.07)

-.27*** (.07)

Gender Quotas: Voluntary

3.10*** (.70)

3.74*** (.69)

Legislative

6.22*** (1.07)

6.74*** (1.07)

Reserved seats

6.37*** (.66)

7.32*** (.65)

Electoral System: Proportional

21.07*** (2.77)

7.96*** (1.33)

Mixed system

4.18 (4.32)

8.39*** (1.94)

Other

Omitted

1.94 (2.89)

Political freedom: Free

-1.26 (.89)

.12 (.84)

Not free

-1.56** (.47)

-1.52** (.48)

Polity IV scale

-.16** (.06)

-.19** (.06)

Ratification of CEDAW: Years in CEDAW
Yes CEDAW

-1.05* (.59)

-.57 (.60)

Conflict type: Ethnic

-.63 (1.59)

.37 (1.52)

Revolutionary

1,48 (1.77)

2.89 (1.66)

Civil violence

.90 (1.81)

2.39 (1.72)

no conflict

.80 (1.88)

3.16* (1.71)

Conflict magnitude: Mild

-1.19 (1.08)

.01 (1.07)

Heavy conflict

-1.09 (1.73)

.59 (1.69)

Control: Labor Participation

-.19*** (.06)

.08* (.03)

Total Fertility

4.88*** (.39)

-3.35*** (.33)

Per Capita GDP

.00*** (.00)

.00*** (.00)

slam

,17 (1.28)

.28 (1.11)

Traditional religion

1.25 (.82)

.87 (.80)

No dominant religion

-6.42* (3.12)

-5.57* (2.38)

South

Omitted

-11.79*** (2.70)

East

Omitted

2.62 (1.85)

West

Omitted

.43 (2.04)

Central

Omitted

.79 (2.06)

R-sq: Within

0.48

0.46

R-sq: Between

0.02

0.45

R-sq: Overall

0.07

0.44

1068

1068

Observations
2

Housman test (chi = 152.47,
p < .00)
Notes: *, **,*** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% levels respectively.
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Appendix J: Regression results for Women’s representation (full
model)
Fixed Effects
Fixed effects with r
Variable
model
model
Constant
9.64* (5.95)
23.11*** (5.43)
Total parties
.30** (.13)
.21*** (.07)
Parties with seats
-.28** (.13)
-.20** (.08)
Parties major seats -.10 (.21)
-.11 (.13)
Polity IV scale
-.30** .(,14)
-.28*** (.08)
Voluntary
3.26** (1.62)
2.64*** (.71)
Legislative
6.43** (2.98)
6.49*** (1.09)
Reserved seats
6.55*** (2.11)
5.91*** (.65)
Proportional
8.52*** (2.64)
21.73*** (2.73)
Mixed
No provision

7.64*** (1.94)
3.35 (3.19)

2.08 (4.26)
Omitted

Free
Not free

.58 (1.23)
-1.33* (.08)

-1.01 (.92)
-1.23** (.47)

Autocracy

-.06 (1.97)

-.55 (.66)

Democracy

.66 (.85)

.96 (.75)

Years in CEDAW
Revolutionary

.34*** (.19)
.88 (1.78)
-.24 (2.85)
-1.72 (1.88)
-.1 (1.43)
.25 (1.24)
-.77 (1.39)

.30*** (.05)
.15 (1.30)
2.68 (1.84)
-.34 (1.14)
.66 (1.30)
.48 (.60)
-1.77* (1.03)

Heavy conflict
Labor
Participation
Total Fertility
Per Capita GDP
% Christian
South
East

-2.36 (1.96)

-3.96** (1.65)

-.03 (.07)

-.25*** (.06)

-1.22 (.98)
0.00** (0.00)
.03 (.09)
-8.17*** (3.13)
4.4* (2.33)

-2.44*** (.56)
.00 (.00)
.08** (.03)
Omitted
Omitted

West
Central
Islam
Traditional
No dominant
religion
R2

4.74* (2.83)
.45 (2.89)
1.01 (2.17)
3.29 (2.6)

Omitted
Omitted
.10 (1.32)
4.02*** (1.11)

-2.73 (2.58)

-4.60 (3.08)

More than one conflict

Ethnic
Civil violence
No CEDAW
Mild conflict

Observations

0.49

0.09

1063

1063
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Appendix K: Regression results for Public expenditure on education
Variable
Full Model
Constant
10.78 (1.47)
% Women
.01 (.01)
Total parties
.07 (.02)
Parties with seats
-.07** (.03)
Gender Quotas: Voluntary
-.16 (.31)
Legislative
1.23** (.39)
Reserved seats
.5 (.37)
Electoral System: PPR
-.26 (.49)
Mixed system
.87 (.71)
Other
-.88 (.79)
Political freedom: Free
.12 (.41)
Not free
-.12 (.21)
Polity IV scale
.00 (.03)
Ratification of CEDAW: No
-.08 (.35)
CEDAW
Conflict type: Ethnic
-.22 (.57)
Revolutionary
.48 (.56)
Civil violence
-.37 (.48)
no conflict
-.03 (.45)
Conflict magnitude: Mild
.14 (.44)
Heavy conflict
2.37** (1.07)
Control: Labor Participation
-.04 (.01)
Total Fertility
-.74 (.23)
Per Capita GDP
-.00 (.00)
slam
-1.34 (.73)
Traditional religion
.07 (.31)
No dominant religion
-1.31 (.72)
South
-.48 (1.03)
East
.89 (.68)
West
1.15 (1.02)
Central
-1.37 (.70)
2
R : Within
0.23
R2: Between
0.47
2
R : Overall
0.4
Observations
457
Notes: *, **,*** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% levels
respectively
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